About Exemption from Prohibition of Weapons Exports.

(From Journal of Japanese Trade & Industry (JJTI))

Byline: Hatakeyama Noboru

Since 1976 the Government of Japan has prohibited all weapons exports with very few exceptions. These included the return of a MiG-25 fighter which made an emergency landing at Hakodate airport in Hokkaido in 1976 by a pilot who defected from the Soviet Union. Even the return of the fighter to the Soviet Union was interpreted as an export of a weapon. The severe policy prohibiting weapons exports has been applied not only to weapons and their parts but also to their manufacturing technologies. However, in 1983, in consideration of its special ties with the United States based on the Japan-US Security Arrangements, Japan lifted its prohibition on the exports of weapons technologies solely to the United States. Taking advantage of this lifting, Japan and the United States have been conducting joint research on weapons technologies, including missile defense (MD) systems. Now the research stage is almost over, the MD project is entering the joint development and production stage. Since the final MD system will be assembled in the United States, Japan is supposed to manufacture and export the parts and components there. However, the exports of weapons and their exclusive parts are prohibited by Japan's policy, even to the United States. The above mentioned 1983 exception is only applied to the exports of weapons technologies and not to the exports of weapons and parts themselves. On Dec. 10th last year, Hosoda Hiroyuki, the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) of Japan announced an easing of the prohibition on weapons exports to some extent. North Korea has been developing Nodong and Taepodong missiles which could reportedly hit Japan within 10 minutes after their launch. To cope with such a situation, the MD system is indispensable for Japan. Therefore it is necessary for Japan to exempt the exports of parts to the United States for the MD project from the prohibition. In this regard, the statement issued by the CCS is most appropriate. However, this exemption should be limited to Japan's exports of weapons and parts to the United States with which Japan has a special relationship based upon the Security Arrangements. The CCS's statement worries me because it has left room for weapons exports destined for other countries to be approved on a case by case basis. For example, 11 countries are now jointly developing F-35 Strike Fighters under the initiative of the United States. Due to the weapons exports prohibition, Japan has not been participating in this project, and it would be too late to join it even if the government eases its policy. But if the international joint development and production becomes the mainstream of weapons development, and if the project necessitates Japan's weapons exports to other countries than the United States but Japanese policy remains unchanged, Japan would always be left ...