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Introduction
Prior to the War on Terror, little emphasis was placed on ensuring battalion S2 sections had adequate manning, training and equipment to succeed. Battalion S2 shops were organized against a Cold War intelligence feed, fighting an enemy on a linear battlefield using doctrinal tactics and procedures. Most operations were top down driven and required basic bottom up refinement. The operational tempo and exploitation process was deliberate and premeditated allowing a smaller S2 section the ability to manage analysis and exploitation. Since then, more and more requirements, expectations, and responsibilities have been placed on lower echelon intelligence sections. The counterinsurgency (COIN) fight has challenged units to adopt new ways of organizing their intelligence architecture to effectively collect, analyze, disseminate and exploit in a rapid and dynamic operational environment.
The targeting process in a counterinsurgency is a 180[degrees] turn around from traditional Cold War practice. The bottom line in a COIN environment is "intelligence drives maneuver operations." Approximately 80 to 90 percent of operations are now bottom up, driven by intelligence collected from "boots on the ground." Information collected may require quick analysis to develop actionable intelligence. In many cases, there is little time for higher echelon analysis due to the enemy's quick reaction to Coalition Forces actions. Processed information at the brigade and higher levels too often provides historical or regurgitated data and no new or targetable intelligence to the battalion and below. Atmospherics change, targets move or go to ground, and caches are repositioned creating a short Last Time Information is of …