New strategy for U.S. military action?(The Orlando Sentinel)

Byline: John C. Bersia

The burden of whether to intervene or not to intervene militarily in other countries has rested on the shoulders of U.S. presidents throughout history. And it settles with particular weight upon President George W. Bush at the dawn of his second term.

In 2005, the world is not the safe and prosperous place that the end of the Cold War seemed to promise. It teems with miscreants, from petty dictators to troublemakers who scheme to obtain weapons of mass destruction to terrorists with global reach.

All bear watching; not all warrant a response. In dealing with those current and emerging threats, the Bush administration has an obligation to develop clearer guidelines for potential U.S. military action.

Bush's thinking about global challenges has evolved significantly since the period before he took office. At that time, his attitude toward the world appeared more hands-off than engaged. He expressed little interest in the idea of intervening abroad _ although the possibility of making an exception in Iraq was never a secret _ and even less in nation-building. Today, Bush displays a strong record of both, driven in large part by the 9-11 tragedy, with indications that more may come.

A year after unveiling the "axis of evil" cluster _ Iran, Iraq and North Korea _ in early 2002, the president ordered the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. Now the axis _ minus Iraq _ has grown and resides under a new umbrella, the "outposts of tyranny," with Belarus, Burma, Cuba and Zimbabwe as additions. Using a similar time frame and assuming a reasonably favorable aftermath to Iraq's elections, should one realistically expect U.S.-led interventions in Iran and other "outposts" by this time in 2006?

As the White House requests billions of additional dollars to finance existing military campaigns, Americans have a right to know what else might loom on the horizon. They also deserve more than passing attention to the rationale for those planned or anticipated interventions. In light of the missteps in Iraq, the evidence, justification and other compelling factors must be substantial, verifiable and accurate.