AccessMyLibrary provides FREE access to millions of articles from top publications available through your library.
Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements
Following is the President's unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements along with his letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate on March 10, 1987..sup.1
Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President): In response to congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.
Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress in the near future.
I believe the additional information provided, and issues addressed, especially in the more detailed classified report, will significantly increase understanding of Soviet violations and probable violations. Such understanding, and strong congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will do much to strengthen our efforts both in seeking corrective actions and in negotiations with the Soviet Union.
At the request of the Congress, I have, in the past three years, provided four reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. These reports include the Administration's reports of January 1984, and February and December 1985, as well as the report on Soviet noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance, their adverse effects to our national security, and our attempts to resolve the issues. When taken as a whole, this series of reports also provides a clear picture of the continuing pattern of Soviet violations and a basis for our continuing concerns.
In the December 23, 1985, report, I stated:
The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT 11 Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).
I further stated:
At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.
I have also expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again this past October in Reykjavik.
Another year has passed and, despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues.
Compliance is a cornerstone of international law; states are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken.
In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:
* Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
* Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
* Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."
Congress has repeatedly stated its concern about Soviet noncompliance. The U.S. Senate, on February 17, 1987, passed a resolution (S. Res. 94), by a vote of 93 to 2, which:
. . .declares that an important obstacle to the achievement of acceptable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has been its violations of existing agreements, and calls upon it to take steps to rectify its violation of such agreements and, in particular, to dismantle the newly-constructed radar sited at Krasnoyarsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, since it is a clear violation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, . . .
Compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements. As I have stated before:
In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.
I have also said that:
Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process iii the future. . . . The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, …