Moral communities and the state: a rejoinder to Russell Blackford.

CONSTRUCTIVE and courteous debate occurs occasionally more than frequently in this country. The desire to win an argument and discredit one's opponent often produces more heat than light while it destroys the conditions conducive to continuing dialogue. Regrettably, public discourse involving an element of disagreement is often a one-act drama as the participants depart feeling either vindicated or offended. And if there is a second act, the players usually raise their voices rather than improve their arguments.

It is for these reasons that I appreciated the tenor of Dr Russell Blackford's response ("Liberty and Paternalism", Quadrant, June 2004) to my article on commercial surrogacy (June 2003) and the opportunities it presented for an extended discussion. In this rejoinder, I want to comment on Blackford's specific criticisms of my position on commercial surrogacy before placing my own views on this particular subject within a broader context. While I suspect we will have to agree to disagree on limits to the conduct of surrogacy, I hope my remarks on the relationship between those with a religious outlook and the state might open a new front for a fruitful exchange of ideas on paternalism and the necessity of restraints on personal liberty.

SURROGACY

THESE IS a difficulty when debating matters like commercial surrogacy of not examining the specifics of existing regulations or proposed public policy. The devil is perennially in the detail. Principles are not easily converted into policies, and policies are not readily given substance in legislation. Conversely, the application of law can encourage actions or produce outcomes that might never have been intended or imagined by legislators. Blackford raises three specific objections to my proposals for limiting surrogacy.

First, why must surrogacy be a last resort? Society must confirm that a woman seeking surrogacy cannot become pregnant and give birth before sanctioning any form of surrogacy, as a means of ensuring she is not wishing to avoid gestation and labour on the grounds of personal convenience. As an extreme response to infertility, surrogacy is about necessity, not preference.

As for the commercial element that would feature in an arrangement not prompted by necessity: once surrogacy has even the smallest commercial element, the character of the activity is altered and the relationship between the commissioning couple and the surrogate changes. Both parties to a surrogacy agreement inevitably become demanding and altruism is rapidly replaced by contractualism. People are then hurt. Generosity is squeezed out by compliance. It is already very difficult to detect the presence of financial dimensions in arrangements that are meant to be purely altruistic. While we might try to limit the commercial element by legal means, I think it would be almost impossible to define limits that would be acknowledged and respected.

Second, why have I restricted surrogacy to what Blackford describes as "traditional" heterosexual couples? My concern in doing so is both practical and pastoral. Experience has shown that surrogacy places great stress on the relationships of all parties involved in the arrangement. Because stable, long-term heterosexual relationships are demonstrably the most resilient in our society, the commissioning couple ought to be in such a relationship for their own sakes and that of the child to be born though surrogacy. I would even want the couples to be legally married to further undergird the relationship in what will be a difficult time for all concerned. Surrogacies allowed outside these strict parameters have been less than successful.