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Processes of globalization seem to have penetrated even the most remote areas of Western societies. The implication of this observation is, for a large part, dependent on how we define globalization. It may be seen as the ongoing scale enlargement of (international) society. From that angle, we can pay attention to a wide range of aspects, including the flow of capital, the flow of people, and the changing production structure. These aspects in particular influence a country in general but are especially important to the economic structure and demographic characteristics of its cities.
It is difficult to show a direct connection between processes of globalization and the dynamics of specific markets. The housing market is a case in point. It is hard to demonstrate that housing market positions of households and housing situations of households are directly influenced by processes of globalization. Yet, sometimes this relation is very clear. With regard to Brussels, for example, Kesteloot, de Decker, and Manco (1997) have demonstrated that the growing internationalization of the economy in general and of the European Union in particular has attracted many well-to-do people to certain neighborhoods previously occupied by poor households. Those neighborhoods have gradually been taken over by these affluent households. In other words, internationalization ushered in processes of gentrification, which in turn implied a negative outcome for the poor in certain areas. But Brussels is not unique in this respect; in other cities, these effects seem to be clear too.
There are cases where these effects are less evident, being mitigated by the role of the state. Especially in the elaborate welfare states of Western Europe, government seems to be very influential in defining what is and what is not possible, specifically on the housing market.
In this article, we first describe the settlement patterns of a numerically important ethnic group in a Western European welfare state: the Turks. We try to explain how they have been able to find their way on the urban housing markets in the Netherlands. After that, we try to show how the Turkish settlement patterns should be evaluated. Are Turks more or less forced to live in certain areas? Or do they choose their neighborhoods voluntarily? This discussion ties in with the ghetto/enclave debate. We show that many aspects of this discourse do not apply in the Dutch situation because of the welfare state arrangements prevailing in the Netherlands. The main focus is on the Netherlands, although we draw some comparisons with other countries. We do not only consider the largest cities. We also want to find out if the extent of segregation and the patterns of concentration in smaller cities differ from those in the largest cities. Indeed, we expect to find differences that reflect the fiercer competition in the bigger cities between (low-income) households.
The next section offers a brief review of the migration history of Turks. Assuming that the economic position of households in general and those of Turks in particular is closely linked to their opportunities on the housing market, we go on to consider how the Turks fit into the Dutch economy. After that, we outline the theory of segregation, emphasizing the role of the state in Western European countries. After formulating some hypotheses about segregation in the Netherlands, we present some results of empirical research. Then we expand on the character of segregation, placing it in the context of the ghettos and enclaves debate. Our conclusions will express our expectations for the future.
MULTICULTURAL HOLLAND: THE GUEST WORKERS' LEGACY
Across Western Europe, the history of Turkish immigration has proceeded along common lines. Basically, three periods can be discerned (Dieleman, 1993; Glebe, 1997; Martin, 1991; Van Kempen & Ozuekren, 1997). These periods are partly defined by (global) economic developments and partly by changing policies in the Western welfare states.
The first period can be called the labor migration stage. Beginning in the 1960s, in the Netherlands, as in many Western European countries, international labor migration was considered necessary because of a booming economy and a consequent shortage of labor. But at that time, governments and employers alike thought the additional labor would be needed only temporarily. The concept of the guest worker was thus invented. The migrants were given work permits and housing permits for a limited number of years. Most receiving countries initially recruited in the northern Mediterranean countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Later, as competition for labor grew, countries and firms had to look for new recruiting areas. Then the Netherlands drew workers mainly from Turkey and Morocco. In the labor migration stage, the guest workers were single men; their families stayed in the home country.
The second period is the family reunification stage. Employers discovered that hiring guest workers had some major disadvantages. Most evident was that they did not speak the language of the receiving country and were not very inclined to learn it. Moreover, living far away from their families affected their productivity negatively. A more settled workforce would not have those drawbacks. In that light, it was in the interests of the employers to ask their workers to stay longer. National governments started to allow Turkish men (and other guest workers) to bring their families over. The economic recession in the mother country induced many Turks not to return home. Many individuals followed the path taken by their relatives who were already living in Western Europe. Family reunification became the major factor behind a continuing migration from Turkey. This period reached its zenith between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, but the process is still going on (Dieleman, 1993). In the same period, the oil embargo of 1973 and the economic restructuring in European countries, which reduced demand for low-skilled workers, put an end to the demand for foreign workers and set off a trend of rising unemployment among the lower skilled.
The third period is called the settlement stage. In this period, many Turks had to make an important decision: to settle in the receiving country or to return to the home country. Faced with unemployment in the host countries, many decided to return. Others decided to stay and settle in the host country. An increasing orientation of the Turks to the host country was demonstrated by higher investments in housing and other aspects. of living in the host country, a lower frequency of trips to the mother country, and less desire to buy a home or invest in a business there (Kesteloot et al., 1997; Van Kempen & Ozuekren, 1997).
TURKS IN THE DUTCH ECONOMY
Especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, many former guest workers were the victims of economic developments in the Netherlands. Industrial employment plummeted because of automation, mechanization, and replacement of whole sectors (including textiles and shipbuilding) to other parts of the world such as the Pacific Rim. Many former guest workers became recipients of social welfare benefits (Dieleman, 1993). At 35%, the unemployment rate for Turks in 1991 was five times higher than that for the Dutch. Unemployment differences apply to every age group and every educational level. The persistently high unemployment rate is the outcome of a complex set of interacting determinants, including economic and demographic developments, the qualifications of the immigrants themselves, and discrimination (Van Kempen, 1997).
Many Turks who do have a job in the Netherlands work in manufacturing industries. This sector is still vulnerable because production in other countries is often cheaper; numerous firms have considered moving at least part of their production process to lower wage countries. Of all the employed Turks in the Netherlands, almost two thirds have a production-related job (Muus, 1993). In the service sector, they are concentrated in cleaning, surveillance, and catering; here they often have part-time and low-salary jobs. More than 75% of the Turks with a job perform simple tasks, compared to less than a quarter of the Dutch (Tesser, 1993). This means that it is difficult for them to change jobs and find employment in the attractive parts (the parts with high-qualified jobs, good salaries, and permanent contracts) of the country's ever-expanding service sector. Accordingly, many Turks are either unemployed or are concentrated in what we used to call the secondary labor market (Doeringer & Piore, 1971).
Lack of opportunities in the labor market may encourage Turks to start their own business. The absolute number of Turkish entrepreneurs has indeed been increasing, although only a small percentage of Turks are self-employed. Many of them are "internally oriented" and target Turkish customers (Van Kempen, 1997).
Labor market developments have had consequences for the incomes of Turkish households. Dutch researchers reported that in 1991, about 20% of the native Dutch population had an income on the level of the minimum wage in the Netherlands (around Nlg. 1,900 per month [U.S. $950]). For Turks, this was about 50%. Only 1% of the Turks had an income above Nlg. 3,100 per month [U.S. $1,550], compared to 16% of the native Dutch (Veenman & Roelandt, 1993). These figures refer to …