Invasive procedures.(Situation: Critical)(Critical essay)

THE GOVERNMENTS of Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries of vital interest to the United States, are in danger of collapse. Whatever optimistic policy makers and presidential candidates may say, Washington has few remaining tools with which to minimize real risks of state failure. The coming year will be critical for the survival of both governments.

Politically Challenged

IN IRAQ, the United States has gotten the military tactics right and the political strategy wrong. President George W. Bush's troop-surge strategy has significantly improved Iraq's security environment. But the surge's larger purpose was to enable Iraq's elected leaders to forge the tough political compromises on which Iraq's future stability will depend. That isn't happening. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government remains crippled by corruption, incompetence and the fragmentation of the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance. Al-Maliki remains unlikely to welcome enough Sunnis into positions of real authority within Iraq's central government to allay their fears of political subjugation. Shia and Sunnis are still unwilling to agree on an equitable distribution of Iraq's oil revenues or to fully reverse the exclusion of thousands of former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party from government jobs.

In fact, U.S. leverage with Iraq's government is now surprisingly limited. The refusal of Iraqi leaders to participate in the U.S.-hosted Annapolis Conference on peace between Israel and the Palestinians in December marked a stunning rebuke of Bush administration diplomacy. That direct pressure from Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice couldn't persuade al-Maliki to change his mind--even Syria sent emissaries to the conference--reveals how little political influence Washington now wields in Baghdad.

The Shia-dominated central government also refused to be part of Washington's security pact with Sunni tribal leaders. This shouldn't have surprised anyone. Officials in Baghdad are right to fear that once Washington finally begins to withdraw significant numbers of U.S. troops from the country, Sunnis will use the American weapons and cash they're stockpiling to attack their Shia rivals.

The military surge was also meant to undermine radical Shia cleric Moktada al-Sadr and disarm his Mahdi Army militia. The group, unwilling to risk a head-on collision with U.S. troops, has gone quiet. But al-Sadr and his militia will remain on the sidelines only until the drawdown of U.S. troops makes it safe for them to reenter the fray. When U.S. forces are withdrawn, al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army may well provoke a direct confrontation with their Shia rivals, exposing the central government's inability to restore order and increasing the risk of all-out civil war.

Then there are the politically inspired security threats the surge was never meant to address. As British troops withdraw from the oil-rich southern Iraqi region around Basra, no foreign power will be able to prevent an intra-Shia conflict over the spoils. Shia leaders in the southern provinces have demanded that Baghdad pass a law on federalism that would give local leaders effective political control over "their" territory. If that law isn't delivered soon, Shia will abandon any pretense of support for al-Maliki's government. If the law is passed, warring Shia factions will probably discard their "honor code" agreement to halt acts of violence as they jockey for best position ahead of the new political order.