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COPYRIGHT 2005 East European Quarterly
Introduction
Small states as a unit of analysis have been presenting political science researchers with challenging research puzzles for several decades. While numerous investigations concerned with problems of modern statehood, sovereignty, and survival of small states were undertaken during the 1950s to the late 1970s, the motivation to study small states began to dissipate in the early 1980s. Eventually, efforts to learn more about small state behavior were given up, primarily due to the loss of interest in the subject by American political scientists who did and continue to define the interests of the political science discipline (Christmas-Moller 1983). As a result of this, research on small states has been largely neglected for a decade or so in the United States. However, with the disintegration of the USSR and the formation of numerous new states, the matter began to receive renewed attention from the scholars of contemporary international relations as new theoretical and substantive puzzles emerged.
One such area of small states' behavior relates to their foreign policy choices in the international environment: why do these states choose certain foreign policies over others, and what are the factors that influence and shape their choices? Within this context, this paper examines the foreign policy formulation and evolution in the Baltic States during the 1991-1999 period, revealing how the three countries' foreign policies have changed over a decade, and what role the leadership factor played in the process. The strength and significance of explanations derived from the conventional theoretical approaches on Baltic foreign policies (e.g., small state and domestic politics theories) are evaluated first. Then the study incorporates an alternative approach, which focuses on leaders and their personal characteristics, to complement the two conventional approaches, arguing that an individual-level perspective brings in new insights into analysis of Baltic States' foreign policymaking of the 1990s.
More specifically, the study attempts to assess how different individuals in key foreign policymaking positions have influenced the choice of foreign policy preferences. The central claim this paper advances is that Baltic States' foreign policies were not solely shaped by the external and domestic environments, but were also conditioned by the individuals in charge of foreign policymaking (Gricius 1994; Haab 1995; Gimius 1997; Bleiere 1998; Lejins 1999). In other words, it is argued that Baltic leaders were not just merely pawns in the process of conducting their states' foreign policies, but actually had personal preferences as to which policy options should be favored and thus left personal imprints in their states' foreign policy behavior.
Theoretical Perspectives
Conventional Approaches
Foreign policies of the Baltic States, as well as East European states in general, has been studied by applying a variety of theoretical approaches such as realism, interdependence, regionalism, small state theory, domestic-level theories, learning theory, and the like. Undoubtedly, these theories and approaches have contributed to the understanding of these states' foreign policy behavior. For a long time it has been assumed that the most persuasive explanation on this issue has been offered by the small state theory (sometimes also referred to as "weak-state theory") (Barston 1973). This is because the small state perspective not only specifically focuses on the analysis of small state behavior, but also helps identify the foreign policy options available for such states. Five major foreign policy options are highlighted in the small state literature: 1) military alliance, 2) economic union/alliance, 3) regional cooperation arrangements, 4) neutrality policy, and 5) membership in international organizations (Rosenau 1966; Rothstein 1968; Amstrup 1976; Schou and Bruntland 1971; Vital 1971; Rapoport 1971; Vayrynen 1971; Barston 1973; Holl 1983; Handel 1990).
Since small states have several foreign policy options to choose from, one may ask what factors determine their preference for one option rather than another. In general, a small state's choice of foreign policy options is influenced by three factors emphasized in the small state literature: a state's geographic location and its distance from large power(s); a state's size and its material and human resources; and the external environment (Rosenau 1966; Barston 1973; McGowan and O'Leary 1975; Mandelbaum 1988; Jundzis 1996). Research on small state foreign policy behavior also suggests that the choice of foreign policy options depends on a combination of the above listed factors, some of which may be of greater importance than the others. Table 1 presents some key variables that affect the choice of small state's foreign policy options as outlined in the small state literature.
Although the predictions and analyses offered by the small state theory are valuable and valid in many instances, in the analysis of the Baltic countries' case they are not fully satisfactory. One of the major weaknesses of the small state theory is that it not only fails to identify the reasons but also cannot predict why a state would choose to change its foreign policy when its external environment remains nearly constant, or why similar states in a similar environment would develop different foreign policy preferences, ceteris paribus.
Another shortcoming of the small state theory is that it regards a state as a unitary actor, assuming that "all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave the same in given situations" (George 1993: 9). Since the small state theory has been predominantly constructed and derived from the realist school of thought, such an assumption is not surprising. However, numerous examples in international politics show that even similar states, as is the case with the three Baltic States, do not always behave in the same way in similar situations.
Another conventional approach used in small state foreign policy analyses is domestic-level theories (Barston 1973). Domestic politics perspective is important because it allows us to identify the internal forces that could pressure the government to favor one specific foreign policy option over another (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). According to this approach, such factors as public opinion, interest groups, political parties, and media may play significant role in influencing foreign policy goals of a state (Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Hagan 1993, 1995; Hudson 1995; Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley 2002). Table 2 provides a list of key factors highlighted in the domestic politics theory that may affect state's foreign policy preferences.
Similar to the small state theory, insights offered by domestic politics perspective in the analysis of the Baltic foreign policy evolution are neither adequate nor fully comprehensive. Its major drawback is that when used by itself, this theory cannot provide sufficiently sound explanations as to why the continuity in a state's foreign policy will be disrupted and a policy change is likely to follow if: I) internal forces (e.g., the public, interest groups, the media, or political parties) do not exert any pressure in favor of a particular foreign policy option; 2) there is no fundamental alteration in societal attitudes or profound transformation of the entire political system; or 3) similar domestic circumstances develop in similar states but result in different outcomes (Hermann 1990). In such cases, explanations provided by domestic-level theories fall short of providing complete and comprehensive elucidations of a state's changing foreign policy preferences.
Alternative Theoretical Approach
To overcome the weaknesses of small state and domestic-level theories, an alternative--so-called individual-level--approach that offers complementary and, arguably, more compelling explanations of the foreign policy preferences of the Baltic States is incorporated into this study's analytical framework. An individual-level approach seeks to unravel the effects leaders may have on foreign policymaking. By focusing on policymakers themselves, this theoretical perspective shows how individuals decide to pursue a particular policy, why they construct the foreign policy choices the way they do, and how they influence the foreign policy formulation process. The core premise of the individual-level approach is that individual leaders or, more specifically, their personal psychological or idiosyncratic characteristics can have a relatively significant impact in shaping the foreign policy behavior of a state (de Rivera 1968). For this reason, "knowledge about the particularities of the people making foreign policy decisions [becomes] critical to understanding the nature of these choices" (Hudson 1995: 214). In this respect, an individual-level approach appears to be highly relevant to an examination of the foreign policies of small states and the role that leadership plays in the policy formation process.
Literature on political leadership lists numerous factors that may influence the foreign policy preferences and choices of a leader (e.g., beliefs, perceptions, motives, leadership style, background factors, personal needs such as need for power, affiliation, etc.; see Table 3) (de Rivera 1968; Tucker 1977; Hermann 1977, 1978, 1980, 1986; Holsti 1962, 1976; Jervis 1976). Depending on a situation and context, some of these personal traits may be of greater importance than others. For the purposes of this research study, however, I will primarily focus on the individual's background factors (e.g., political career; leader's beliefs, interests, and training/expertise in foreign affairs; and individual's sensitivity to environment).
Baltic Foreign Policies: Formulation and Evolution
With official international recognition of their statehood in 1991, the governments of the Baltic States were pursuing several foreign security policy options, namely neutrality, regional Baltic cooperation, integration into the EU, and membership in NATO (Vares and Zurjani 1995). There is little doubt that the choice of foreign security options pursued by the three countries, as explained from the perspective of the small state theory, was determined by external constraints, namely the country's geostrategic situation, lack of material resources, military weakness, proximity to Russia, and the like (Marsh 1998; Hansen and Heurlin 1998; Norgaard and Johannsen 1999). By taking into consideration such tangible factors, and in light of the fact that the international environment has changed after the break-up of the USSR in August 1991, the neutrality policy was given up. Instead, establishment of a closer cooperation with the closest neighbors--Scandinavia and Poland--and, most importantly, with the West became a number one priority.
Such a pro-Western orientation was not surprising. As prescribed by the small state theory, the three small Baltic nations have sought to counterbalance and escape the Russian influence, associating it with poverty, unpredictability, lack of democracy, and ever-present threat, while perceiving the West as a guarantor of stability, prosperity, and democracy (Uncaptive Minds 1994). On a broader scale, one could even argue that Estonia's, Latvia's, and Lithuania's foreign policies lacked "meaningful alternatives" in terms of orientation (Park 1995). Given the perceptions of Russia that Baltic populations and leaders had, combined with the desire to disassociate these countries from Russia and everything Russian, it was obvious that the Baltic States would favor a western alignment rather than reintegrate into the newly established Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), which was viewed as the recreation of the USSR.
Having defined their foreign policy orientation and having decided to seek integration with the Western community, the Baltic States began applying for membership in various international organizations. In a relatively short period (1991-1994) they were admitted into the UN, Council of the Baltic Sea States, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Council of Europe, Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe (predecessor of the OCSE), and other similar multilateral institutions (Holoboff 1995). At the same time, even if the Baltic countries' membership in international organizations was considered of crucial political importance, it was, nevertheless, viewed as a complementary rather than a primary foreign policy option.
Ultimately, the pro-western orientation pursued by the Baltic governments narrowed the choice of foreign policy options, leaving but three--Baltic regional cooperation, membership in the EU, and joining of NATO. Although interests to join NATO and the EU were expressed in the early 1990s, the Baltic applications for membership in NATO were made official only in 1994 and for the EU in 1995. Without doubt, these two alliances were considered to be the best assurances for a small state's "political independence, national security and economic development" (Vayrynen 1989: 205). From the mid-1990s, however, each of the three states began ordering and re-ranking their foreign policy preferences somewhat differently, while the Baltic regional cooperation started to disintegrate. (1)
To summarize, since 1990 the Baltic States have adopted a pro-Western orientation, seeking integration with the Western political and economic institutions. To achieve this goal, they pursued three foreign policy options: 1) declarative type of neutrality until 1991; 2) Baltic regional cooperation, which peaked between 1990 and 1994; and 3) integration into multilateral defense and economic alliances (NATO and the EU) (see Fig. 1). In all respects, these policies are consistent with the foreign policy options outlined in the small state literature.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The outside environment with its external pressures and influences, however, was not the only determining factor that shaped Baltic States' foreign policies. As indicated above, around the mid-1990s Baltic governments began to prioritize different dimensions of their foreign policies. Thus, Estonian policymakers, differently from the Lithuanian and Latvian leaders, decided to prioritize economic aspects of foreign policy, namely membership in the EU; Lithuania placed its focus on the military dimension, striving to become a NATO member first; Latvia chose the "golden" middle on a foreign policy preference scale (2) (Gricius 1994; Haab 1995; Vitkus 1997; Bleiere 1998; Lejins 1999; Miniotaite 1999). Why did the three states choose to emphasize different foreign policy dimensions? The small state theory clearly cannot provide sound answers to this question. Would domestic-level theories be more helpful?
Unfortunately, if the domestic politics perspective is considered, the answers do not appear to be completely compelling either. For one, the Baltic population had only a very general notion that the country should take a pro-Western orientation, and that it should be disassociating itself from Russia and the CIS as much as possible. At the same time, however, the public in the Baltics had no strong opinion on which foreign policy dimension--security/military or economic--should be given preference, or how this preference should be implemented (Huang 1999a; Estonian Human Development Report 1999; Public Awareness Workshop on Security Issues in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 1998; See Table 4). Moreover, in the first decade since regained independence, it was the top leadership rather than public opinion that guided and took charge of foreign policy formulation and goals. Indeed, credible and abundant evidence exists, suggesting that in the 1990s public opinion and views/preferences of the general population not only played an inconsequential role in Baltic States' foreign policy formulation, but there was also a noticeable mismatch between the opinions of the public and those of the top elite (Ozolina 1998a; Norgaard and Johannsen...
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