Inspections That Work.(Brief Article)(Interview)

No one has to convince Robert Gallucci that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man. In the past 10 years, he's come to know the wily dictator's methods well. In 1991 Gallucci served as deputy executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the international agency overseeing the disarmament of Iraq. Since then he's worked on non-proliferation issues in the former Soviet Union, negotiated with the North Koreans and served as former president Bill Clinton's global point man on issues of proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. Currently dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Gallucci remains one of Washington's foremost experts on weapons proliferation. He spoke last week with NEWSWEEK's Adam Piore on the challenges facing any inspection regime in Iraq. Excerpts:

What type of weapons do you think Iraq now has?

I think there's a very, very high probability--close to a certainty-- that they have regenerated chemical weapons, both mustard and nerve agents, and biological weapons, both toxics and bacteriological weapons. The issue of uncertainty is whether they've gone into viral weapons and made substantial progress in nuclear weapons.

Do you think it's possible to make inspections work?

I think our objective has to be clear and agreed upon. Iraq must believe--Saddam must believe--that if he does not accept an extraordinarily intrusive inspection regime that the alternative will be an invasion and regime change. But he also has to be convinced that if he does accept it, there will not be an invasion and regime change. If the administration is not serious, if their real intent is regime change, then I don't think inspections are a good idea.

What is needed for the inspections to be effective?

The first thing is no sanctuaries and no-notice inspections: any place, any time without notice. There are no palaces, there are no Islamic holidays, no military locations that are out of bounds. Second, we must know where to go. We would rely on intelligence from concerned states, and on information from defectors and others. So it's important that inspectors be able to engage in a dialogue that is a two-way street with concerned nations. This is a sensitive and controversial position because there is a lot of thinking that the United Nations can't do this or oughtn't to do this. The rejoinder is this is not a normal state. Iraq is a hostile environment and should be dealt with ...