Security challenges and responses.(Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security)

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States has employed a multifaceted approach to stabilizing Iraq, but in late 2006 the effort was determined by the Administration to be faltering. President Bush, in his January 10, 2007, speech on Iraq, said, "The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people and it is unacceptable to me." The deterioration was, at least partly, the result of continuing sectarian violence superimposed on a tenacious Sunni-led insurgency, and prompted the strategy revision announced in January 2007.

U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-7, CJTF-7) is a multi-national headquarters "Multinational Force-Iraq, MNF-I," headed by Gen. David Petraeus, who previously led U.S. troops in the Mosul area and the training and equipping program for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The head of Multinational Corps-Iraq is Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, replacing Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno.

Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency

The duration and intensity of a Sunni Arab-led insurgency defied many expectations, probably because, in the view of many experts, it was supported by much of the Iraqi Sunni population that feels humiliated at being ruled by the Shiites and their Kurdish partners. Some Sunni insurgents seek to return the Baath Party to power, while others want to restore Sunni control more generally. The insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated within cities and provinces. The most senior Baathist still at large is longtime Saddam confident Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri.

The Sunni insurgency did not derail the political transition, (35) but it has caused rates of U.S. casualties and sectarian violence sufficient to stimulate debate in the United States over the U.S. commitment in Iraq. Sunni insurgent groups have conducted numerous complex and coordinated attacks on various locations, suicide attacks on markets frequented by Shiites, and occasional mass kidnappings. Targets of Sunni insurgent grenades, IEDs (improvised explosive devices), mortars, and direct weapons fire are U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces, as well as Iraqi civilians of rival sects, Iraqis working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and aid workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and other facilities. In 2007, insurgent groups exploded chlorine trucks to cause widespread civilian injury or panic on about ten occasions; another chlorine attack occurred in late January 2008. A trend in early 2007 was attacks on bridges, particularly those connecting differing sects. Some Sunni insurgents have been able to choke off power supplies to starve rival communities of power, for example in northern Diyala Province. An April 12, 2007, bombing of the Iraqi parliament, coming amid increasing mortar attacks on the heavily fortified International Zone, demonstrate the ability of the insurgency to operate in Baghdad. Prior to 2007, whole Sunni-dominated neighborhoods of Baghdad, including Amiriya, Adhamiya, Fadhil, Jihad, Amal, and Dora (once a mostly Christian neighborhood) were serving as Sunni insurgent bases. Sunni insurgents also made substantial inroads into the mixed province of Diyala, pushing out Shiite inhabitants, and in Nineveh province as well.

Sunni "Awakening" in 2007. U.S. officials say that a major positive trend emerged in late 2006, even before the U.S. "troop surge" began in early 2007. Some Iraqi Sunnis began turning against the mostly foreign-composed Al Qaeda Iraq (AQ-I)--which has been a key component of the insurgency--because of its commission of some atrocities and abuses--such as killings of those who want to cooperate with the Iraqi government, forced marriages, and attempts to impose strict Islamic law. AQ-I, founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in a June 7, 2006, U.S. airstrike) has been a U.S. focus from very early on in the war because, according to U.S. commanders, it is responsible for an estimated 90% of the suicide bombings against both combatant and civilian targets. AQ-I has always been considered by Iraqis as an "alien" component of the insurgency because it is led by non-Iraqis with different traditions and whose goals are more worldwide jihadist than Iraq-specific. (36) The Sunni Iraqi turn against AQ-I was begun in Anbar Province by Sunni tribes belonging to the "Awakening" (As Sahwa) or "Salvation Council" movement who sought to limit AQ-I's influence--and perhaps bolster their own strength against Iraq's dominant Shiites--by cooperating with U.S. counter-insurgency efforts. The Anbar Salvation Council has survived the September 13, 2007, assassination of its key founder, Shaykh Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi; the movement, which is now seeking political influence as a rival to the more established, urban-based Sunni Arab parties, is now headed by his brother, Ahmad, in partnership with Anbar province Governor Mamoun Rashid al-Alwani.

"Concerned Local Citizen" (CLC/"Sons of Iraq" Fighters). In the course of the "troop surge," U.S. commanders have taken advantage of this trend by turning over informal security responsibility to 91,000 former militants called "Concerned Local Citizens" (CLC's) or "Sons of Iraq" in exchange for an end to their anti-U.S. operations. (About 80% are Sunni and 20% are anti-extremist Shiites, according to the U.S. military.) These fighters were recruited by the various tribal Awakening and Salvation Councils, or represent former insurgents from such groups as the 1920 Revolution Brigades who have decided by themselves to cooperate with the United States. U.S. commanders are giving funds to and sharing information with the CLC fighters--a strategy that is controversial because of the potential of the Sunni Iraqis to later resume fighting U.S. forces and Iraqi Shiites. U.S. officials say no new weapons have been given to these groups, although some reports say U.S. officers allow these fighters to keep captured weaponry. At the same time, these fighters and leaders of the Awakening movement--"Awakening Councils" have now formed in several districts of Baghdad--are increasingly targeted by AQ-I and some Iraqi Sunni insurgents. There were about 100 attacks on these fighters in January 2008, up from 50 in December and 25 in November.

The Sons of Iraq program has led to some tensions between Maliki and U.S. officials. The entire UIA bloc publicly demanded an end to this U.S. strategy on October 2, 2007, claiming the United States is "embracing ... terrorist elements." However, ISCI leader Hakim said in early January 2008 that the Sunni volunteers have improved security in Iraq. Still, Shiite political resistance has stalled U.S. plans to integrate all the CLC fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); in some cases ISF commanders have confined the Sunni fighters to their homes or headquarters. The government, fearing empowering Sunnis particularly in the security services, has thus far only allowed about 20,000 such volunteers, mostly from the almost exclusively Sunni province of Anbar to join the ISF, causing some of the fighters to rejoin insurgent activity. In February 2008, several hundred such fighters in Diyala Province abandoned their posts to protest alleged sectarianism by the Shiite police chief in the province.

Despite the new cooperation of Sunni tribes and former insurgents, Gen. Petraeus has declined to "declare victory" against AQ-I and say it remains highly dangerous and capable of a come-back. There are continuing U.S. anti-AQ-I operations in Diyala, and in Nineveh province (Mosul city) where AQ-I apparently has fled to, and these provinces continue to experience relatively high levels of violence. U.S. commanders in Iraq say that AQ-I is fighting hard to maintain its presence in Mosul, which is the major city along its corridor from the Syrian border into Iraq's heartland. A major suicide bombing in August 2007 killed over 500 members of the Yazidi (Kurdish speaking, pre-Islamic) sect in northern Iraq--the most lethal attack of the war to date.

Outside Support for Sunni Insurgents. Numerous accounts have said that Sunni insurgents are receiving help from neighboring states (money and weapons), (37) although others believe that outside support for the insurgency is not decisive. The March 2008 "Measuring Stability" report says that Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq. The report also notes that Syria hosted the inaugural meeting (August 2007) of the Border Security working group formed by the "Expanded Neighbors" process discussed above, and a follow up in November 2007, and that Syria has made recent efforts to stem the flow of extremists into Iraq. Largely because of this outside support, the first 17 recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report call for intensified regional diplomacy, including multilateral diplomacy with Syria and Iran.

Other assessments say the Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,38 where a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency. As noted above, the Saudi leadership has been notably cool to the Maliki government publicly--even to the point of refusing visits by him--which likely means that the Saudi leadership is at least tolerating aid to Sunni insurgents privately.

Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War?

Contributing to the …