The European Convention: bargaining in the shadow of rhetoric.

 
   The European Convention on the Future of Europe was initially 
   presented as a turning point in the history of European integration. 
   This article argues that, although its composition was broader, its 
   process more transparent and its rules more flexible than classic 
   intergovernmental conferences, the Convention was not Europe's 
   Philadelphia. Since it took place under the shadow of the IGC and 
   under a leadership especially sensitive to the positions of big 
   member states, the Convention reproduced, by extension, the logic 
   of intergovernmental bargains. Nevertheless, some of the 
   Convention's outcome--the most formal aspects of its draft treaty 
   with less predictable distributional consequences--can be explained 
   by the 'social norm' of constitutional deliberation conveyed by its 
   president and supported by a majority of its members. 

A constitutional Convention does not come every day in the history of a polity. When in December 2001 at Laeken in Belgium, the heads of state and government of the European Union (EU) agreed on the creation of a 'Convention' with a broad and open mandate to prepare the next reform of the treaties, many claimed that this would be remembered as a turning point in the history of European integration. (1) While no one knew for sure what the outcome of this process would be called, enthusiasts already saw the dawn of a 'Constitutional moment' for Europe. Accordingly, the Laeken declaration meant that EU governments acknowledged the limits of intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) as the prevailing approach for revising the EU's basic treaties. Moreover, the story went, if the EU was to survive the most far-reaching enlargement in its history, it had to move from inter-state diplomacy to a politics more closely resembling domestic politics and adopt a new pact to make such evolution irreversible.

Was the inflated rhetoric borne out? It is no surprise that when, a year and a half later, the Convention adopted its 'draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe' most members of the Convention hailed this outcome as a great success, the proof of the superiority of the 'conventional model'. Others, on the contrary, argued that, in spite of all the constitutional rhetoric it generated, the Convention had been no Philadelphia. It had been business as usual after the initial enthusiasm, as classic forms of bargaining between the governments took centre-stage. As a result, the draft treaty did little more than codify and clarify the acquis, thereby demonstrating that the logic of treaty reform in the EU remains fundamentally unchanged (Moravcsik 2003).

The purpose of this analysis is to address this conflict of interpretations and seek to characterise the current phase of European integration. Are we witnessing the advent of a new form of 'constitutional politics' in the EU? Beyond the traditional debate over intergovernmentalism vs supranationalism, can it be that the very fact of writing a constitution would itself make room for a new kind of European politics? We argue that there has indeed been a Convention paradox. On one hand, the negotiations within and around the Convention did not fundamentally differ from previous treaty reform. In spite of the Convention's formal independence from the governments that had given birth to it, the broader range of actors participating in the process, and the public character of their deliberations, there is little doubt that the work of the Convention took place above all 'in the shadow of the IGC' with the familiar patterns of interests and strategies. And yet, on the other hand, the final result of the Convention would not have been imaginable as the output of an IGC. This outcome, we argue, was due to two contradictory factors: the 'constitutional ethos' pervading the proceedings of the Convention and the special brand of 'forceful leadership' to which it gave rise which combined in almost eliminating strict veto tactics.

WHY A CONVENTION?

In the narrow circles of those who follow the evolution of the EU, a 'constitutional legend' is born. It goes as follows. First, the famous speech of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fisher, in May 2000, resuscitated a 'constitutional ambition' for the EU which, since the failures of the 1950s, had been confined to the federalist groups within and around the EP. This speech gave rise to a broad stream of public reactions among European leaders and intellectuals, and popularised the idea that the EU treaties should be transformed into a single and clear constitution. Second, the how followed the what and the EP, soon supported by the Commission and the traditionally federalist member states, used this context to promote its favourite arguments: since the IGC process is both inefficient and illegitimate, the next revision of the treaties should be prepared by a broader, more representative and open body. It so happened that the Convention which met in 2000 to write the EU's charter of fundamental rights offered an appealing alternative to the IGC method and a credible precedent. Indeed, the contrast between its widely acclaimed results and the 'fiasco' at Nice within a month could not have been greater. Third, this idea was adopted by the Belgian government and became the top priority of its presidency in the second half of 2001 leading to the Laeken declaration.

This is an attractive story, emphasising as it does the role of ideas and institutions. Beyond the headlines and collective myth, however, we must, as is usual with European politics, examine the intergovernmental bargain which gave birth to the Convention if we are to explain its features.