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COPYRIGHT 2007 M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
Advertising has almost become synonymous with ethics in marketing, reflected characteristically by its having attracted the most public criticism of any aspect of marketing (Calfee 1997; Smith and Quelch 1993). Such is the extent of the concern regarding ethics in advertising that Beltramini (2003) raises the interesting question of whether ethics in advertising is itself the ultimate oxymoron. However, at the heart of this concern is the publics' fear of advertising (Calfee 1997; Laczniak and Murphy 1992; Schlegelmilch 1998). Indeed, Shimp (2003) summarizes some of the key criticisms levied against advertising: "untruthful and deceptive, manipulative, often offensive and in bad taste, often creates and perpetuates stereotypes, causes people to buy things they do not really need," and finally, the charge that "advertising plays on people's fears and insecurities" (pp. 605-606).
From a wider societal perspective, Pollay (1986) asserts that the unintended consequence of advertising is its infringement on social and psychological ecology. Others have noted its negative effect on consumer autonomy (Lippke 1989), on the cultivation of virtues (Waide 1987), or on the development of a false sense of well-being and happiness (Jhally 1998). Clearly, it appears that the unintended consequences of advertising are not limited to the dyadic relationship between advertiser and consumer, but extend to the wider sociocultural world (Fry and Polonsky 2004).
Although ethics has long been considered a mainstream topic in the advertising literature (Hyman, Tansey, and Clark 1994), many questions remain unresolved (Drumwright and Murphy 2004). Key issues in advertising ethics appear to have evaded societal attention, despite well-grounded attempts to capture the numerous unethical consequences and characteristics of advertising in general. However, Hyman, Tansey, and Clark's (1994) classic review of the literature on ethics in advertising still provides researchers with the most rigorous and pragmatic agenda for exploring ethics in advertising. From a list of "prime topics," these authors gleaned the most important areas for ethical enquiry, summarizing them as (1) use of deception in ads, (2) advertising to children, (3) tobacco advertising, (4) alcoholic beverage ads, (5) negative political advertising, (6) racial stereotyping, and (7) sexual stereotyping. In summary, Hyman, Tansey, and Clark concluded, "only a handful of topics dominate ... recent research [in advertising ethics]" (1994, p. 6), and these are concentrated in two areas: advertising deception and advertising content. Indeed, the use of deception in ads ranked first in importance across all the prime areas. Consequently, this study seeks to contribute to the developing literature on both deception and advertising content by exploring the use of humor to mask deceptive claims.
Humor remains one of the most poorly understood (Sutherland and Sylvester 2000), and yet at the same time, one of the most prevalent of communications strategies employed in advertising (Alden, Mukherjee, and Hoyer 2000). This is the case despite a growing body of literature within advertising on the use and application of humor (Weinberger and Gulas 1992). The role of humor in masking deceptive claims should come as no surprise. It reflects the very essence of persuasive advertising as being able to influence its audience in the same way as the "artist and the priest.., by creating symbols that promise more than what is observable" (van de Ven 2001, p. 221).
The case for focusing on humor appeals is further strengthened by the fact that unlike other ethically contested appeal forms such as sexual appeals, humor has traditionally evaded ethical enquiry. In line with sexuality in ads, however, which has been described as a "soft issue" by Boddewyn (1991), humor is also rooted in a series of complex subjective and socially or culturally constructed values and beliefs. In general, the use of such appeals reduces the risk of unethical perception or offense, but as a result, may lead to less stringent control. Consequently, there is greater opportunity for advertisers to misuse legitimate appeals forms such as humor (Boddewyn 1991). The primary aim of this study, therefore, is to investigate the use of humor as a masking device for deceptive advertising claims. Since the masking of deceptive claims remains unexplored within the extant literature, exploring such practices has important implications for resolving any unintended consequences of advertising (Fry and Polonsky 2004).
Masking "occurs when the processing of a stimulus is interrupted by the subsequent immediate presentation of a second, different stimulus. The second stimulus acts retroactively to obscure the former one" (Moore 1988, p. 302). In effect, the second "masking" stimulus reduces the visibility or perception of the primary or target stimulus (Breitmeyer 1980; Breitmeyer and Ogmen 2000; Kahneman 1968). Such forms of masking can serve to generate a positive perception of a negative or neutrally perceived target stimulus; alternatively, they can also generate a negative perception of a positive or neutrally perceived stimulus. For instance, Way and Masters (1996) demonstrated how images of politicians could be improved if they were linked to positive emotional appeals.
Within an advertising context, visual masking assumes that an appeal form is being used to conceal the manner in which the message is perceived. This perception may be subliminal and operate at an unconscious level. Alternatively, and perhaps as occurs more frequently within advertising, is when the conscious processing of the target stimulus may be reduced such that if the masking appeal were removed, the perception of the target stimulus would become clearer. This study investigates the latter form of visual masking, using content analysis to determine the extent to which humor is used to mask deceptive claims within advertising.
Furthermore, visual masking within advertising is a classic example of manipulation and can be considered a covert mechanism for subliminal persuasion. This is based on Phillips's definition of manipulative ads as "those that attempt to either (1) nonrationally change consumers' desire or tastes or (2) associate the product or service with the satisfaction of conscious or unconscious desires that it is unlikely, in fact, to satisfy" (1997, p. 19). Masking, therefore, represents a special form of manipulation that could fulfill both of Phillips's criteria by altering the rational evaluation of the product or service through the creation of illusionary associations.
Deceptive claims masked by such positive appeals could also operate at a subconscious level and remain latent during ad viewing. Alternatively, a mediated version of the deceptive claim could be processed consciously. In either case, the humor would serve to obscure the underlying deception within the ad. The masking function of humor can potentially have a priming effect on the deceptive content (Grazioli 2004; Hausman 2000; Miller 1983), that is, it can alter the perception of the associated deceptive claim--for instance, by mediating its perceived severity through the illusionary association with the positive aspects of humor. Nevertheless, it is not the purpose of this study to explore the level of perceived severity of deception. Rather, this study serves as an initial exploration of the role of humor as a mask for deceptive claims. It also identifies relationships between various types of humor used to mask specific types of deceptive claims. A summary of relevant sections of the extant literature on humor and deception in advertising comprise the following section.
DECEPTION IN ADVERTISING
Most of the studies exploring deception in marketing involve an examination of advertising claims (see, for example, Braun and Loftus 1998; Carlson, Grove, and Kangun 1993; Gardner and Leonard 1990), although other contexts have also been explored, such as marketing research (Axelrod 1992). Olson and Dover defined a deceptive ad as "one that creates a false or incorrect belief about the product" (1978, p. 30). It has also been defined as the "message distortion resulting from deliberate falsification or omission of information by a communicator with the intent of stimulating in another, or others, a belief that the communicator himself or herself does not believe" (Miller 1983). Clearly, as Olson and Dover (1978) pointed out, the basic problem here is identifying whether a particular belief...
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