Modernity, Freedom, and the State: Hegel's Concept of Patriotism.

Hegel's concept of patriotism helps specify an account of the just association of collective identity and state power. This concept has three main features. First, as a distinctly modem virtue, patriotism is limited by Hegel's account of modernity and its link to "subjective freedom." Second, patriotism forges an important connection between critical reflection and habitual practice, illuminated in a comparison of Hegel's thoughts on ethical education with Aristotelian practical philosophy Third, these first two dimensions are brought together with a decision grounded in the acceptance of the irreducibly collective dimension of freedom -- the will to war for one's country Hegel's account of war is also a "test case" for his internally limited patriotism, as a comparison with Kant's argument for "perpetual peace" reveals. In conclusion, this account connects traditional liberal institutions with a republican concern for self-rule in a framework that offers legitimate bounds to a "right to national self-determ ination."

All around the world the relationship of the state to collective identity has become the source of conflict, revolution, and the devolution of established political communities. Perhaps more than any other concern, nationalist and patriotic movements raise seemingly contradictory sentiments in the Western moral mind. On the one hand, we seem to "respect the right of self-determination of peoples," and, on the other hand, we look with horror at the violence and genocide that claims for the association of state power and particular ethnic identities have caused in places like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. We struggle to find ways to reconcile fundamental impulses of universal respect for persons, with an appreciation of the value of individual cultures. We wonder which national groups deserve to associate state power with their particular identities and which do not.

Contemporary theoretical reflection on these issues has developed two general, and opposing, positions--"cosmopolitanism" and "patriotism." For cosmopolitan universalists like Martha Nussbaum, we must treat the collective memberships of persons (with the exception of their "world citizenship") as "morally irrelevant," or simply as "special affections or identifications." [1] The cosmopolitan is one "who puts right before country and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging." [2] Here there is no moral value to national membership, a dismissal of unreflective cultural and social practices, and a fundamental opposition to the association of state power and collective identity. By contrast, for patriots like Alisdair MacIntyre, "I find my justification for allegiance to...rules of morality in my particular community; deprived of the life of that community, I would have no reason to be moral." [3] On this view, morality is "learned from and through the way of life of some particular community" i n both its explicit rules, and its particular practices and habits which are bound up with particular institutions. [4] Here there are no apparent standards by which to evaluate the character of this patriotic morality that seemingly yields a "cultural relativism," impotent to challenge the horrific associations of state power and identity which may result in violence, war, and genocide. [5]

The strength of this contemporary thinking about "patriotism" and "cosmopolitanism" lies in the capable illumination of tensions between these two outlooks. We now understand the contradictions between universality and particularity, and between theoretical rationality and practical habit. What is disturbing about this thinking, however, is the legacy it has produced. We appear to be in a quandary; facing an irreconcilable, polar, binary opposition of patriotism against cosmopolitanism. Instead, my view is that we should move out from the explanation of the contradictions between patriotism and cosmopolitanism toward an account which shows how and why these elements hang together in Western moral experience.

Hegel is an important and under-appreciated resource in helping us to articulate the ways in which these "patriotic" and "cosmopolitan" views can be connected. Yet, the argument here is emphatically not that the Hegelian method achieves the perfect synthesis of reconciliation between all contradictions in this debate. Instead, my position is that Hegel's thought points to the ground on which an account of the coherent integration of some elements of both "patriotism" and "cosmopolitanism" can be built. It shows us how we can begin to explain not just the sense of moral conflict that the association of identity and state power inspires, but also the sense of justice the Western moral mind finds in this association.

In this spirit, this article focuses on elaborating Hegel's teachings on patriotism. Hegel's account has three main features. Firstly, by seeing patriotism as a distinctly modern virtue, Hegel connects particularistic communal loyalty to an important universal principle which, in turn, limits the particularistic commitment. For Hegel, patriotism is a disposition which embodies modern freedom as choice, and which is properly exercised only in contexts which preserve and promote this modern freedom. I argue this shows how apparently conflicting liberal and republican impulses converge on a contextually sensitive understanding of the rule of law. Secondly, Hegel's account of patriotism forges an important link between critical, rational reflection and more unreflective habitual practice. I illuminate this connection by discussing Hegel's thoughts on ethical education in the context of Aristotelian practical philosophy. Thirdly, these first two dimensions are brought together in an account of what is a classic m easure of patriotism--the will to war for one's country. This decision is grounded in the free choice to live freely, the highest act of the Hegelian citizen. The account of war is also important as a "test case," in Hegel's own writings, for the ways in which "modern patriotism" is internally self-limiting. I illustrate this mechanism of self-limitation by comparing Hegel's account of a just and limited war to Kant's prescription for "perpetual peace." In conclusion, I suggest the ways in which this account may well be useful to the liberal states of the modern West in evaluating the justice of claims to self-determination of national groups, especially within their own borders.

Modernity and Patriotism

While Hegel does not explicitly contrast the modern "political disposition" or "patriotism" with pre-modern forms of allegiance or loyalty to the political community, there are three ways in which his description of patriotism reveals its inherent modernity. [6] These modern dimensions, in turn, prescribe the limits of the proper extent and objects of patriotic commitment.

First, in contrast to many cosmopolitan characterizations of patriotism, Hegel describes this disposition as a state "in which rationality is actually present," [7] and "rationality" (die Vern[ddot{u}]nftigkeit) has a peculiarly modern connotation for Hegel. In The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel characterizes "rationality" as the development of a distinctive form of modern thinking toward reconciliation, and contrasts it with the earlier, fragmentary activity of human understanding (die Verst[ddot{a}]ndigkeit). [8]

Similarly, the famous passage from The Philosophy of Right where Hegel celebrates the ideals of the French Revolution with the statement "What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational," [9] explicitly connects "modernity" and "rationality." The citation ought to be understood to mean that the ideals of the French Revolution shall exist not only as ideals, but also shall be realized in political practice and institutions: the rational is, or will be, actual. [10] In the political realm, this rational reality is defined by the "absolute and unmoved end in itself" of the modern state, [11] a structure characterized by the ideals of the Revolution and the constitutional institutions Hegel describes in The Philosophy of Right. Patriotism as an attitude toward these institutions which sees them as guardians of the individual's fullest freedom, is rationally grounded. The fact that this allegiance can be accounted for or grounded rationally in accord with these historically evolved ideals makes it mode rn, on Hegel's view.

Hegel's claim that patriotism is "based on truth and a volition" deepens its modern character. [12] A "volition" is a choice. Hegel argues that the difference between "antiquity and the modern age" lies in modernity's openness to, and protection of, the right to choose -- the recognition of "subjective freedom." [13]

So, as a disposition grounded (partly) on choice, patriotism is closely connected to Hegel's understanding of modernity's defining characteristic.

These two dimensions, rationality and choice, are connected in a third ground which identifies patriotism as distinctively modern. This ground appears in a more textured exploration of what Hegel means by a "volition" (Wollen). In contrast to an act of arbitrariness (Willk[ddot{u}]r), a volition is an act of will (Wille) taken in accord with rational reflection. [14] So, patriotism is an expression of "choice," but a choice that is not whimsical, desirous, or fanciful; it is studied, conscious, and objective reflection. This means that the "volition" that grounds patriotism pulls the two modern elements of rationality and choice together into a third modern ground, their unity in a reasoned judgment.

So what of patriotism's modernity? Why does it matter? The "modern" character of Hegel's patriotism prescribes important limits to its proper exercise, and to the objects worthy of patriotic allegiance. In short, political communities that fail to embody the character of Hegel's conception of modernity--for example, those that do not protect subjective freedom as a fundamental entitlement and that do not manifest the universal ideals of the French Revolution--are simply not worthy objects of what he calls "patriotism." The analysis below of Hegel's account of the justice and limits of war places this general and abstract structure in a more concrete context.

But these passages and descriptions of Hegel's concept of patriotism raise an issue demanding more immediate consideration here. Hegel details the disposition's rational character; but he also claims that patriotism "has become habitual," and that this "disposition is in general one of trust." [15] This seems to mean that our practice of this rationally grounded commitment to the state is generally unreflective. But how can any disposition be simultaneously rational and unreflective? Providing an account of this phenomenon is important not only to understanding Hegel's concept of patriotism, but also for finding the ground on which "patriotic" and "cosmopolitan" views converge. In the next section, I argue that the idea of patriotism as a "rational habit" is best understood in the context of Aristotle's practical philosophy.

Patriotism as a Virtue, in the Aristotelian Sense

Here I explain the apparently contradictory idea of a rational habit using Aristotle's notion of moral virtue as an exegetical device. In this context, I am not trying to establish a definitive intellectual-historical connection between Aristotelian and Hegelian teachings on ethical education. [16] Instead, Aristotle's writings serve as a parallel to explain the structure that I see at work in Hegel's thought. Hegel, like Aristotle, sees certain habitual acts and practices as imbued with "rationality," and that this rationality and …