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COPYRIGHT 2008 Professors World Peace Academy
If Belgian troops had stayed [in Rwanda] we could have saved hundreds
of thousands of people. --Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt May, 2007 The most difficult scenes that I found was looking in the eyes where they would recognize the blue beret and they would be bewildered.... What happened? How did we end up like this? What were you doing here? --General Romeo Dallaire UNAMIR Force Commander (1)
When the Dutch peacekeepers deployed in and around Srebrenica decided that resisting the Bosnian Serb soldiers' attack was not a viable option, they were fully aware that such a course of action would result in some sort of harm to the Muslims under their protection. Several reasons have been provided to explain the Dutch soldiers' decision. They were outnumbered, with little ammunition, poor support, and afflicted by a sense of isolation because of the inability, unwillingness or incompetence of the UN military and political leaders in the Balkans to provide them with vital military support. Perhaps more importantly, they believed that there was no good reason to risk their lives to save people they did not even know. British General Sir Rupert Smith, who commanded the UN forces in Bosnia in 1995, (2) in a testimony said that he had received from Dutch authorities the clear impression that Srebrenica with its refugees was "not worth dying for." (3) Hasan Nuhanovic, a young Muslim interpreter for the Dutch contingent remembers. "From my conversation with the Dutch soldiers, they were just saying we want to go home--you know--we do not want to stay here, it is not our war. I do not see any sense to stay here." (4) The Dutch contingent had no legal obligation to take additional risks to protect thousands of civilians, who, in their view, might have been killed anyway.
A similar approach, very likely, determined the action of some of the soldiers deployed in Rwanda when the genocide began. They found themselves in a very dangerous position, deployed between the perpetrators of the genocide and their defenseless victims. Even more than in Srebrenica, they had no doubt that giving up the responsibility to protect, or simply abandoning their post, would have allowed the killing of thousands people. Indeed, in several cases these soldiers abandoned the civilians they were protecting, knowing perfectly well that they would be slaughtered. The understanding was that taking additional risks for people with whom they shared nothing was not worthwhile. Interestingly, however, these same soldiers did feel they had an obligation to protect their fellow citizens: Europeans and all western expatriates. Additional troops from France, Belgium and Italy were sent in to comply with this mission. Rwandans, however, were left to be slaughtered.
Since the conclusion of these missions, numerous reasons have been provided to explain and, to a larger extent, justify what can be described as a failure of humanity. Too few troops, poor armament, insufficient training, limitation of the mandate, and unclear rules of engagement are but a few such justifications. Yet, one wonders whether those men and women wearing a blue beret had a moral responsibility to do something more, something beyond their legal obligation.
I argue that soldiers who are sent on a peacekeeping mission should have a sense of moral responsibility that is linked to the peacekeeper role more than the soldier role. As soon as soldiers are deployed as peacekeepers, no matter what the mission's mandate and objectives are, they convey to the local population a strong message that they will offer protection. They symbolize much more than just the country they come from or the UN. They are, in many cases, the last hope of survival to many who have experienced the worst atrocities. Then, I explore how the local population's expectations and perceptions place a moral responsibility on peacekeepers that goes beyond their legal responsibility, the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and ultimately the mandate of the mission. Peacekeepers should have an ethical code that would provide them with clear guidance when confronted with situations in which their decision can determine life or death for the weak and defenseless.
Yet, since the middle 1990s, when it became clear that peacekeeping was no longer just about monitoring, very little has been done to implement an ethical code for peacekeepers. It is important to understand why we have not experienced situations similar to Srebrenica and Rwanda, whether this is because peacekeepers have shown a stronger moral resolve when protecting civilians, or, as I believe is the case, because peacekeepers have not faced similar moral challenges since Rwanda and Srebrenica.
THE MORAL MEANING OF A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION
Robert Siekmann offered an interesting analysis of the legal responsibility of the Dutch soldiers deployed in Srebrenica in July 1995. He provided an elegant answer about why they should not be held legally accountable for not stopping, or trying to stop, the Bosnian Serb soldiers who ultimately killed about 8,000 Muslim men who were supposedly under the protection of the small Dutch deployment. According to Siekmann "from a legal/normative perspective (in the UN context), it cannot be concluded that Dutchbat acted unlawfully during the evacuation [of the Muslims] of Srebrenica." (5) He noted that, "According to the present state of public international law, the Dutch soldiers have not committed a punishable act" (6) and that "International humanitarian law was ... not applicable to Dutchbat." A key point in his thesis is that "From a UN law perspective, an order had merely been given to take all 'reasonable' measures for the protection of refugees and civilians. I have concluded that the behavior of Dutchbat during the evacuation of the Muslims may not be qualified as unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful. The same goes for the behaviour in witnessing war crimes committed by Bosnian Serb forces." (7)
Following the genocide in Rwanda, which was perpetrated while a 2,700 strong UN mission was deployed in the country, no peacekeepers at any level were held legally responsible for failing to act to protect the refugees. It can, therefore, be concluded that UN peacekeepers' failure to act to stop the genocide in Rwanda is not considered unlawful.
Although both Srebrenica and Rwanda might successfully pass the "legal" test, I intend to explore whether the moral analysis reaches a similar conclusion.
As regards the legal...
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