The Age of Gulliver.(United States militarism, foreign policy)(Brief Article)

There was George W. Bush's galvanizing State of the Union speech. Then came the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in New York--an occasion for a U.S. "power fiesta," with key officials of the Bush administration aligned on the determined assertion of U.S. security and strategic interests, whether America's friends or foes like it or not. Now comes the mind-boggling boost in military spending: a $48 billion increase next year alone. If ever there were doubts about the new world order, they are now at rest. The extraordinary events of September 11 and its aftermath demonstrate new geopolitical realities:

First, America is emerging stronger from the crisis. Not since the Roman Empire has any state enjoyed such absolute supremacy, in every domain, as the United States today. Americans may feel vulnerable after September 11. But this seems only to reinforce the sense of determination and uninhibited strength that the Bush administration projects into its actions and foreign pronouncements. Washington is clearly moving more and more toward proactive policies that advance its strategic interests.

Europeans are unsettled by such bluntness. The "axis of evil" worries them, as does the president's warning that America will not sit idly as potential adversaries develop weapons of mass destruction. They reassure themselves by suggesting that the tough new language is for a U.S. audience--swaggering political rhetoric, with an eye on the November elections. They are wrong. Bush makes professional diplomats nervous because he speaks plain language, and he means what he says.

September 11 marks the death of the Vietnam syndrome, a watershed. For 26 years, ever since its humiliating evacuations from Saigon and Phnom Penh, America has been deeply ambivalent about its role and the use of power in the world. While it grew progressively dominant in every realm--especially since the mid-'80s--it was never quite certain whether, how or when it should exercise its might. It definitely was not ready to pay the price of being the sole superpower, particularly when that price could be counted in body bags, as in Somalia.

That changed with September 11. Gone, suddenly, is the diffidence and soul-searching of the post-Vietnam era. Gone too is the Powell doctrine, with its emphasis on a "casualties-free" exercise of U.S. power. If one thing distinguishes the Bush administration to date, it's the strong belief that power is to be used as extensively as necessary to protect and further U.S. interests, and without dressing it up as some lofty U.S. mission to save humanity. Implicit in this new policy is the recognition that power comes at a price (albeit a price lower than might be paid if Washington allowed adversaries to continue thinking of it as vacillating and procrastinating when ...