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Indonesian Army Gen. Endriartono Sutarto seems at his best in tight spots. In 1998, just before the fall of President Suharto, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, the former dictator's powerful son-in-law, demanded that Sutarto swear an oath of loyalty to defend the beleaguered president. Sutarto refused, saying a soldier's allegiance is to the country, not to any individual. The general's mettle was tested again this year by President Abdurrahman Wahid, who's fighting for his political life. At least three times since January, Wahid has asked Sutarto, now the Army's chief of staff, to support a state-of-emergency decree, the first step in the president's effort to "freeze" and ultimately disband a hostile Parliament. By doing so the president was in effect offering Sutarto--and the Indonesian military--a chance to regain much of the power the armed forces had lost when Suharto resigned three years ago.
Once again Sutarto, 54, refused. The stocky, U.S.-trained military leader is no fool: he knows that martial law is "bad for the nation." He also recognizes that the military must transform itself into a more disciplined and professional outfit under civilian control. Sutarto gave Wahid no choice but to abide by the Constitution. Relieved Indonesians hailed Sutarto's stand. "The military is acting responsibly," says political analyst Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Adds Juwono Sudarsono, Wahid's former Defense minister: "Ironically, people now see the military as the defender of democracy against the president's authoritarian threats."
Over the past six months Indonesia's armed forces have staged an amazing comeback. Long scorned as a brutal instrument of repression, the military is now arguably the only stabilizing force in a shaky country. Harold Crouch, an Indonesia expert, says that the military's resistance to Wahid is a sign of maturity. "It was a smart, defensive reaction," says Crouch. "The military didn't want to be dragged into the political fray." The generals are keenly aware that they have neither the capability nor the popular support to take over the country--or to fix it. "They know they would encounter fierce domestic resistance and international condemnation," says Anwar. "And they know they don't have a clue about dealing with our economic and financial troubles, the IMF, bank restructuring or private debt."
Wahid and his predecessor, B. J. Habibie, contributed to the military's new reserve. When Wahid became president, one of his first priorities was to establish firm civilian control over the ...