Wollheim's dilemma. (Richard Wollheim, institutional theory of art)

I turn very belatedly to an argument that Richard Wollheim in 1980(1) set out against the institutional theory of art as it was presented in my Art and the Aesthetic in 1974.(2) I do so at this late date because philosophers continue to refer to the argument and apparently regard it as a definitive refutation of the institutional theory--a sort of killer argument on the model of the Monty Python killer joke. I consider this argument in spite of the fact that I no longer hold the 1974 version of the institutional theory. I think Wollheim's argument is completely spurious, and further I think it is important to clarify the issue in case anyone thinks his argument applies to the later version of the institutional theory.(3)

Wollheim begins the article in which the argument at issue occurs by denying that there are evaluative and other senses of `work of art'--senses that I had tried to distinguish. He claims that what I called senses of the term are cases of ellipsis and metaphor. He writes that what my examples `show is that "art" is often used idiomatically or in ways which cannot be understood simply on the basis of knowing its primary meaning' (my italics).(4) Whether there are different senses or simply cases of ellipsis and metaphor here is not important, as Wollheim's remark about primary meaning shows; the institutional theory has always been an attempt to deal with what Wollheim calls the primary meaning of `work of art'. Whether there are evaluative or other senses of `work of art' or whether there are only ellipses and metaphors, it is the primary meaning of `work of art' that is at issue. (Whether a given usage of a word is metaphorical or has a new sense depends, I suppose, on whether or not a metaphor has recently died.)

I turn now to Wollheim's argument. His argument takes the form of a dilemma. He writes:

Is it to be presumed that those who confer status upon some artifact do so

for good reasons, or is there no such presumption? Might they have no

reason, or bad reasons, and yet their action be efficacious given that they

themselves have the right status--that is, they represent the artworld?(5)

If, Wollheim claims, the institutionalist takes the first horn of the dilemma, his theory is not institutional, but if he takes the second horn it is not a theory of art.(6) Taking the first horn, Wollheim argues, would make the theory non-institutional because it would be the possession of the characteristic referred to by the good reason that makes the artefact a work of art. As far as I can tell Wollheim never says or indicates why taking the second horn would prevent the theory from being a theory of art.

There is a difficulty with the way the second horn of the dilemma is stated. I have never claimed that anyone has a status of representing the artworld. I have previously argued(7) against a more exaggerated form of this misrepresentation of the institutional theory in Wollheim's, Painting as an Art.(8) In this book, he caricatures the institutional theory as holding that there are artworld representatives who are nominated and have meetings to confer the status of art. In Art and the Aesthetic, I did speak of a person (an artist) acting on behalf of the artworld to confer the status of candidate for appreciation because of his or her imagination and because of his or her knowledge of the artworld. I did not say that the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred because of a status that a person has. Perhaps the dilemma could be rewritten as:

Is it to be presumed that those who confer status upon some artifact do so

for good reasons, or is there no such presumption? Might they have no

reason, or bad reasons, and yet …