|
COPYRIGHT 2007 The Institute Inc.
Introduction
Economic and social development in China is bedevilled by the immense disparities in levels of well-being (1) between and within different regions of the country. While causal factors are frequently material, involving distance from urban centers, lack of natural resources, absence of entrepreneurial traditions and expertise, inadequate infrastructure, corruption and others, nonmaterial factors can also have a concrete impact on development outcomes. In this paper, the usual material explanations for development outcomes are considered with an eye to understanding that the explanations are themselves profoundly affected by the nonmaterial elements of culture. The objective is to demonstrate that in the case examined here, not only does development impact upon culture, but also that religious rituals impact upon development. The thesis of this paper is that to understand why some communities within a given region are more successful in economic development, we must take into account the stories that surround communities (myths) and the way that they enact those myths (ritual) in making choices and organizing behavior, particularly within the important social unit of the clan. This indicates that material and nonmaterial factors work in concert to contribute to development outcomes. In this paper, the development process can be seen to depend on ethnic identity, not in the sense that primordial ethnic factors predispose certain groups to certain behaviors or abilities, but that perceptions of traits associated with ethnic identity predispose the self and the other to make assumptions about what a particular group is capable of or is inclined to do. These assumptions constitute a body of myth that is enacted in social and religious ritual. It is further argued that this ritual enactment is used to assist in identifying those who can develop swiftly and easily, and those for whom the capacity for development is limited.
This paper considers primarily the Manzu village of Yi Lan Gang in Heilongjiang province. Additional data are considered from an Oroqen township in Heilongjiang and an Ewenki village in northeastern Inner Mongolia. These latter two communities will not be identified for reasons of confidentiality. It is appropriate to consider the situation of ethnic minorities in relation to their Han neighbors, as proposed here, because ethnic identity has become a key factor in mobilizing resources in the Chinese state. Ethnic minority status ought to provide an advantage in terms of state funding, and yet all three Tungusic communities mentioned appear to lag behind.
The Chinese state is engaged in a process of structural reform that holds out the prospect of material wealth, but meets with varied and limited success in rural communities (Bernstein 2000; Chen 1999; Liu 2000; Watson and Wu 1994). Leaders of neighboring rural communities are in direct competition for limited support from regional and district governments. Minorities are ostensibly entitled to special assistance, but local government operatives do not necessarily implement such aid. This may be in part due to low expectations of successful outcomes based not simply on perceptions of minorities' abilities, but the nature of interactions between minority leaders and government officials. As Cheung (2003) has noted, the formulation of indigenous conceptions of identity in China has depended heavily on Han Chinese ethnic categories. The Manzu and other Tungusic peoples may, in some communities, come to view themselves through an ethnic lens developed in concert with their Han neighbors that limits their ambitions in the economic sphere. The perspective of the majority Han Chinese in a district, and the operation of state mechanisms that the Han tend to dominate, are an important component in the relational production of ethnic identity in China (Gladney 1998; Humphrey 1992).
The Setting
The village of Yi Lan Gang, in the Ning Xi district of Ning An county, Heilongjiang province, has a population of about 440 people. Ten years ago, the population was evenly divided between Han and Manzu, but today the population is about 60% Manzu, partly due to the out-migration of Han Chinese to work in urban areas. Unlike many contemporary Manzu, the members of the clan resident in the village have always known their ethnic and clan affiliation. The Manzu there are mainly members of the Guan (Guarjiya in Manzu) clan, which is an ancient clan descended from Niyahana, one of the original companions of the founding Manzu emperor, Nurhaci. The villagers are engaged in mixed farming, and the Han who live there also keep shops and operate some rural industrial enterprises. The communalistic aspects of the village have been reduced to a minimum, and in fact the administration plays a minor role in the village. As the state apparatus has been reduced, the Guan clan has expanded its function. This is not a wealthy village, and there are no major urban centers nearby. Economic opportunities are limited, and the residents see themselves as largely missing out on the benefits of economic and agricultural reform.
Unlike their ethnic brethren in other parts of China, in the northeast the historical Manzu continued to conceive of their Manzu identity in terms of their clans and saw this identity as mediated by the survival of the clans. The Guan clan still does so today. During the reign of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795), an attempt was initiated to restrict membership in the Manzu based on clan genealogies and associated clan-based shamanism. These efforts influenced Manzuness as manifested in Manchuria to the extent that the clans and clan shamanism became paramount. It was primarily via the clans that the individual Manzu was able to retain a sense of social place (Crossley 1990: 34). In turn, it was through shamanic ritual that the cohesiveness of the clans was largely maintained. However, the shamanic text (2) created at and for the imperial court, which deemphasized trance and raised ancestor worship to preeminence was of little import in the northeast and is unknown to the Manzu shamans in Yi Lan Gang today. The shamanic ritual referred to throughout should be understood as the ritual of the Manzu living in the northeast, not the ritual of the Qing court. This is true despite the fact that the Qing was a Manzo, and not a Han Chinese, dynasty.
Although the Guan of Yi Lan Gang are generally limited in their direct knowledge of Manzu life to what they have experienced in their district, they tend to generalise to the Manzu as a whole. They understand their cultural identity as members of the Guan clan, inhabitants of Yi Lan Gang, and as Manzu. In terms of shamanism then, the shamans of the Guan clan consider themselves to be part of a continuous tradition, even while they acknowledge that their powers are diminished compared to the ancestral shamans. The Guan shamans see themselves as continuing the work of maintaining the welfare of the clan by intervening with the ancestors.
During the Japanese occupation (1931-1945), the colonial government forbade gatherings of more than a few people. In addition, the Manzu clans were impoverished by the occupation and thus were unable to sponsor lavish and complex rituals such as the ji si (the major sacrifice to or memorial ceremony for the ancestors). Later, the Communist regime brought education and propaganda to raise the socialist consciousness of the Manzu. This undermined their belief in an already weakened institution. Finally, the Cultural Revolution had a devastating effect on the shamans themselves, and the entire shamanic complex. Yet many still believe, either in shamanism or in the tradition of shamanism as a defining characteristic of their ethnicity. This belief is manifested as a desire to memorialize the ancestors (ji zu xian), both totemic and historical. Ultimately, their ceremonies are intended as a sacrifice to Nurhaci (founder of the Qing Empire) and his devoted followers, including the ancestor of the Guan clan. By so doing, they are remembering themselves.
Manzu shamanic ceremonies are held to celebrate the benevolence of the ancestors at marriages, births of sons, harvests and successes, or to celebrate the health of children and elders. These rites may also be held to ask for these blessings, but they are not calendrical. An individual can sponsor them at any time with permission from the mokunda, or clan head. When the entire clan comes together to sponsor a ji si they call this a gongji. The date and purpose are decided by the mokunda in consultation with his deputies and the shamans, who in turn canvas the community for enthusiasm and willingness to contribute.
Guan shamans ask for aid in times of drought, illness or other troubles, or for blessings upon a journey or their leaders. Clan members cannot individually communicate with the ancestors, but only through the shamans, who protect the ancestors by filtering out petty requests and complaints. The shamans say that the ancestors have to be spoken to in Manzu, and as most clan members do not speak it, they need the shamans to speak for them. Each prayer or chant has a specific purpose, and so even the young shamans are able to communicate with the ancestors through ritual. The Guan shamans today do not concern themselves with the individual power of the shaman but rather with the power of their words to influence the ancestors for the benefit of the community of which the ancestors are an active part.
Shirokogoroff informs us that life outside the clan was impossible, since the clan controlled all important social phenomena (1924: 15). This is certainly not the case today, and participation in the clan can be avoided. The social pressure to conform and participate is strong, but there is no coercive element remaining that allows the leaders of the clan to impose their will upon clan members. One of my neighbors in Yi Lan Gang in 1997, Manzu on both sides and the son of a shaman's helper, was adamantly opposed to participation in any clan events. He neither attended clan meetings nor contributed money, labor or materials to clan projects. Yet, by 2004, after the clan had considerably consolidated its stability and influence, he had come around to participating to some degree in clan activities
The original clans, the hala, were broken up due to the garrisoning of China after the Qing conquest of 1644, and subdivisions called mokun were created to assume the functions of the clan within a compact territory. They retain the same name as the clan (e.g., Guan) but for practical reasons function as if they were separate clans. When two members of the same hala but different mokun meet, they behave as clansmen. Today this hiving off is no longer necessary, and the clan members who live far away are still able to remain connected thanks to mail, telegraphy and telephony, and modern transport technology. However, the mokun that developed after the conquest remain divided.
Shirokogoroff (1924: 51) provides an in-depth discussion of the role of the mokun in social organization: "in the competence of the mokun are included the following affairs: marriage, affairs of justice, home affairs, intermokun affairs, administration, financial and economical questions." Broadly speaking, this is still true for the Guan clan today, but there is competition in many of these matters from the state. The clan cannot dictate to its members, but pressure and moral persuasion may be brought to bear. They must have a general meeting that all mokun members attend not less than once in three years. The mokunda is obliged to be present at all important events. The clan chief maintains his influence by consulting with the senior members of the mokun (Shirokogoroff 1924: 54). In Yi Lan Gang the Manzu still select a mokunda, and they refer to him either by the Manzu title or the equivalent Mandarin: hu zhong. He in turn appoints deputies who assist him and communicate with members of the mokun who live outside the district.
Although the present clan chief (and also the man who preceded him until 2005) is neither a Communist Party member nor a member of the village...
Read the full article for free courtesy of your local library.
|
Bookmark this article
Print this article
Link to this article
Email this article
Digg It!
Add to del.icio.us
RSS
