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COPYRIGHT 2002 Indiana University, Purdue University of Fort Wayne
Although all readers of the Phenomenology of Spirit are familiar with Hegel's device of the "we" (wir) that is employed throughout it, very little commentary exists on the meaning of the "we." None of this commentary has noted the connection between this device and the trope of irony, a trope that since Socrates has been associated closely with philosophical modes of experience and thought. In this essay, I will consider what has been said about the "we" and suggest that irony is the best way for comprehending how the "we" ultimately functions in Hegel's portrait of consciousness.
When a person reads the Phenomenology of Spirit, he or she takes a journey through the history of consciousness itself. It is a long and difficult journey because the truths discovered on it dissolve into falsehoods, and then reappear as truths in a higher form through a dialectic of consciousness that refuses to stand still. This history of consciousness is in fact "the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science." (1) At the standpoint of Science, history has completed itself; self-consciousness, or the universal individual, has achieved absolute knowledge. This knowledge, however, is not guaranteed to reappear in the singular individual (the individual person) simply because he or she is coeval with historical consciousness. Singular individuals, if they are to attain true knowledge, require an education of their own. As Jean Hyppolite has noted, "the problem which the Phenomenology poses is not that of world history but that of the education of the specific individual who must, necessarily, be formed to knowledge by becoming aware of what Hegel calls his substance." (2) Making the singular individual aware of his substance by providing"him with the ladder" to the standpoint of Science and "showing him this standpoint within himself" is what the reader of the Phenomenology "has a right to demand" from Science (PS, 14).
From the point of view of the individual who comes to it, the Phenomenology represents a way to Science, or an introduction to Science. It can be viewed as a "forepiece that can be dropped and discarded once the student, through deep immersion in its contents, has advanced through confusions and misunderstanding to the properly philosophical point of view." (3) From the philosophical point of view, the Phenomenology is Science becoming aware of itself. Recollecting the necessary progression of Science, according to Hegel, is already Science: "the way to Science is itself already Science, and hence, in virtue of its content, is the Science of the experience of consciousness" (PS, 56).
This conception of Science creates a paradox that makes interpreting the education of the singular individual difficult. If the introduction to Science is itself already a Science, the pedagogical task of the Phenomenology seems impossible, and is tantamount to Meno's paradox of learning. That is to say, either a person not educated to the level of Science will be unable to follow the introduction to Science because this introduction is already a Science and therefore presupposes knowledge of it, or the introduction to Science will be comprehended by the singular individual because such an individual already possesses knowledge of Science, which means no introduction is needed in the first place. Hegel is able to overcome this paradox because he understands the standpoint of Science as a standpoint existing within the individual. The task of the Phenomenology is merely to show "him this standpoint within himself" (PS, 15). One way Hegel attempts to do this, I will argue, is through an ironic use of the phrase "we," that is, the Hegelian phenomenologist. Hegel employs irony because "it transfers or turns meaning over to its opposite," (4) and demands self-reflection on the part of the reader, which in turn forces the reader to confront his or her own subjectivity in order to discover the truth of what is being said. Before examining Hegel's ironic use of the "we," I will explain in greater detail the paradox of learning as it is found in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
To understand the paradox of learning we may inquire into Hegel's phenomenological method and ask whether it provides a solution to this paradox. In his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojeve claims that the Hegelian method "is purely contemplative and descriptive, or better, phenomenological in Husserl's sense of the term." (5) Hegel corroborates this descriptive interpretation when he states that "It is the corning-to-be of Science as such or of knowledge, that is described in this Phenomenology of Spirit" (PS, 15). The only thing "left for us to do [in this examination] is simply to look on" (PS, 54). Hegel's references to a descriptive method, however, do not provide the strongest support for such an interpretation. The most convincing reason for thinking that Hegel's method is descriptive is that it provides a cogent explanation for Hegel's unique positions regarding criterion, consciousness, and the activity of we, the phenomenologists. These positions appear in the Introduction and are well known to anyone familiar with the Phenomenology. Although a descriptive interpretation of Hegel's method is able to account for these positions, I will show that they conflict with Hegel's educational requirements and that this conflict is the source of the paradox of learning as it appears in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
A descriptive interpretation of the Phenomenology helps explain the question of criterion as it is posed by Hegel in the Introduction. Here Hegel suggests that if we were to inquire into the relation of truth to knowledge, the "criterion would lie within ourselves, and that which was to be compared with it and about which a decision would be reached through this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize the validity of such a standard" (PS, 53). However, the relation of truth to knowledge is not the phenomenological object of study in the Phenomenology of Spirit-consciousness is. According to Hegel, what makes consciousness a unique object of study is that it splits itself into two. There is (1) consciousness of some object and (2) a consciousness that this object is for consciousness. In Hegelian terms these two moments are the `being-in-itself and `being-for-another,' `object' and `Concept,' or `Truth' and `knowledge.' These two moments exist within the subject of our investigation. Consequent]y, "Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself ... we do not need to import criteria, or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is in and for itself ... all that is left for us to do is simply to look on" (PS, 53-54). Kenley Dove takes the question of criteria to be a primary reason that Hegel's phenomenological method is descriptive, arguing that "the phenomenological method must not interfere with the movement of the subject-matter ... it is precisely this internal negative movement which the Hegelian phenomenological method seeks to describe." (6)
The question of criteria not only lends support to the idea that Hegel's method is descriptive but also can lead to...
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