Prepare for trouble, take risks for success.(What's Next in Iraq?)

It is still far from clear what kind of opposition the United States is confronting in Iraq. Neither the Pentagon nor the Central Intelligence Agency have an accurate picture of the enemy. They know that foreign Sunni jihadists are crossing the Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi borders, but they don't know how many, or how large the local logistical network supporting them is. They don't know how many home-grown Sunni militants there are in Iraq, or how many militants really want a holy war against the "American occupation." They know that former Baathists--Republican Guards, Saddam's security officers, and fedayeen--are killing coalition personnel and allied Iraqis, but they aren't sure of the numbers or level of coordination among the Baathists. Most worrisome, the U.S. military does not know the breadth or depth of support for these various forces existing among the natives of the Sunni belt in central Iraq.

Sunni Arabs probably make up less than 20 percent of Iraq's population. But if a significant slice of the Sunni community supports violence against Americans and allied Iraqis, it is unlikely today's resistance will disappear in the foreseeable future. That needn't block the Bush administration's efforts to create a democratic country. As long as the violence doesn't spread into Shiite regions--and it is a surprising and good sign that the various Sunni forces have not tried more aggressively to wage a campaign against the Americans in the Shiite south--the United States can probably keep progress toward democratic self-government in Iraq alive. The one stumbling block would be if the sustained casualty rate of a soldier a day seriously undermines popular support of the administration back in the United States.

There is no need to flood the Sunni trouble spots with more troops if the United States isn't facing a broad Sunni insurrection. Trying to avoid excessive force in fighting a guerrilla-terrorist enemy hiding amidst a civilian population makes sense. But if the Sunni violence significantly increases, and especially if it expands into the Shiite south, Washington should be prepared to take up the old, ...