The Politics of Legitimacy in International Relations. A Critical Examination of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo.

Hideaki Shinoda [*]

There was an interesting, although militarily insignificant, discrepancy among the leaders of NATO, while the alliance conducted the air campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999. This discrepancy concerned the way in which their action should be described. In the press conference following the attack upon Yugoslavia over the issue of Kosovo, NATO's spokesmen repeatedly emphasized that they were not waging war. This was the official view of NATO headquarters. Consequently, a majority of journalists at first seemed to hesitate to call the military operation a war, despite growing suspicion. Preferred expressions to designate it were air campaign, air strikes, and the like. However, the most hawkish figure in Operation Allied Force, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, did not refrain from using the word war, although he believed that it was not a normal war, but a just war. This "doctrine of the international community" sharply contradicted even his defense secretary, George Robertson, who remarked in a House of Commons Select Committee debate on defense on March 24, 1999, that "It is not a war." [1]

The discrepancy reflects the difference between moderate figures who did not dare to elaborate on a "just war" theory and the politician who insisted upon sending in ground troops. However, in more theoretical terms, it expresses the complex normative structure of international society. The question about war and peace in the context of the use of force is always concerned with the issue of legitimacy, on which the characterization of actions like military intervention depends. There are certainly many conflicting views about the conceptual map of war, peace, and legitimacy in international society. In international society where no written constitutional law exists, the issue of legitimacy as an object of political struggles determines the conceptual nature of war and peace.

This article explores the issue of legitimacy in international relations in conceptualizing war and peace. It focuses on the case of NATO's intervention in Kosovo as a signpost of intervention in the post-Cold War world. In so doing, the article examines and assesses the achievements of the NATO action in the normative structure of international society. The first section attempts a typology of ways to justify the military intervention by looking at the discourses of NATO leaders. The second section considers the implications of the NATO action in the normative framework of international society. Finally, I draw attention to the theoretical problem regarding legitimacy, war, and peace exemplified by Operation Allied Force.

Typology of Justifications for NATO's Intervention

The Official View of NATO Headquarters

The official view of NATO denied the existence of war in Kosovo. How was it possible to say that, despite the heavy exchange of weaponry attacks, NATO was not engaged in a war? According to Javier Solana, the then secretary-general of NATO, at a press conference on March 25, 1999, the air strikes to be launched the next day were legitimate and therefore not a war. He stated that