A Fight Against The Faceless.(War on Terrorism, 2001-)(Brief Article)

In the first day after the attack on America, it appeared that there was almost a global constituency instantly built in favor of a war against terrorism. But for how long will Le Monde's headline of midmonth--we are all Americans now--serve as a genuine political rallying cry to unite and mobilize a hugely diverse network of states? Sustaining a coalition against an enemy depends on maintaining a constant image of the ever-present threat and perpetual evil against which one must fight.

The cold war had the image of the Kremlin and its arsenal of nuclear weapons. But how, in the Information Age, can one sustain the coalition against terrorism, against an anonymous enemy that does not show his face? And to the degree the enemy has a face, that of Osama bin Laden, can the coalition be kept together in the event he disappears from the scene or is killed, even though his and other terrorist networks will remain active?

In the Information Age, the branding of the effort is as important as the packaging. This is also true in the modern age of law. This is where the use of the word "war" may cause problems. The campaign needs to be fought on several fronts. The control of financial flows, the sharing of information on individuals linked with terrorist groups and political cooperation to sustain weaker members of the coalition will be vital elements. The language of war is not best suited to define these activities. More important, in the campaign against terrorism, it will be vital to avoid the unhelpful intrusion of the laws of war. If this were a war in the true sense, the combatants would have rights as well as obligations: the right to attack military installations and the right to be treated as prisoners of war. It is no accident that in dealing with the Irish Republican Army, the British always referred to the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, despite the ferocity of the violence. No one wanted to confer legal rights or excessive political legitimacy on those who depended on terrorism to achieve their goals. The Americans would do well to keep this European precedent in mind.

Maintaining a coalition depends, too, on what is asked of the partners and how they are implicated in the activities of its leader. NATO's decision to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will of necessity implicate the European members in America's military response. This could make key infrastructure in Europe, whether American or European, a potential target for remaining terrorist networks. This will be all the more true if Europeans do not commit themselves strongly to improved "homeland defense" procedures and are perceived to be more exposed than the United States.

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