Seeing oneself through the eyes of the other: asymmetrical reciprocity and self-respect.

Iris Marion Young argues we cannot understand others' experiences by imagining ourselves in their place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity (1997a). For Young, reciprocity expresses moral respect and asymmetry arises from people's greatly varying life histories and social positions. La Caze argues there are problems with Young's articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the gift. By discussing friendship and political representation, she shows how taking self-respect into account complicates asymmetrical reciprocity.

**********

In her essay "Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought," Iris Marion Young argues that we cannot understand others' experiences simply by imagining ourselves in others' place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity, which is merely a projection of the self's perspective onto that of the other (1997a). She develops her idea of asymmetrical reciprocity by drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Luce Irigaray, Hannah Arendt, and Jacques Derrida. For Young, reciprocity expresses moral respect and means "that each acknowledges and takes account of the other" without assuming their perspective (1997a, 41). The asymmetry or lack of reversibility arises from people's different life histories and social positions, which vary by sex, age, ability, and culture, for example.

Critics of Young have claimed that she argues people cannot understand each other (Simpson 2001) or that she fails to recognize the significance of distinct bodily existence to asymmetry (Stoller 2005). As I explain in the paper, the first criticism misinterprets Young and the second is addressed in many of Young's other works. My view is that asymmetrical reciprocity is an important concept for thinking about relations between self and other and has implications for both ethics and political philosophy. However, I argue that there are some problems with Young's articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the gift, problems that center on her neglect of the difference between wonder and respect and her neglect of the significance of self-respect. Using the examples of friendship and political representation, I show how taking self-respect into account complicates and refines the picture of asymmetrical reciprocity because it prevents us from conceiving the asymmetry between people as self-sacrificial, an issue of special concern to feminists. Understanding friendship as a spontaneous gift suggests that the other owes nothing to the self and there can be no expectations. I contend that this conception implies a lack of self-respect and destroys any idea of the commitment and responsibility essential to friendships. In relation to political representation, I argue that self-respect demands that we are reflective and critical of the experience and views that we claim to represent as members of oppressed groups, as they may have been shaped by oppression.

WHAT IS ASYMMETRICAL RECIPROCITY?

First, I wish to explicate Young's concept of asymmetrical reciprocity. Her essay begins from a critique of Seyla Benhabib's view that moral respect consists in a symmetrical relation of reversibility, where we take the perspective of the other by imaginatively representing their perspective to ourselves (1991, 32, 136-37). While Young acknowledges that this imaginative process can sometimes be useful, she believes problems arise if it is conceptualized as a moral theory. Young criticizes symmetrical reciprocity on three grounds: that it obscures difference, that it is impossible to reverse positions, and that it is politically suspect (1997a, 44-49). Her concept of asymmetrical reciprocity involves thinking of relations with others in terms of gifts and dialogue where we can take others' perspectives into account by asking questions rather than by imagining ourselves in their position. (1)

Young develops the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity by maintaining that people should regard each other as "irreversible," or not mirrors of each other, which she believes is the image that the concept of symmetry between human beings evokes. Instead, we should accept the differences of the other, adopt a stance of "moral humility," acknowledge that our relations with others are asymmetrically reciprocal, and not attempt to espouse their standpoint and speak on their behalf (1997a, 49). Asymmetrical reciprocity is an attempt to understand each other across difference without reversing perspectives or identifying with each other. The idea is that we can take others' views into account without imaginatively occupying their position or "putting ourselves in their place." (2)