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AT PRESENT, in Australian debate about the future of Taiwan, three views dominate discussion. The first is the official policy. It is that there is one China, of which Taiwan is a part, but it is apart. Reunification should occur by peaceful means, but it is what is expected to occur in due course. This is a bipartisan view and has been articulated by both Alexander Downer and Laurie Brereton.
The second is what I would identify as Australia's tacit policy. It is that Taiwan may well not accept reunification and China may use force, in which case we would side with the United States in defending Taiwan--but with serious misgivings. This has been stated on the record by a number of senior figures, including the former Chief of the Defence Force, General John Baker.
The third view is the neutralist position. This view holds that reunification is inevitable and China's position is completely justified. The USA, in this view, is wrong to prolong what has become a dangerous situation. It should make clear to Taiwan that it needs to negotiate seriously about reunification and soon. If Taiwan goes down the path to independence we should not support it. If the USA supports it in doing so, we should not join the American side. We should make it clear to both Taiwan and the USA now that this is how we see the matter. This view has been forcefully articulated by Malcolm Fraser.
The official policy seems to me to exhibit notable and alarming similarities to the official policy adopted by the Whitlam government on East Timor. That policy was seriously flawed. If I am correct, then the Taiwan policy could also be seriously flawed, with potentially extremely serious adverse consequences for Australia--and, by implication, Taiwan.
In September 1974, Prime Minister Whitlam told President Suharto that he believed Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia, but it should do so by a genuine act of self-determination on the part of its people. What he told Suharto secretly and repeated at Townsville in April 1975, however, was that if things got nasty Australia would place greater weight on its cordial relationship with Jakarta than on the right of the Timorese to self-determination. This contributed to Australia's most invidious position when Indonesia chose to invade East Timor, first by covert means, in October 1975, then openly in December 1975. The attempt to compel the Timorese to accept integration into Indonesia was a disastrous failure for Indonesia, a catastrophe for the Timorese and a huge foreign policy headache for Australia.
There is a considerable risk of something along these lines happening in regard to the Taiwanese desire for self-determination, which China wishes to thwart and which Australia and the United States insist on treating with studied ambivalence. There is an expectation of reunification in China, an apprehension about it in Taiwan, and a dangerous ambivalence about it in Australia and America. We and the Americans continue to seek interim measures both to discourage Chinese use of force and to buttress Taiwanese defences, while conceding both the Chinese claim and the Taiwanese right. If it seemed probable that the majority of Taiwanese desired reunification, the danger would be only moderate. The reverse is the case, just as in East Timor in early 1975, where a clear majority of Timorese did not desire integration into Indonesia. This means the situation in regard to China and Taiwan is inherently unsustainable. Something has to give. We should apply our minds to thinking the matter through before something does.
DESPITE the Shanghai communique of 1972, acknowledging that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it, followed in 1979 by the formal diplomatic recognition of Beijing as the government of China, the United States has never abandoned its tacit alliance with Taiwan. It continues to supply Taiwan with the means to defend itself against any Chinese attempt to complete the civil war of the 1940s by militarily subduing Taiwan.
Source: HighBeam Research, Taiwan: thinking outside the Chinese box. (Foreign...