The politics-administration dichotomy model as aberration.

One of the most important and enduring theoretical constructs in public administration is the politics-administration dichotomy model. It has been useful for marking off the boundaries of public administration as an intellectual field and for asserting the normative relationship between elected officials and administrators in a democratic society. It has been a convenient straw man for public administrationists; to attack and has been criticized as being irrelevant to current conditions. Montjoy and Watson (1995) have recently observed that the main shortcoming of the model comes from using it as a guide to describing actual behavior in the policy-making process. They argue that the model, as they have interpreted it, "remains important as a normative standard in the profession of local government management." They express the view also held by many practitioners that the dichotomy model is useful because it provides a rationale for insulating the practice of public administration from political interference.

The debate about the utility of the original or a reinterpreted version of the model misses a fundamental point: the dichotomy model is not what it seems. It is not an idea that can be traced back to the origins of the field of public administration or the municipal reform movement. Rather than trying to explain or rehabilitate the model, it is more appropriate to view it as an idea that emerged relatively late and that deviated from the ideas of the founders of public administration and the framers of the council-manager form of government. It is important for academics to get their intellectual history right and stop presenting simplistic and historically inaccurate explanations of how the field began and evolved. In addition, practitioners and promoters of the council-manager form should recognize that they have been disadvantaged by the pervasive attitude that the form is based originally on the dichotomy model and realize that they weaken the legitimacy of city managers as comprehensive leaders by perpetuating this notion.

Let us be dear about the definition of the concept. As it applies to local government, the dichotomy model holds that:

* The city council does not get involved in administration.

* The city manager has no involvement in shaping policies,

* The manager occupies the role of a neutral expert who efficiently and effectively carries out the policies of the council. (Presumably, administrators do not exercise discretion, for to do so opens the door to interpreting policy and choosing how and to what went it will be applied.)

Montjoy and Watson characterize a similar definition as a "strict version" of the doctrine, and they propose a "reinterpreted dichotomy" that reinforces legislative supremacy while permitting a policy-making role for the manager, but still helps managers resist the forces of particularism (1995, 231). While these ideas would be acceptable to die early thinkers in public administration and municipal reform, they are different from the dichotomy model rather than a reinterpretation of it. The "strict" definition is the dichotomy model. It is not conceptually possible as Montjoy and Watson suggest and as many practitioners would prefer, to have a one-way dichotomy that keeps elected officials out of administration but allows administrators to be active in policy making. The dichotomy model, standing alone, is an aberration. It is associated with the dominant concepts of orthodox public administration during the twenties and thirties and is essentially different from concepts of democracy and administration that preceded and followed it.

The historical record shows that die dichotomy model came along after the founding period of public administration and the creation of the council-manager form. The early statements by Wilson and Goodnow were an attempt to define the field and to defend public administrators from interference by elected officials and party organizations, but their view of government does not match the features of the dichotomy model. The writings of political reformers before and for several years after the endorsement of die council-manager form by the National Municipal League in 1916 stressed the importance of council government with broad authority for elected officials including administrative oversight and dearly accepted the policy role of the manager. The dichotomy model, which proscribes any manager involvement in policy while erecting a high wall to prevent council involvement in "administration," appeared in the twenties, took hold during the thirties, and hung on into the sixties. Although the model has increasingly Fallen out of favor, it survives in pan because of the common presumption that it is linked to the ideas of the founders of the field and the council-manager form. Although appropriately criticized for being irrelevant, the model is a being given a historical legitimacy it does not deserve.

This view has important consequences. A faulty conceptual basis distorts the meaning of public administration since the field appears to have evolved from norms that were not originally intended. By viewing the dichotomy as the original prescription for relationships among officials, city manager involvement in policy appears to be illegitimate. It weakens the form and limits its transferability to other countries.(1) If the dichotomy model is recognized to be an intellectual detour, our efforts can be directed to developing a model that dearly formulates the boundaries of administrative action and the interdependent relationship between administrators and elected officials.

Early Attempts to Clarify the Relationship Between Politics and Administration

The dichotomy model is associated with the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow. Wilson's views, however, expressed in Congressional Government and "The Study of Administration," originally published in 1885 and 1887, respectively, are more complex--and more farsighted--than he is normally given credit for (Wilson, 1966). Wilson was concerned with both the corrupting and politicizing interference of party organizations in administrative affairs and also with the excessive attention by Congress to administrative matters (Stillman, 1973). Congress, he wrote, "set itself...to administer government" (1966, 49). It has gotten "into the habit of investigating and managing everything" and has a tendency to "subject even the details of administration to the constant supervision...of the Standing Committees" (50). On the other hand, Wilson was critical of the way Congress handled core legislative functions: its policy making was haphazard and its oversight was weak. When Wilson suggested die dearer differentiation of politics and administration, he was seeking to strengthen and redirect the former while protecting the latter.

In "The Study of Administration," Wilson explained the division of functions as follows: "Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law...but the general laws...are obviously outside of and above administration. The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative" (1966, 372). He wanted to shield administration from interference: "Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices" (371). His view of the administrative function was broad and not consistent with the dichotomy model as it came to be articulated later. He argued that "large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility" for administrators (373).

In addition, administrators would directly…