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ITEM: In an early October news release, the Arms Control Association reports: "After mope than two years of stop-and-go efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, six countries agreed Sept. 19 in Beijing on a joint statement of principles to guide future negotiations. The product of several weeks of tough diplomacy, the statement commits the participants to achieving 'the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.' The statement contains several ambiguities and leaves many difficult issues to be resolved. Nevertheless, it marks he most important diplomatic achievement of the talks to date."
ITEM: The Washington Post for October 5 reported: "With the fragile framework of a nuclear agreement in hand, President Bush's envoys now plan to push North Korea to begin disclosing the extent and locations of its secret development programs right away to test the sincerity of Pyongyang's commitment to give up its pursuit of atomic weapons.... Bush and his advisers want to translate the pact's ambiguous language into a more concrete set of obligations, senior officials said."
CORRECTION: Contrary to the limp misgivings expressed above, it is more than an "ambiguity" when even the basic aspects of an agreement are interpreted completely differently by the parties involved. What kind of an agreement is it when the parties can't even concur on what is in the deal? As usual, North Korea got most of what it wanted while Washington and its negotiating partners were left with empty boasts that an "agreement" had been effected.
The Bush administration formerly ridiculed the Clinton administration for promising North Korea light-water nuclear reactors to produce electricity (a 1994 agreement that fell apart when it became obvious that Pyongyang was continuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program). As late as this August, the Bush team held that North Korea should have no nuclear reactors whatsoever. Those principles were thrown overboard in the rush to sign a last-minute, take-it-or-leave-it proposal offered by Communist China.
To get Pyongyang's latest worthless promise to abandon its nuclear weapons programs, the U.S. (and South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia) agreed to provide North Korea with a light-water reactor at an "appropriate time"--which meant (at least to Washington) after the dismantlement of the North's weapons program. There were also promises of economic and security aid to the North, as well as electric power from South Korea. The North's underground weapons program was not mentioned.
Pyongyang, however, demands the reactor first. North Korean officials said that Washington "should not even dream" that Pyongyang would give up its nuclear weapons program until it first receives a light-water nuclear reactor. "The physical foundation of consolidating trust between our nations is a light-water reactor," a top North Korean official told the Associated Press in early October.
Yet, realistically, why should the Stalinist regime give up its nukes? They are virtually the only thing that makes North Korea more important than, say, Eritrea or Paraguay. It has been playing ...