Lost in the Baghdad triangle.

Publication: Kurdish Life

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COPYRIGHT 2006 Kurdish Library

"Every American official, commander, adviser or analyst involved in the



occupation insisted on discussing Iraq in terms of Sunni, Shia and Kurd from day one." Laith Saud, Aljazeera, 3.1.06

No wonder Patrick Cockburn reported on the first day of winter: "Iraq is disintegrating. The first results from the parliamentary election last week show the country is dividing between Shia, Sunni and Kurdish regions ... The election marks the final shipwreck of American and British hopes of establishing a pro-Western secular democracy in a united Iraq."

It is a planned shipwreck from which only a U.S. presence can salvage victims and cargo. Iraq is a treasure trove. From the outset the plan has been to rule the unruly trio from a Green fortress in Baghdad. But as life would have it, the best-laid plans are often harder to bring to pass than even the best architects anticipate.

The bloody chaos in that ancient land was bound to worsen. But American equestrians on their British steeds would not quit, hurdles be damned. Instead they would blame amorphous insurgents, boast of "benchmarks," and stump their "strategy for victory." The latest benchmark, the parliamentary elections, had ended days earlier. Not thrilled with the results, U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad shook his head and groaned: "It looks as if people have preferred to vote for their ethnic or sectarian identities. But for Iraq to succeed there has to be cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian co-operation."

For half a year Shiites had ruled Iraq in alliance with Kurds, as Washington wanted. The triangle was never meant to be equilateral. It was meant only to appear so, with just enough Sunni participation to keep the insurgency under control. With secular strongman Ayad Allawi having come up too short of votes, and with the closer to Tehran Shiite Ibrahim al-Jaafari looking toremain prime minister, Washington moved to Plan B. As the Independent put it: "The Kurds, supported by the US, will now try to dilute Shiite control of government by bringing in Sunni ministers and Mr. Allawi." (1.21.06) What did the Kurds in Washington's employ want but what Washington wanted: the more amenable Adel Abdul-Mahdi to be prime minister and the entirely amenable Jalal Talabani to remain president.

Meanwhile the Kurdish parties were having troubles in the Kurdish north. When Baghdad issued an increase in fuel prices, the PUK accepted the dictate, but not the KDP. Kurdish Media explained why: "The Suleimani administration is more pro-Iraqi Arab. In the KDP-controlled region, not a single Iraqi Flag can be found. However, in the PUK-controlled region, next to every Kurdistan flag, there is another Iraqi Flag." Another gripe: "The new Iraqi currency and the new Iraqi passport have not a single Kurdish word written on them." (KM 12.21.06)

On December 23rd the Shiite religious bloc said it was "ready" to discuss Sunni Arab participation in a coalition government. Rest assured they were under considerable pressure from U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to do so. Sunnis were under even more pressure. One day later an Iraqi court would disqualify 90 Sunni candidates from serving in the Iraqi Parliament. The pretext: their "ties" to the Baath party. (NYT 12.24.06) Soon after, the Shiite bloc held talks with Kurdish leaders to divide up the top 12 government jobs.

While thousands of Sunni Arabs and secular Shiites took to the streets to protest what they termed a "tainted" December vote, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the United Iraqi Alliance, met with Massoud Barzani in Arbil. "Today, we held preliminary consultations," he told reporters during a joint press conference. "All the details need to be studied and we need to evaluate the previous alliance and study its weakness and strengths. Then we will try to include the others." By "others" he meant Sunnis. Two days later al-Hakim announced: "We set up the mechanism to elect the new prime minister but have not started it yet. Any member of the Alliance has the right to be nominated for that post." But there were only two main Shiite contenders: al-Jaafari head of the Dawa party, and Adel Abdul-Mahdi, head of SCIRI. Therein lay the rub. Washington, and therefore the Kurds, preferred the latter.

No wonder Ambassador Khalilzad told Cihan news agency: "The Kurds are the U.S.'s strategic partner. The US had left had experiences with Kurds behind due to the Algeria Treaty signed in 1975 sold out the Kurds for a deal between Baghdad and Tehran] but now they are on good terms and expect better relations. Once Kurds did not trust the United States, but that now they have become good allies." (KO 12.31.05) (italics, ours) Apparently the ambassador has a better memory than Barzani and Talabani.

He calls them good "allies." Closer to...

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