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COPYRIGHT 2002 Southern Public Administration Education Foundation, Inc.
Abstract
Although economic problems and political developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s had already started to sap its political import and erode its electoral support, since the fall of state socialism in 1989 the French Communist Party (PCF) has found itself in an even more severe identity crisis. Much of its decline can be traced to its inability to effectively define itself ideologically and its corresponding inability to formulate an attractive and relevant set of policy positions. This article presents an overview of the historical evolution of the PCF from its zenith of political relevance to its recent delicine, paying special attention to the PCF's attempt in the face of political oblivion to delineate distinctive and effective political strategies and political programs.
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Communist political parties have faced unusual difficulties in establishing identities and distinctive political programs and agendas in the aftermath of communism's collapse in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Even before this great revolution, economic problems and political developments had discredited the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It was that ideology that gave focus and distinction to Communist parties whether they exercised power in countries that they dominated or sought it in competitive western democracies and unstable developing countries (Wilson, 1993). Communism no longer appeared as a sustainable option to capitalism; Leninism and Stalinism could not compete as attractive or viable alternatives to western-style democracy (Rose et al, 1998). Faced with political oblivion, Communist parties have hunted for new ways to define themselves for voters and political leaders.
Nowhere has this quest for a new identity and program been as difficult and as fruitless as in France. The French Communist party (PCF) was once among the top two or three competitors for power in that country and among the largest and most important Communist party outside the Soviet bloc. It now struggles to elect enough deputies to the National Assembly to qualify for its own parliamentary group. Once a major force in local politics, it tottered on the brink of irrelevance in the 2001 municipal elections. Much of this decline comes from the loss of its ideology and its inability to formulate an attractive alternative dogma and policies. This article will examine the PCF's efforts to delineate a distinctive and effective political program and strategy.
Programs and Parties in the New Century
It is not just Communist parties that have struggled to retain distinctive identities in recent years. The decline of ideology that began soon after World War II as intellectuals and citizens reacted against the extremes that ideologies had produced in the 1930s and 1940s (Bell, 1960). Political ideologies that offered all-explaining, rational, and revolutionary solutions to society's problems lost favor to more pragmatic politics based on meliorating policies achieved through muddling through. This trend away from comprehensive and millenarian ideologies affected Communist parties in and out of power. The decline of ideological fervor and conviction contributed to the spread of corruption in Communist countries. In democratic countries, Communist parties found their ideologies to be obstacles to broadening their electoral appeal. There, competing parties carried little ideological baggage and relied less and less on clearly defined party programs.
The tendency to move away from ideologies or even clear party programs continued through the 1970s and 1980s as democratic parties sought to maximize their electoral appeal. In the past fifteen years, political parties in established democracies have undergone significant transformation in their basic organization, strategies, and tactics (Katz and Mair, 1995). These changes have reflected new cultural values and attitudes, political changes, socioeconomic alterations, and changes in the terms competition facing these parties and their societies. While some observers maintain that the process is one of political party decline, it is more accurately a process of adaptation through trial-and-error to respond to new features of contemporary society. Parties are becoming little more than labels that candidates for public office may use as they seek election to public offices. The parties' democratic function of setting policy agendas is now little more than listening to the advice of pollsters and the "findings" of focus groups. Parties pay less attention to linking citizens with government now than to providing "service-oriented" organizations of professional vote-getting machines to aspiring candidates. Party bureaucracies remain important even as individual party membership has declined because they provide technical expertise, campaign management, survey research, and public relations skills to their parties' candidates. Party officials also play key roles in raising and allocating the vast public and private funds needed to run modern election campaigns. Modern parties are becoming more and more "client-serving" organizations than vehicles to present alternative ideas and policies to the public.
The flight from policy and program is stimulated in part by the recognition that voters make their choices less on the campaign issues than on established party loyalties and traditional cleavages, even when those cleavages have lost significance in the contemporary world. After World War II, political and socioeconomic leaders embraced a consensus on state planning and management of the economy, a mixed economy of public and private enterprises, and a generous social-welfare state (Zysman, 1977). It was a dominant but not unchallenged viewpoint, supported broadly by elites and masses for nearly 30 years. Which parties could best establish and implement these policies became the heart of public debate and electioneering in most western industrial democracies. The state's role in the economy and society came under attack in the mid- to late 1970s when Keynesian economics failed to control simultaneous recession and inflation. The costs of social welfare programs exploded as they became more generous and more widely used at the same time that the size of the working force that paid for them stabilized and then began to decrease.
By the 1980s, most industrialized democracies had begun to retreat from the postwar socioeconomic consensus. High costs of social services, large state deficits, stagnant economies, and growing economic competition from low-cost labor areas threatened long-term economic decline and un-employment. Above all, unification of European economies in the European Community (now the European Union) required the elimination of competitive advantages bestowed by differing patterns of state subsidies and government regulation among its member states (McGowan, 1996). In addition, the rise of a new generation of people who had not experienced war and depression gave higher priority to esthetic and individual freedoms than had earlier generations (Inglehart, 1990). The new "postmaterialist values" wrought important social and political changes and reordered policy priorities in many advanced industrial democracies (Inglehart, 1997). These cultural changes prompted a reaction from the far Right. Extreme rightists in several European countries exploited racial antagonisms against immigrants, urban decay, fears of globalization, and eventually populist resistance to economic changes to carve out their own, sometimes large, electorates (Betz, 1998). None of these three challenges to the postwar social-welfare state consensus-the neo-liberal socio-economic agenda, new post-modern political and cultural values, and the counterrevolution from the far Right-has yet won the endorsement of a popular consensus in any major industrial social-welfare state. Nor have they entirely supplanted the older social and political cleavages. They compete with each other and the older cleavages in a political party setting where policy is declining as a mobilizing force for voters and members.
Neo-liberalism, postmodern values, and populist reaction have nevertheless introduced issues and policies that have come to dominate politics and policy-making in many industrialized societies. Positions on these issues often cut through the established parties that have dominated politics over the past fifty years or more. Hence, parties often play down such issues in their platforms since these new issues may divide their own ranks. In addition, the new themes have not yet proven to be successful in mobilizing voters. Political parties often invoke these new themes in their campaigns but their commitment to them is marginal, often contradictory, and expedient rather than principled. Parties of both the Right and Left (1) claim to have defined a "third way" but the policy content of the third way is unclear, changing, and by no means supported by a public consensus (Wilson, 1998; Giddens, 1998). It is in such an era of incoherent and unwanted policy programs among political parties in general that the French Communist party seeks to find a program that will give it specific meaning and prevent its disappearance from the French political scene.
The Rise of the French Communists
The PCF is the oldest functioning party in France. It was formed in 1920 when the majority of the French Socialist party of the era, the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO), accepted the Moscow-dominated Third International and its Twenty-One Conditions. Now known as the French Communist party (PCF), it soon became one of the most loyal Communist parties in backing the Soviet model of political and socioeconomic development and in supporting Moscow's foreign policies. It was also among the largest Communist parties in Europe. As one analyst noted, the French Communist party "was, and is, a party of a wholly different type" committed to the interests of a revolutionary movement more than to its winning elections (Bell and Criddle, 1994: p. 2).
On several occasions during its history, the PCF has shifted from hardline to more conciliatory platforms (Tiersky, 1974). In the past, these strategic shifts were dictated by Moscow; more recently policy shifts have been the calculations of the party's own leaders. As the Cold War developed in the late 1940s, the PCF showed no hesitation in aligning with Moscow. The PCF's advocacy of Moscow and its call for revolution in France soon isolated it in a ghetto on the fringes of mainstream domestic politics. The Soviet Union remained always its model and master; East European Communist states were "the future that works." But these ideas and the party's isolation in French domestic politics did not prevent the PCF from having a major impact on France from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s.
Influence without Power
The Communist party's ghetto position in French politic kept the party out of government. But it did not prevent it from exercising influence over the content of...
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