State repression and political violence: insurgency in Northern Ireland.

Publication: International Journal on World Peace

Publication Date: 01-DEC-06

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This paper examines the extent to which the escalation or de-escalation of political violence in Northern Ireland between 1969-1999 was related to three main factors: a) the duration, consistency, and magnitude of formal and informal repressive policies/acts by the state, b) the existence of large economic disparities, and c) the level of democratic development attained. The article finds that different types of repression by the state appeared to have impacted various forms of violence differently, hence varied outcomes to repression may be due not only to the nature of the type of repression, but also to the form of violence adopted by insurgents to combat it. The author concludes that formal and, to a much lesser degree, informal repression by the state encouraged more rather than less political violence in Northern Ireland.

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In order to avoid a greater level of death and destruction in the future, it is imperative that we enhance our knowledge and understanding of the elements that increase the probability of political violence. Therefore, this paper seeks to enhance our knowledge of political violence by elaborating on the following specific question: What are the determinants that contribute to the escalation or de-escalation of political violence once a conflict erupts between a state and disaffected groups living within that state? In an examination of this question this paper will delve into the causes and consequences of the political violence that ravished Northern Ireland for over thirty years. Before examining the evidence supporting the decay in state legitimacy and its impact on political violence in Northern Ireland, it is necessary to briefly examine the primary issues at stake.

While a detailed historical account of the engrained grievances felt by the minority in Northern Ireland cannot be explored in its entirety, a summary of the primary issues will now be examined. (1) The primary issues of conflict in Northern Ireland remain the socio-economic and political inequalities and the future of the state. The two nationalistic religious groups living in Northern Ireland have competing visions of the future. The dominant Protestant segment of the population views itself as being British subjects and would like to preserve the status quo, i.e., that Northern Ireland remain a part of the United Kingdom. As the majority they have historically enjoyed advantages over the Catholic minority in such areas as housing and employment opportunities. This minority, who view themselves as Irish, would like to see the state disbanded and have Northern Ireland rejoin the Republic of Ireland in a united Ireland. This scenario is not acceptable to the Protestant community in Northern Ireland because in a united Ireland Protestants would be the minority. Meaningful reforms regarding discriminatory practices toward the minority in Northern Ireland were gradually implemented in the 1960s with the establishment and subsequent pressure brought to bear by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1968. This civil rights movement was influenced and molded by similar events occurring in the United States, and as was the case there, the movement appeared to be very threatening to the stability of the status quo. Many in the Protestant community saw the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland as merely a ploy with a goal of destroying the union and replacing it with a united Ireland (Hewitt 1980). Therefore, between 1968 and 1969 many of the civil rights marches were marred by violence perpetrated by the police and members of the Protestant community against these marchers. Coogan (2004) asserts that the violent repression of the civil right marches promoted the notion in segments of the minority community that radical extremism in the form of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was necessary.

At the beginning of the "Troubles" (name used to describe the political violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1999) the situation became even more intense with the mobilization of Protestant and Catholic paramilitary groups who decided to take measures into their own hands. The increased use of state repressive measures and the absence of democratic solutions to Catholic grievances pertaining to franchise, gerrymandering, and the allocation of housing and jobs by local councils in Northern Ireland only served to foster the growth of Catholic extremism. Northern Ireland was on the verge of civil war. Unable to control the escalating violence in the Province, the police were supplemented with British troops sent as peacekeepers to Northern Ireland on August 15, 1969 to regain control. There were 2700 British troops initially stationed in Northern Ireland, but by 1972 this number had risen to 22,000 (Hadfield 1992). The state sought to rely on formal and informal repression to reduce the escalating tensions. Let us now examine the implications of these decisions.

This case study focuses on the duration, inconsistency and severity of two main repressive acts by the state, one formal (sanctioned) repressive policy adopted by the state (Internment) (2) and one informal (unsanctioned) repressive act (Bloody Sunday) (3). Grievances by the minority in Northern Ireland had to do with inequalities in housing, education, employment, and the right to vote. This case study focuses the bulk of its attention on one particular form of economic grievance, specifically, unemployment levels, as this is a widely accepted indicator of social change and economic grievance. The level of democratic development in the Northern Irish democracy was different for the majority and the minority; therefore, political or social inequalities among these groups were extremely prevalent in this society. The level of democratic inclusiveness has a direct bearing on how the minority in Northern Ireland views the legitimacy of the state. Therefore, this research predicts that political violence will increase when the state uses inconsistent, severe repressive measures and when unemployment levels remain high. Conversely, political violence will decrease when the opposite occurs and when the state introduces a greater degree of democratic inclusiveness into the system.

In an examination of these factors the following hypotheses were tested.

H1: Severe formal (sanctioned) repression (Internment) applied by a state will cause a short-term decrease in the levels of political violence, but ultimately a long-term increase in the level of violence.

H2: Severe informal repressive acts by state agents (Bloody Sunday) will increase the probability of violence.

H3: The efficacy of repression will diminish with the passage of time. Therefore, as the duration of a repressive policy increases, the probability of political violence should increase.

H4: The use of inconsistent repressive policies by the state will increase the probability of political violence.

H5: As the level of democratic maturity and institutional development increases in a state the probability of political violence will decrease. (4)

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The argument and the theoretical framework developed assert that the escalation of political violence results because repression by a state has conflicting effects, that is, while the threat of violence by the state has a deterrent effect (which may decrease the probability of violence), the state's decision to employ such techniques may in fact reduce the state's legitimacy and in so doing ignite a volatile situation where a grievance-based insurgency becomes mobilized towards violence. Consequently, this research contends that the varied outcomes to repression that are consistently debated in the relevant literature may be due to which of these factors, deterrence or lack of legitimacy, prevail and if alternative institutional mechanisms are available.

This argument has been framed in what is referred to as Power Legitimacy Transition (PLT). In this framework, the decline of state legitimacy is a product of a state's use of repression. The inspiration for this framework originated from previous research on conflict initiated by Organski (1958). In 1958, Organski developed a theory called Power Transition Theory (PTT) to explain how conflict causes a transition of power to emerge between two nations, namely a dominant declining hegemon and a rising power. While Organski examined violence at the inter-state level, this research contends that a similar power transition may occur at the intra-state level leading to an increased probability of political violence due to the decay of legitimacy.

This research asserts that there is a dynamic relationship between a state's use of repression and insurgent violence, and that a greater analysis of this cause and effect relationship will help one better understand how repressive policies may increase or decrease political violence. Earlier research on this dynamic relationship was investigated by Lichbach (1987). Lichbach was able to successfully demonstrate that consistency had an extremely important impact on the outcome of repressive policies. This research seeks to expand on Lichbach's conclusions by arguing that the probability of violence increases as a function of inconsistency, but also as a function of duration and severity of state repression. Understanding the impact of duration is fundamentally important due to the fact that the short term and long term effects of repression may impact its deterrent effects and hence its efficacy. Understanding the impact of severity is important because the severity of repression used by a state may dramatically impact that state's legitimacy and hence intensify societal grievances.

This paper contends that state repression, which is essentially a special form of political...

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