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COPYRIGHT 2003 All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission of The Condé Nast Publications Inc.
The first important decision of retired Army General Wesley Clark's new political career was the long deferral of its launch. As Clark lodged safely in the rear echelon, the other Democratic Presidential aspirants spent most of the year hustling money at fund-raisers, finessing the Iraq question, and trying to befriend every citizen of Iowa and New Hampshire. By September, a bleak common wisdom had taken hold among Democratic Party pros: the established candidates were struggling, and an outsider, Howard Dean, seemed destined to win the nomination but would be a weak opponent for George W. Bush.
By mid-September, many Democrats were eager to be convinced that Wesley Clark was what Bill Clinton had reportedly declared him to be--the only Democrat besides Hillary Clinton who qualified as a true political "star." He was the anointed choice of many in the Clinton wing of the Party, the stop-Dean candidate charged with keeping Democrats tethered to the center. When Clark finally announced his candidacy, in Little Rock on September 17th, he was surrounded by old Clinton hands and the national press; a loudspeaker played the theme music from the movie "The Natural."
It quickly became apparent, however, that Clark, in terms of his oratorical prowess or personal magnetism, was not a natural at all. He required heavy handling on the campaign trail, where, as a political novice, he was prone to gaffes, such as his opening-week assertion that he "probably" would have voted for the congressional resolution authorizing the war in Iraq. One of his press representatives described the misstep as "devastating, a huge mistake"; the mood among Democratic activists is unambiguously antiwar, and Clark's subsequent attempts to amend his position have made him seem confused on the subject. (He eventually declared that he didn't know the full content of the resolution.)
Still, Clark ascended immediately to the top in national polls, and he remains in the upper tier of candidates. On a late-night flight from Iowa City to Little Rock shortly after his announcement, I asked him how he explained his appeal. "Democrats are desperate for someone who's got a coherent message and the courage to deliver it," he said. "It just seems to me that much of the Democratic dialogue, preelection, in recent years has been stressed in terms of policies. It's 'He believes in universal health care.' Or 'He believes in something else.' Or it's been expressed in terms of labelling. Like 'He's a moderate,' 'He's a liberal.' I think that my candidacy is not as easily tagged."
Clark seemed to recognize that the central message of his candidacy is Wesley Clark, and the uniform he wore for thirty-four years as an officer in the United States Army. For many Democrats today, the uniform is a kind of talisman, a tool for neutralizing George Bush's perceived strength on national defense. When Clark entered the race, the cartoonist Garry Trudeau devoted a full week of "Doonesbury" to a Clark homage. In one installment, the character Jeff Redfern reads an article about Clark: " 'A brilliant, telegenic, Southern Rhodes Scholar, decorated Vietnam hero and ex-Supreme Commander of nato.' Whew! I wonder if Bush has the slightest clue what he may be up against."
Soon after Clark entered the race, though, another Clinton-era general, Tommy Franks, who retired this summer after directing the capture of Baghdad, was asked in a private setting whether he believed that Clark would make a good President. "Absolutely not," Franks replied. Retired General Hugh Shelton was asked the same question after giving a talk at a college in California. Shelton, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was Clark's boss in 1999 when Clark was unceremoniously told that he was being removed from his position as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. "I've known Wes for a long time," Shelton said. "I will tell you the reason he came out of Europe early had to do with integrity and character issues, things that are very near and dear to my heart. . . . Wes won't get my vote." Shelton has refused to explain how he came to his conclusion.
Clark indicated that he was puzzled by such comments. "I've known Hugh Shelton for years," he said, with a tight smile. "I always liked him." The comments of Franks, Shelton, and others in the Clinton-era military and defense establishment suggest a paradox in Wesley Clark's candidacy for President: his military career, the justification for his candidacy, may also be a liability.
Our conversations began on that flight to Little Rock, as we were squeezed into the rear of a borrowed Beechcraft King Air turboprop. Clark has often been described as tightly wound. He seems almost physically to exude an inner tension. He rarely blinks his eyes. When he does close them, he is able to impose on himself what he calls "sleep discipline," nodding off instantly in the back of a plane, his arms clinched across his chest, tightly wound even in slumber. Our talk resumed a week later in New York, and concluded a week after that in Los Angeles. The subject was how the war in Iraq, which Clark calls a "historic blunder," differed from the 1999 war over Kosovo, which Clark commanded. Clark was welcomed into the campaign by many Democrats as the triumphant commander of Kosovo, and he uses the lessons of Kosovo to explain his criticism of the Iraq war. In a speech at the University of Iowa College of Law, on September 19th, Clark had declared that chief among America's mistakes was that it had gone to war in Iraq without "the mantle of authority" bestowed by United Nations approval. But hadn't the Kosovo war also been conducted without the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council? Yes, Clark allowed, and in that regard the Kosovo war was "technically illegal." He went on, "The Russians and the Chinese said they would both veto it. There was never a chance that it would be authorized." That situation did not seem entirely dissimilar from the prewar maneuverings regarding Iraq, when France and Germany said that they would oppose any Security Council resolution authorizing an immediate war; Bush bypassed the U.N. and resorted to an alliance with Prime Minister Tony Blair's Britain and sundry lesser members of the "coalition of the willing." But there was one more important difference, Clark said: the war against Serbia was waged to stop the imminent threat of ethnic cleansing in the disputed province of Kosovo; the war in Iraq, he said, was waged under false pretenses. He then told me--as he has told others--how he came to learn of a secret war scheme within the Bush Administration, of which Iraq was just one piece.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Clark said, he visited the Pentagon, where an old colleague, a three-star general, confided to him that the civilian authorities running the Pentagon--Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his team--planned to use the September 11th attacks as a pretext for going to war against Iraq. "They made the decision to attack Iraq sometime soon after 9/11," Clark said. "So, rather than searching for a solution to a problem, they had the solution, and their difficulty was to make it appear as though it were in response to a problem." Clark visited the Pentagon a couple of months later, and the same general told him that the Bush team,...
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