The Defence bureaucracy.(Letters)(Letter to the editor)

SIR: I retired in 2001 after more than thirty years as a Defence Department public servant. During the latter part of my career, I worked in the Force Development and Analysis, Human Resources and Management, and Resources and Financial Programs Divisions, and in the Defence Personnel Executive. I was on the team that prepared the Force Structure Review of 1991, assisted in implementation of the 1997 Defence Efficiency Review, and was involved in some of the other reviews held in the 1990s. Given that background, Michael O'Connor might be surprised that I agree with much that he says ("The Pen-Pusher is Mightier than the Soldier", January-February 2008).

Mr O'Connor notes that the many defence reviews seem to have had little effect. This is not for lack of good intentions. A specific aim of the Force Structure Review, for example, was to reduce "the numbers of service personnel involved in headquarters and base support functions", while the Defence Efficiency Review attempted to "free up resources from support and administrative activities to strengthen the ADF's combat capabilities". The reviews had little long-term effect on the targeted areas.

I consider that a principal cause of the problem is that while these and other reviews aimed to reduce markedly the bureaucratic structures (both military and civilian) in Defence, the individuals who had major input into the actions needed to implement change were the majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels, and the civilian executive level 1 and 2 officers, who stood to lose most from the reforms. Some 90 per cent of military officers at major/lieutenant-colonel level are employed in staff jobs servicing the higher defence organisation, and the figure for the executive level civilians would be similar. Reform of the higher structures would most severely affect the careers of those whose task it was to do the fundamental work necessary to make reforms happen.

Mr O'Connor also makes a good point about the waste of people skills. Without going into the background to the civilian--military relativities, whatever their validity when established in the early 1970s, they are clearly not well matched now. It is impossible to argue sensibly that an officer posted from unit command to a job in Defence headquarters, who moves from having authority over perhaps hundreds of personnel and equipment worth many millions, should not be rated higher than an assistant director in a (probably) small directorate. The relativities need to be brought into line with present reality. As Mr O'Connor would be aware, the effect of such a change would be a significant reduction in the high proportion of officers in the ADF which so concerns him, as fewer officers at major/lieutenant-colonel/colonel level would be needed in headquarters jobs, with flow-on effects down the promotion structure.

Turning to a couple of points of disagreement, it would certainly be possible to separate Defence's military and civilian roles if there was a better arrangement for establishing national security policy and national strategic policy. However, removing the diarchy would not solve all the internal ...