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COPYRIGHT 2000 JAI Press, Inc.
The collapse of East European communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later had an immediate impact on the fortunes of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups in Latin America. They lost not only their rear bases in Nicaragua (because of a regime change) and Cuba (because Castro abruptly lost the resources to promote revolution elsewhere), but their discredited ideological underpinnings as well. All this seemed to spell the end of Marxism-Leninism as a military threat in Latin America. Conservatives and liberals agreed that communism was dead. [1] Hence the decisions of El Salvador's Farabundo Mart[acute{i}] National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart[acute{i}] de Liberaci[acute{o}n Nacional--FMLN) and Guatemala's National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca--URNG) in 1992 and 1996, respectively, to make their peace with the government and become "normal" political parties. Even earlier, the remnants of the Argentine Montoneros and the Uruguayan Tupa maros had made similar transitions, but only after they were already militarily defeated and saw legal acceptance as their only chance for survival. All of these groups participated in elections and, with one exception, fared poorly at the ballot box in 1999. The URNG was a poor third in the Guatemalan elections, the Tupamaros and assorted allies narrowly lost the Uruguayan presidential race, and Gladys Mar[acute{i}]n, the unreconstructed Stalinist candidate of the Chilean Communist Party, received 3 percent of the vote in that country's presidential contest. Only the main splinter faction of the FMLN has had some success: after losing two consecutive presidential elections, the party won the race for mayor of the capital and, in March 2000, won a plurality in the Salvadoran legislature.
The Exceptions
Against this background of renounced violence and disavowed ideologies across Latin America, three countries appear anomalous. In Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, Marxist-Leninist organizations continued to thrive and wage deadly insurgent campaigns long after most others had disappeared or been defeated. Peru was for years plagued by the Communist Party of Peru (better known as Shining Path--Sendero Luminoso, henceforth Sendero) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). [2] Next door, Colombia continues to struggle with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--Ej[acute{e}]rcito del Pueblo, known as FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ej[acute{e}]rcito de Liberaci[acute{o}]n Nacional--ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (Ej[acute{e}]rcito Popular de Liberaci[acute{o}]n--EPL). Mexico faces the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), the People's Revolutionary Army (EPR), and the Insurgent People's Revolutionary Army (ERPI). [3]
Several preliminary observations can be made about these groups. [4] First, Marxism-Leninism is far from dead in Latin America, regardless of its fate elsewhere, because the politics of the Latin American Left do not always mirror its West European and American counterparts. Secondly, the persistence or public appearance of insurgent groups cannot be explained by a country's lack of democratic political systems. Although opinions differ as to the real level of democracy, the three countries in question were at least as democratic as most of the other states in the region, which do not now face armed insurgencies. Indeed, some facts suggest that democratic practices coincided with, even if they did not facilitate, violence by groups seeking a totalitarian solution to social, economic, or political problems. Sendero's first violent action took place on May 17, 1980, in the Andean village of Chuschi, on the same day that electoral politics returned to Peru after a seventeen-year interruption. The EZLN made its first public appearance the day Mexico formally renounced economic nationalism by joining the North American Free Trade Agreement, and during the campaign for what was the most open, fair, and closely contested election in Mexican history.
The present analysis is limited to Colombia and Peru, two neighboring Andean countries that at different times during the past two decades faced similarly grave revolutionary challenges. Mexico is beyond the scope of this paper because the EZLN, EPR, and ERPI are not, and never were, serious military threats or nationwide movements.
The insurgents in Peru and Colombia share a similar ideology, the main enemy of which is democracy. Sendero consistently described leftists who participate in elections as "parliamentary cretins" and proudly admitted that the date of the Chuschi attack was selected because the organization wanted to "expose the whole 'return of democracy' as a patent fraud, a sham manipulated by the US." [5]
That Peru won its war against Latin America's most vicious communist insurgency is indisputable. In addition to the Sendero threat, Lima also had to deal with the Castroites of the MRTA and a large drug production and trafficking network. Colombia, faced with a similar constellation of threats, has failed to defend itself and is now desperately seeking outside military and diplomatic help. The question immediately arises as to why Peru, with a shorter history of uninterrupted electoral politics than Colombia and a considerably smaller population, was successful in prosecuting its war, while Colombia is close to defeat. Perhaps the different outcomes can be traced, at least in part, to practical and cultural differences between the two countries. Specifically, two matters seem essential: different perceptions, among both the elite and the general population, of the nature and seriousness of the threat, and differing assumptions as to whether the population is hostile to, and thus could be mobilized to resist, Marxist rebels.
Resolve in Peru
In 1990, Peru was under siege. Enormous areas in the hinterland were devoid of any state presence, the police were consistently being routed in small-town skirmishes, and Sendero insurgents openly controlled neighborhoods in Lima. Many of the country's roads were cut, severely curtailing movement in provincial cities (particularly at night), and the economy was collapsing because of governmental incompetence and the damage inflicted by insurgents. Entire universities, such as San Crist[acute{o}]bal de Huamanga in Ayacucho and La Cantuta in Lima functioned as indoctrination and training camps for the rebels. Reputable analysts in the United States predicted imminent victory for Sendero. In light of the civil war's death toll of at least 25,000 since 1980, direct economic damages of $25 billion, and the regime's clear inability to cope with the challenge, such estimates seemed entirely realistic. [6]
Prior to 1990, Peruvian political leaders failed to perceive the nature of the threat posed by the Communists. Between 1980 and the end of 1982, President Belaunde Terry and his government derided Sendero as "cattle rustlers" and "bandits"--a criminal problem, not a serious political danger. [7] The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a left-of-center party with ties to the MRTA, advocated dialogue with Sendero. [8] Alan Garcia of the APRA, Peru's president from 1985 to 1990, publicly expressed admiration for the Senderistas' commitment and willingness to sacrifice themselves, and his prime minister, Armando Villanueva, professed his belief in "convincing" the rebels to see the light of peace. The Garc[acute{i}]a administration appointed a peace commission in September 1985 that included Bishop Augusto Beuzeville, whose nephew, Edmundo Beuzeville Cox, was a known Sendero military leader in Puno. [9]
By the end of the Garc[acute{i}]a regime, however, things started to change--not because the government reassessed the threat, but because the insurgent groups rejected APRA's peace offerings. The MRTA, after declaring a ceasefire upon Garc[acute{i}]a's election in 1985, reopened its war against the state a year later and assassinated a retired admiral and Peru's first defense minister. In 1986, Sendero embarrassed President Garc[acute{i}a by staging a violent prison riot when APRA was hosting a Socialist International meeting. Sendero also murdered APRA leader Rodrigo Franco and made it clear that it had no interest in negotiations with "imperialist puppets" such as APRA (which was, in fact, one of the most anti-American governments in Peru this century). But...
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