Introduction: a thin democracy.(Argentina Under Menem)

Argentina has often seemed a paradigmatic in Latin America, whether

in relation to the history of Peronist nationalist populism, the military

dictatorships of 1966 and 1976, or the democratic renaissance since 1983.

President Carlos Menem, who came to office in 1989, has been one of the

clearest examples of the national-populist-statist politician now turned

uncritical United States supporter/free marketeer. The economic "revolution"

is being carried out, however, by a still populist if not Peronist politician.

Often seen by political scientists as a paradoxical case, Argentina now seems

to provide a clear case study that may illuminate regional trends. In a broad

review article included in this issue I survey a dozen books in English and

Spanish that provide the necessary background; here I examine the thin,

anemic, distorted democracy now being consolidated in Argentina, which

may well be the face of the future for other countries.

M. A. Garreton (1994: 232) has argued that "in the wake of economic,

social, political and cultural transformations in the international context, a

new sociopolitical matrix appears to be emerging in Latin America." In

Argentina, where we have become used to history as cycles, we now seem

indeed to be witnessing the emergence of a new social regime of

accumulation and political matrix. If the cycle, the "impossible game" of

Argentine

politics, has been broken, then the implications for a new critical Latin

American sociology (see Osorio, 1993) will indeed be significant. If we are

witnessing a democratic consolidation "of a special type," we are also now

seeing increasing disenchantment with democracy. Exploring the anatomy of

Menemism may lead us to a clearer understanding of the limits of the new

mood of democratic (read capitalist) triumphalism so prevalent in politics

and what passes for political analysis. The "transition to democracy" debates

have now been superseded in practice, and we need to examine the nature

and contradictions of the democratic consolidation and the new democratic

discourse.

Norberto Lechner, in a wide-ranging review of the "democratic decade,"

has suggested that "the reinstatement of democracy reflects above all the

yearning for a restored sense of community" (Lechner, 1991: 548). This

analysis springs from a belief that the 1980s represented a crisis similar to

that of the 1930s, when intense socioeconomic transformations led to radical

political change, whether in the form of Satalinism, Keynesianism, or fascism.

Yet the intense capitalist restructuring of Latin America has led to social

disintegration with little sign of the new institutions and new mode of

political activity that were promised at the start of the democratic decade.

Political reform has been hindered by a system in which decrees prevail over

consultation and competition overrides cooperation. The new democratic

legitimacy that should have been built around political institutions that

futhered the deeply felt desire for citizenship has instead led to a shortcut

populism creating a fragile and false sense of cohesion and identity on the

basis of emotional appeals. This ultimately is the story of the transition

from

Alfonsin to Menem that I will now trace.

FROM ALFONSIN TO MENEM

The "decompression" of the military dictatorships of the 1970s began in

Brazil toward the end of the decade, but it was in Argentina in 1983 that the

first and most precipitate transition to democratic rule took place. When

President Raul Alfonsin took office in 1983 -- after defeating the Peronists,

who had been discredited by the chaotic governments of 1973-1976 -- there

was a great flourishing (even inflation) of democratic discourse in Argentina.

The constitution and the due process of law became, once again, important

symbols of political legitimacy. In a country where powerful nationalist

political movements (such as Peronism) and social corporations (such as the

trade unions and the military) held sway, the new mood imposed the primacy

of parliament and the rule of law. There was a virtual cultural pact between

the people and the political parties, or at least sections of them, centered

around the requirement of democratic institutions. As Isidoro Cheresky notes,

the year 1983, with the revalorization of the democratic ideal and the

rejection

of authoritarian projects and personalized powers, "seemed to provide

exceptionally favorable circumstances for the establishment of a new political

regime" (Cheresky, 1992: 10). But Alfonsin's regime was not to prove

foundational for a bold new democratic era.

This is not the place for a review of the Alfonsin period (see Epstein, 1992;

Nun and Portantiero, 1987). Alfonsin's campaign had stressed the negative

role of the "corporations," primarily those representing the military and labor,

which he accused of an unholy alliance. The novel (for Argentina) message

was that social demands should be articulated and mediated through the

political system. Governability in Argentina required a neutralization of

corporatism. However, the labor movement was divided and seemed unable

to assume the risks entailed by a non-Peronist government, and employers'

associations were loath to move beyond a zero-sum conception of economic

life. It was therefore impossible to move toward Alfonsin's and much of the

progressive intelligentsia's goal of a social and economic compromise to

consolidate democracy and prevent the recurrence of cyclical instability. The

emphasis on the political moment of the transition led to an underestimation

of the economic moment that was soon to dominate the scene.

The Plan Austral, launched in 1987, was designed to cut the inflationary

spiral with a price and wage freeze and a monetary reform that included a

new currency (see Canitrot, 1992). However, the very success, albeit

ephemeral, of he economic plan reduced the government's reformist will. Adolfo

Canitrot, himself involved in developing the plan, admits that the

government's policy in this regard "had the negative effect of gradually

weakening

its capabilities and reducing public confidence in the efficiency of the

institutions of representative democracy, in particular that of Congress and

the political parties" (1991: 129). From 1985 on, the gap between rhetoric

and reality could only grow, and the possibility of a coherent set of

structural

reforms faded. The corporations set to defending their interests. The

organized labor movement carried out 13 general strikes under Alfonsin, in some

ways reminiscent of the period leading to the fall of the Illia government in

1966. For their part, the so-called captains of industry precipitated a virtual

economic coup in 1989 through frenetic financial speculations that led to the

collapse of the Plan Primavera. The state was bankrupt, inflation had reached

a staggering 4,000 percent, and Alfonsin's government had virtually

collapsed.

Carlos Menem took office in July 1989 promising a …