Liberty and paternalism: a reply to Tom Frame.(Philosophy & Ideas)

IN A SERIES of recent Quadrant articles I have attempted to analyse a variety of policy issues from a viewpoint that emphasises the values of a liberal society, one in which approval is generally expressed for individual liberty and moral pluralism. Such a society does not attempt to enforce a detailed moral consensus or a supposedly perfect standard of individual morality (as judged by any religious, cultural, or ideological standard), but enforces only a minimum of important, widely shared moral and social norms.

Unfortunately, this viewpoint is open to a number of overlapping challenges, each with obvious strengths. First, the ideal of a liberal society might be dismissed as being without adequate foundations. Why, it may be asked, should it be given any more credence than rival ideals arising from religious, cultural or ideological viewpoints that assert a far stronger role for the state in controlling the behaviour of its citizens?

Second, the liberal ideal that I have described might be considered unrealistic, partly because it sits uneasily with the post-industrial role of the state. The state's role has expanded enormously since the peak of laissez faire economics in, say, the 1870s. Many of the functions it has taken on in regulating business, trade and finance, gathering taxes, redistributing income and creating public institutions such as hospitals and universities go far beyond what was once envisaged. This expanded role must, it seems, be accommodated. However, if the liberal ideal accommodates too much, how much guidance can it really give us if we apply it to public policy? What, exactly, does it really exclude?

Third, specific arguments can be put as to why the state is justified in exerting greater control over its citizens than the ideal of a liberal society appears to allow. In some cases, these arguments appeal to more of less utilitarian considerations, such as the need to protect people from their own incompetence or folly.

Taken together, all these challenges seem to produce a dilemma. On the one hand, the ideal of a liberal society may need to be elaborated and qualified in many ways if it is to remain attractive. But it might as well be scrapped if it becomes too accommodating and diffuse to remain meaningful. So, should it go on the scrap heap?

MY MAIN CONCERN is the third challenge, that based on specific considerations such as the need for a degree of state paternalism. However, all three challenges seem to be lurking beneath the surface in my recent exchange of views with Dr Tom Frame over the issue of surrogate motherhood or gestational surrogacy,

In "Surrogate Motherhood and Public Policy" (Quadrant, March 2003), I argued that none of the possible forms of gestational surrogacy, including formal commercial arrangements, should be forbidden by law. At the same time, I proposed that the practices of commercial surrogacy agencies should be subjected to regulation to ameliorate their potential harshness for surrogate mothers, and that, in any event, the law should not enforce any contractual terms that would compel surrogate mothers to hand over the custody of children to whom they have given birth.