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For individuals and communities who identify themselves as Native American, few issues carry greater political and economic implications than federal tribal acknowledgment. When Indian tribes attain federal recognition, they enter into a government-to-government relationship that promises partial sovereignty and numerous federal benefits. In theory, federal recognition rests upon the assessment of ethnographic and ethnohistorical data relevant to each tribal entity. In practice, recognition involves a highly politicized process influenced by the relative power of tribes (both those seeking recognition and those already acknowledged), corporations and private landowners, and agents of the state. Due to the significant economic interests at stake in acknowledgment decisions, petitioning tribes often find their claims opposed by corporations whose control of land and other resources would be threatened by federal tribal status. The recognition process thus affords an opportunity to evaluate the role and relative power of local communities and corporations in crafting state policy. A critical examination of this process also takes up Laura Nader's (1974) frequently cited, if less often heeded, appeal for anthropologists to "study up," i.e., to analyze the exercise of bureaucratic and corporate power as it affects local communities that are the traditional subjects of anthropology.
In this article, we examine the relationships among the United Houma Nation (UHN) of southern Louisiana, the region's oil and gas industry, and Louisiana's Congressional representatives, as the Houma pursued federal recognition of their tribal status. In common with more than 100 other native groups that did not enter into formal treaties during the era of U.S. expansion, the Houma identify themselves as an Indian tribe but have had to petition the federal government for such recognition. And, like most petitioners awaiting final determination, the Houma have thus far failed to win acknowledgment. Since the tribe began to seek federal recognition in the late 1980s, its cause has been adopted by powerful allies in the U.S. Congress. The Representative to the U.S. House from Louisiana's Third Congressional District and both of Louisiana's U.S. Senators introduced bills that would have conferred federal recognition on the Houma by legislative flat. That the Houma, an isolated and impoverished rural population, enjoyed such political support is surprising. By endorsing Houma recognition, Louisiana's congressional delegation appeared to act against the interests of their largest political donors, the very oil and gas companies whose control of land and energy resources could be threatened if the Houma acquired federal tribal status.
By examining the myriad interests entailed in legislative efforts on behalf of the Houma, we explore the ways in which officeholders craft policy to engender both the electoral and corporate support necessary for re-election. These political calculations form an ever-present backdrop to relationships between local communities and corporations. In this process, the state's actions are driven as much by the self-interested objectives of officeholders as by the demands of their constituencies, both electoral and corporate. Hence, the role that the state plays in crafting policy is both more variable in outcome and more autonomous than is suggested by prevailing models in political economy, which emphasize the state's direct or indirect control by corporations and other economic elites.
Federal Acknowledgment and Indian Lands
Between 1960 and 1990, the number of Americans identifying themselves as "American Indian" in the U.S. Census more than tripled, far exceeding increases due to population growth. This increased self-identification has been attributed to a variety of factors, including both American Indian activism and the appropriation of native identity as a political and material commodity (Castile 1996). While ethnic pride may have led many to reclaim an Indian identity they had formerly denied, of equal or greater significance are federal policies allocating social and economic benefits to recognized tribes (Nagel 1995: 956). Because of such policies, once impoverished communities have received an economic infusion upon attaining federal tribal status. Writing of the Alabama Poarch Creek tribe and its efforts to gain recognition, Paredes observed that "identity as Indian ultimately maybe the most important economic asset held by poorer, smaller Indian communities" (1974: 77). By 1992, less than a decade after the Poarch Creek had secured acknowledgment, the thousand member tribe had obtained a land base, federal funding for a tribal center, an 80-unit housing development, a fire station, a senior citizens' center, and numerous other community services. Federal funds and proceeds from a highly profitable bingo palace and hotel yielded an annual budget of nearly $8 million, and the once-impoverished tribe had emerged as the fifth largest employer in the county (Paredes 1992: 136).
Acknowledgment is a formal act that delineates government responsibilities toward a tribe's members and affirms the tribe's sovereign status. Federal services for recognized tribes have long included funding for housing, schools, public health services, and scholarships. In recent years, members of acknowledged tribes have also become eligible for affirmative action consideration in employment and contracting. Sovereignty entails some measure of independence from surrounding non-Indian communities, including self-government through tribal councils. These are chosen according to their own constitutions, which must, however, satisfy Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) guidelines. Sovereign status also means that a tribe may institute its own tax structure, exempt its members from taxes by the surrounding state, and operate businesses otherwise restricted in the state. The most dramatic effect of tribal sovereignty since the late 1980s has been the operation of gambling casinos on Indian reservations, established among tribes that have negotiated gaming licenses with surrounding states (Blu 2001: 72). Tribally owned casinos and related businesses, such as hotels and restaurants, annually generate nearly $13 billion of revenue (Olin 2002: 35). More than one-third of all federally recognized tribes now operate casinos on tribal lands in 29 states, and the proceeds from their gaming operations exceed those of Las Vegas (Darian-Smith 2004). Other businesses established on Indian lands benefit from tribal sovereignty by conducting a brisk business in tobacco, alcohol and other products exempted from taxation by surrounding states (Castile 1996). Because of such lucrative uses for Indian lands, the adjudication of land claims and legal protection of lands awarded to tribes are considered among the most significant of acknowledgment benefits. By the same token, the profits from Indian casinos have enabled some tribes to acquire newfound political importance: in California alone, tribal contributions to state political candidates exceeded $42 million between 1999 and 2002 (Darian-Smith 2004: 9).
The adjudication of land claims follows upon precedents established with 371 Indian tribes during the 18th and 19th centuries, when the federal government allotted reservation lands to those tribes that signed treaties with U.S. authorities (Jaimes 1988). Many tribes that attained federal recognition in administrative decisions during the 20th century also received land grants or compensation for lands lost to outsiders in the past. Between 1940 and 1978, the Indian Claims Commission and U.S. federal courts awarded more than $657 million in compensation to federally recognized tribes (Lurie 1978: 101). Two of the three federally recognized tribes in Louisiana have filed for land claims, and one of them recovered $1.3 million in compensation (Gregory 1992: 182). In some cases, even more substantial awards have been granted to petitioning tribes. In 1980, two federally recognized tribes in Maine, the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot, received 300,000 acres of land and a payment of $27 million through the federal courts (Jaimes 1988). Rewards of this magnitude have generated sharp opposition among corporations and private landowners who would be adversely affected by Indian land claims. Searles (1995) notes that land grants and monetary settlements since the early 1980s have declined dramatically in size, largely due to litigation and lobbying by landowners. In one controversial ruling, the Mashpee Wampanoag were denied tribal status after testimony by an array of well-funded expert witnesses hired by opponents of the tribe's land claims (Clifford 1988; Campisi 1991).
Reservation lands awarded before the 20th century were often far from desirable given their known uses at the time, but the later discovery of energy or mineral resources on some Indian lands greatly heightened their value. When oil and minerals were found on lands earlier allocated by treaty, outsiders often alienated those lands, frequently with the complicity of federal and state authorities. Between the declared closing of the frontier in the 1887 Dawes Act and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, more than 80% of the 156 million acres of land awarded by federal treaty to Indian tribes were seized by or transferred to non-Indian homesteaders, investors and corporations (Snipp 1986: 463). (1) Since the passage of the Reorganization Act, widely regarded as the "New Deal for Indians" (Darian-Smith 2004: 44), the rate of tribal land loss has been stanched, and the federal government has required energy, mining, timber and ranching interests that extract resources on reservation lands to pay rents and royalties to Indian tribes.
Although the BIA is charged with overseeing the negotiation of leases by which non-Indians gain access to reservation land for ranching, agriculture, and resource extraction, chronic lack of oversight often resulted in extremely one-sided agreements or outright theft in the past. Oil companies are required to pay royalties for petroleum pumped from Indian lands, but historically the BIA and Indian tribes simply relied on company reports of pumping volumes, which almost invariably understated the amounts of oil removed from reservations (Snipp 1986: 468). While the BIA is also responsible for protecting tribes from unscrupulous business interests, it frequently endorsed leases that returned few benefits for the resources removed from their lands. Leases negotiated in the 1950s and 1960s allowed outside control of Indian lands for up to 99 years, and reimbursed tribes for a tiny percentage of the value of resources extracted by energy companies (Snipp 1986: 468). Because of such abuses, and deriving lessons from the successful strategies of the OPEC countries to regulate the global price and production of oil, leaders from 22 tribes formed the Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) in 1975. (2)
Through advisory and consultation services provided by CERT, American Indians increasingly challenged leases that failed to return fair value for raw materials extracted from tribal lands. A 1981 U.S. Senate Select Committee corroborated Indian claims that the BIA and U.S. Geological Service had failed to monitor oil drilling on Indian land, with the result that many western tribes were deprived of millions of dollars in royalties (United States 1981). Soon energy-producing Indian tribes began to more aggressively negotiate leases, resulting in substantially improved payment conditions. For example, CERT recommended that the Laguna Pueblo tribe reject an offer of $191,000 for a pipeline easement, leading to the negotiation of a $1.5 million lease in its place (Snipp 1986: 469). In a similar case, Atlantic Richfield Oil offered the Navajo $280,000 for an easement routinely approved by the BIA. After conferring with CERT, the tribe declined the offer and negotiated a lease worth $70 million over 20 years (Snipp 1986: 469).
In addition to more assertively negotiating royalty conditions, tribes have required industries that lease land or resource rights from them to post bonds that would cover the cost of environmental damage caused by resource extraction (United States...
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