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COPYRIGHT 2004 The Institute Inc.
Introduction
China's shift from a redistributive system to a market economy has unleashed a series of anticipated and unanticipated changes. Perhaps the most unexpected change is the appearance of a form of social activism that is concerned with improving the quality of life in Chinese society. The impulse to make China a better place in which to live has pushed some people to join groups organized to improve the natural environment. By official count there "are more than 2,000 nongovernmental environmental groups, up from virtually zero a decade ago. China's new green groups inhabit a wide spectrum that range from students to retired workers" (Wonacott 2004, June 15, A13). This is in stark contrast to my memories of a 24-year-old Beijing student telling me in 1981 that one of his life goals was to travel to Qinghai Lake and shoot wild birds with his brother's machine gun. Today, he may be active in an environmental group.
The newfound sensitivity toward the wider social landscape is found in some members of the urban public who are concerned with the prevention of cruelty to animals. This civic activism recently defeated efforts to establish a bullfighting ring just outside Beijing (Magnier, 2004: A6). There is even a newfound empathy for the hardship of the country's farmers. This is evident in the popularity of a recent best seller AN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE CHINESE PEASANTRY (estimated to have sold over 7 million copies) that is written in defense of the peasantry. The authors, Chen Guidi and Chuntao (2004), stressed that China's surging urban economy has done relatively little to benefit the two-thirds of the population living in rural areas (Kahn and Yardley 2004). What is significant is the popular reaction to the tales of countryside corruption and rural backwardness. The book clearly struck a sensitive nerve among many of China's urbanites. It caused some Chinese to feel ashamed and ask: How can the government allow this to happen? This is significant. Fifteen years ago the thinking of most urbanities was that animals exist for their amusement and pleasure, the environment is something to use for personal gain, and the peasant is simply a miserable object. The fact that people are openly discussing these, albeit tacit, assumptions and finding them troubling suggests a new cultural framework in urban China. It is a framework that stands in opposition to the social darwinian ethos favored by China's new business entrepeureurs. Moreover, it is a conceptual framework that links the self with membership within the larger nation (Liu 2002) and thereby, offers an alternative cultural model for how China might be improved.
Market, Nationalism, and Moral Sympathy
Adam Smith (1966) first suggested a strong link between the development of a nationalistic government, the rise of a capitalistic economy, and the expansion of an empathic gaze toward another's plight. The American historian Thomas Haskell (1985, 1998) drew upon Smith's discussion of the origins of moral sentiments to advance the thesis that there is a causal relationship between the appearance of a global trading system and the expansion of an individual's sense of moral inclusiveness and thus obligation to others. In a series of impressive publications, Haskell (1985; 1998; and Haskell and Teichgraeber 1993) sought to explain this relationship. Smith and Haskell (1993) assume that humans are "cognitively and emotionally predisposed towards moral sensibility" (Howell 1997: 10). From this, it follows that once someone becomes aware of misfortune or an injustice, an ethical imperative will arise to do something to alleviate the suffering of others. This imperative, Haskell points out, stimulates us to mitigate another's suffering not only for their benefit but also for the benefit of ourselves.
The Smith-Haskell hypothesis suggests that the rise of a worldwide market system would result in the formation of a new cognitive framework in which individuals perceive themselves in relation to society. In contrast to life in a small scale society, where individuals' empathic response is restricted to their immediate community of residence, faith, or kin, participating in a fully developed market economy requires individuals to become knowledgeable about and involved with other customs and practices. The growth of the market can also amplify a person's understanding about how the social world operates. This understanding results in the development of new ways of acting on the world. People can no longer lightly disregard social injustices and other forms of human suffering. In effect, people are pushed "over the threshold from separating passive sympathy to being engaged in some form of humane action" (Haskell 1985: 556). Individuals now want to do something about the suffering of others that had previously aroused no more than passive sympathy (Haskell 1985: 853).
The Smith-Haskell hypothesis has implications for understanding the impact of market reform on urban life. If the hypothesis is correct, market reforms should result in greater social awareness and, thus, expanded moral empathy for people living in and outside the city. The hypothesis stands in contrast to an earlier scholarly view of the city which perceived it as a corrupting site that dampened an individual's ability to become empathically engaged in another's plight (Simmel 1950; Zhang 1996). Simmel assumed that the density of urban living promoted a blase attitude toward life. In effect, urbanism, especially when linked to capitalistic market economy, did not enhance but numbed one's capacity for empathy. In contrast, Viviana Zelizer notes that Simmel failed to account for "the rich social hues as people improvised different ways to personalize and differentiate monies (1979: 9) for strikingly different uses, such as charitable gifts and civic improvements. For Zelizer (1997), the city is not only the site of alienation, but also the site of richness, possibilities, anticipation, and future achievements. In this scenario, urban life, especially when linked to a market economy, does not dull an individual's ethical sensibilities as much as nurture it. From this perspective, urban mental life expands people's moral horizon, and does not, as Simmel and the romantic writers suggest, eliminate it.
Studies of the history of consumerism routinely emphasize the role of the market in promoting greater consumer choice and personal freedom. These studies suggest that the more dynamic a market system, the more connected are individuals in that system. This new reference perspective accounts for an individual's receptiveness to transnational forces. Participating in the global culture (Appadurai 1990, Croucher 2004) provides a wider frame of reference in which people can reconsider local traditions in light of new information (Gerth 2003: 14-15). Much less commented upon is another attribute of living in a global culture: A heightened sense of responsibility to alleviate misfortune and human suffering. From this it follows that the more fully integrated a community, the greater its interdependence within the global economy (Featherstone 1990). Consequently, communities that are less linked to a national or global economy should have a weakly internalized set of social values such as justice and altruism (Humphrey 1996: 33). To date, there is no study designed to test this hypothesis.
China today presents an opportune moment to revisit this discussion. The shift from a closed work-unit or danwei system to a more open society in many ways mirrors the conditions that were present in Europe during the 17th century. The ability to move and work in different parts of the country, competing media and entertainment outlets, and a sundry of consumer goods provides for an array of choices not available in the previous decade. New economic opportunities enable individuals to realistically speculate about the possibility of working, visiting, and living in distant places. Market reforms also undermined the central place of the work-unit as not only the primary urban social organization but also a distinct way of life that encouraged an inward life-orientation that was organized primarily around local concerns and less with national or international events.
In this paper, I examine the transformation of the Chinese moral universe as it is reflected primarily in their changing evaluation of occupational prestige. The first study took place in 1983, during the height of Chinese socialism in Hohhot, the capital of The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). A follow-up study was conducted in 1987 at the beginning of China's urban market reforms. The third and substantially larger survey (n=844) was conducted in 2000 in two separate cities (e.g., Hohhot and Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, in Southwest China) when the work-unit system was a secondary, albeit still a significant player in the urban economy. In all the studies I was not interested in understanding the Chinese perception of occupational prestige per se. Rather I wanted to know which cultural principles shaped their perception in ranking an occupation as having more or less esteem. Special attention has been given to analyzing the way Chinese place themselves conceptually into hierarchies of social standing, which is the basis for ascribing social prestige. By exploring the cultural principles that frame the urban Chinese perception of social hierarchy, I show that the Chinese conceptual order expanded from the one organized in 1983, around four distinct cultural principles: Extraordinary administrative authority / no administrative authority, academic knowledge/ignorance and the genteel/the crude, by 1987, a new principle-money/no money. The 2000 occupational survey found the appearance of one additional cultural principle (beneficial / not beneficial) for national well being. The emergence of this new principle did not eliminate or undermine the importance of the others. But it did constitute a fundamental shift in our understanding of how present-day Chinese regard their place in society and in the world. This shift in cultural logic has altered the way urbanites perceive their relative social standing. Further, I discuss the significance of almsgiving in the Chinese city as evidence of the appearance of a more fully developed sense of social responsibility. In probing the motivation behind the new occupational rankings as well as the reasons for almsgiving, I demonstrate the presence of a profound transformation in Chinese social and moral consciousness.
Leadership and the Danwei Social Organization
The Communist party came to power promising to curb governmental complacency, corruption, and economic individualism, and thereby rescue Chinese society from impending economic and moral bankruptcy. Under the party's guidance, a "socialist ethos"was promoted that stressed public virtue over individual gain, the importance of self-denial and social obligations, and an overall egalitarian lifestyle. This ethos, the party felt, would improve the moral climate and, in turn, increase the productivity of the entire nation. The linking of productive labor to socialist ethics would allow the ethos to flourish. Toward this end, an increased number of "efficient" production and consumption work units (danwei), or work enterprises, were created to function as combined social, political, and economic institutions by providing, among other things, labor insurance, social security, health benefits, and residency and travel permits, as well as serving as a means to administer marriage and divorce and investigate crime (Walder 1986: 28-29; Southall 1993). In effect, enormous resources of power were placed in the hands of the cadre (ganbu), a new kind of bureaucrat responsible for the management of the state-sponsored work enterprise.
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