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Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review, November-December 2005 (leavenworth.army.rail)
Although the U.S. Army is an acknowledged master of conventional war, it isn't as adept at tying up loose ends when a conventional war ends. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, a brigadier in the British army who served in Iraq for a year, argues that the Army failed to "exploit success immediately after the fall of Saddam," and was too slow to adapt to changed conditions.
He's especially critical of the bureaucratization of the Army during the years following the first Gulf War, which resulted in an "exodus of the captains." By 2000, the Army could fill just over half of its positions slotted for experienced captains. One result: Prior to 1994, the average "pin-on" time to captain was 54 months; by 2002, this dropped to 38 months, a sign that inexperienced officers were being promoted into demanding posts.
Why did these young officers leave? ...