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COPYRIGHT 2005 Professors World Peace Academy
Vladimir Putin wants to create a stronger state in Russia, to make it more governable, and to reduce corruption so that its economy can be competitive. The author discusses Putin's plans, his view of the role of law, the problems he has inherited from the Yeltsin era, and his relationship to judges, oligarchs, and leaders of other governments that make up the Russian Federation. The author predicts a flurry of legislation aimed at strengthening the central government, as well as a backlash to this legislation. The question, if this legislation gets passed, is whether it will lead to a state consistent with Putin's objectives. The author is pessimistic because he does not believe that political competition in Russia is adequate and that leaders may manipulate the law rather than being constrained by it.
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Recently it has become fashionable to criticize Vladimir Putin for curbing rather than encouraging democracy in Russia, pointing for example to his proposal after the September attack on the school in Beslan that Russia abandon direct elections of governors of regions and presidents of republics. The critics are right, but fail to take into account what Putin is trying to accomplish and the challenges posed by governance in the large and diverse country that is the Russian Federation.
Above all, the Russian president wants to strengthen the state to make Russia governable. In itself this goal need not threaten democracy or a market economy. On the contrary, theorists of transition agree that without an effective state a democracy can be neither deep nor lasting. (1) By a strong state most scholars mean one with a reasonable degree of legal hierarchy and with mechanisms that ensure that officials implement laws and policies most of the time. Or, that formal institutions or rules are supplemented rather than supplanted by informal practices, such as corruption. (2)
While Vladimir Putin would no doubt like to have such a state, his approach to state-building has been shaped by the short term challenge of overcoming the most obvious signs of state weakness. In his first term in office, this meant restoring the power of the central government to reverse the diffusion of power under Yeltsin to both the regions and republics (the equivalent of provinces in Canada) and the business tycoons known as "oligarchs." It meant, as well, planning a reform of public administration to curb the dominance of personal networks in government. But in his second term that began in winter 2004 Putin changed his standard. A strong state in Russia came to mean not merely a reasonable degree of central direction but also the "perfection of a system of power" (Putin's own words) in which the various players, be they governors, oligarchs, or even judges could be relied upon to cooperate with the President in the crunch. (3) The irony is that a Russian state that emphasizes coordination without competition will likely encourage informal institutions and practices rather than the observance of formal rules, and as a result weaken rather than strengthen the capacity of the state.
On his accession to the presidency Vladimir Putin was well-aware of the diffusion of power that had occurred...
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