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Previous research suggested that an individual's capacity to self-regulate is limited, and easily depleted. The strength, or resource, model posits that self-regulation operates like a muscle, fatiguing after use and requiring rest. We attempted to replicate studies that supported this model. In Experiment 1, participants completed the Stroop task (requiring self-regulation), and then squeezed a handgrip exerciser as long as they could (a measure of self-regulatory depletion). In Experiment 2, participants were instructed NOT to think about a white bear as they wrote down their thoughts; depletion was then measured by time working on difficult anagrams. Self-regulatory depletion was not evident in either study. A new model for understanding the key psychological process of self-regulation may be needed.
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The self is often conceptualized as the executive agent of the personality, responsible for regulating an individual's activities (see, for example, Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 1998). This sometimes involves suppressing or over-riding immediate impulses or needs, and choosing a behavior that is more appropriate to the individual's long-term goals. Research on self-regulation has focused on the individual's capacity to monitor and modify behavior, cognition, and affect (and, sometimes, the individual's environment), in order to achieve a goal (Efklides, Niemivirta & Yamauchi, 2002). The latter authors point out that self-regulation has been seen in the research literature as relevant to various lines of research, including metacognition, achievement goals, intrinsic motivation, action control, appraisal processes, autonomy and self-determination in goal-setting, and cognitive or metacognitive strategy use in the implementation of goals.
There are definitional and conceptual issues to be clarified in research on self-regulation. As Boekaerts, Pintrich, and Zeidner (2000) note in their edited volume Handbook of Self-Regulation, "self-regulation is a very difficult construct to define theoretically as well as to operationalize empirically" (p. 4). Their Handbook presents multiple definitions of self-regulation, and the editors' conclusions include recommendations that a "common theoretical framework and nomenclature of constructs" be developed through future research.
One of the areas in need of clarification is the relationship between self-regulation and self-control. One distinction between the terms was made by Diaz, Neal, and Amaya-Williams (1990, as cited in Barkley, 1997); these authors construe self-control rather narrowly, as "a developmentally earlier form of self-regulation in which a child simply repeats and then obeys an adult command in the absence of the caregiver" (as described by Barkley, 1997, pp. 55-56). These authors see self-regulation, on the other hand, as "more complex behavior involving self-generated plans and flexible adaptation to the changing demands of a task" (as described by Barkley, 1997, p. 56).
Another distinction between self-regulation and self-control was implied by Baumeister and colleagues (1998) in discussing the results of one set of studies. These authors state that "some internal resource is used by the self to make decisions, respond actively, and exert self-control" (p. 1263). In this sense, self-regulation might be seen as the broader term (the internal resource), including self-control as well as active responding and decision-making.
In the same article, however, Baumeister and colleagues use the terms "self-control" and "self-regulation" interchangeably at times, making no clear distinctions between them, as do many other studies investigating the strength model (Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Baumeister & Mick, 2002; Baumeister et al., 2000; Muraven et al., 1999; Muraven et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Russell Barkley, in ADHD and the Nature of Self-Control (1997), also uses the two terms interchangeably, noting that this has been the practice in the previous literature in that area. The term "self-control" is being interpreted by these authors in a broad sense, and is not seen as equivalent to impulse control (although the latter is clearly one part of self-regulation or self-control). According to Baumeister and Mick (2002), both self-regulation and self-control "refer to the self's capacity to alter its own states and responses" (p. 670-671).
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to resolve these conceptual issues; we will consistently use the term "self-regulation", both because it seems more appropriate to the broad processes of interest to us, and also because this is the term used more often in previous studies in this area.
Self-regulation appears to be central to effective functioning in a number of ways--e.g., in impulse control, time management, and coping with emotions or stress. Many clinical conditions, such as anxiety, depression, or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, may be viewed as limiting and restricting the individual's ability to self-regulate and cope with everyday challenges and stress (see, for example, Barkley, 1997). Clarifying the nature of this active self, then, is of paramount importance for understanding a variety of phenomena related to educational and clinical contexts, as well as everyday functioning, and has implications at both personal and societal levels.
Some researchers have suggested an explanation for the observation that individuals often fail to self-regulate at times when self-regulation would be to their advantage. According to the strength model (also known as the ego-strength model or resource model),self-regulation might operate like a muscle that fatigues after use and then requires rest. The strength model posits that various acts of self-regulation (cognitive, emotional, and behavioral) all draw upon one, limited supply. Baumeister, Muraven and Tice (2000) concluded that all acts involving self-control, volition, or initiative rely on this resource. In addition, the strength model proposes that this resource is easily depleted (Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998).
The strength model has found some support in the literature; in a number of studies, when individuals were asked to engage in tasks involving self-regulation, their ability to self-regulate in subsequent activities significantly declined (Baumeister et al., 1998; Kahan, Polivy & Herman, 2003; Muraven et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). In a similar way, with longer tasks demanding self-regulation, performance has been found to decline over time (Smit, Eling, & Coenen, 2004). This depletion of self-regulatory capacity was reported across a variety of tasks in physical, intellectual, and emotional domains. Other research has suggested that this resource--again, like a muscle--may be strengthened with certain types of practice (Muraven, Baumeister & Tice, 1999).
The present studies attempted to replicate and extend the findings of previous research related to the strength model. In the first experiment, we utilized a new approach to the manipulation of self-regulation, a computerized version of the Stroop Color and Word Test (Golden, 1978). (The Stroop task has since been used to manipulate "energy resources" in another study; see Wallace and Baumeister, 2002). Requiring considerable conscious effort, the Stroop task would clearly be expected to draw on self-regulatory capacity. The experimental group worked on Stroop (and related) tasks for approximately 15 minutes, while the control group performed a more automatic computer task for the same amount of time. A simple handgrip exerciser was used to assess self-regulatory capacity (as used in previous...
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