No right (to organize) without a remedy: evidence and consequences of the failure to provide compensatory remedies for unfair labour practices in British Columbia.

Employees and unions encounter significant risks during union organizing and often see their efforts thwarted by employers. Labour law regimes attempt to minimize these risks by rendering unlawful a number of unfair labour practices (ULPs) employers can use to prevent unionization. But labour relations boards (LRBs) in Canada often avoid awarding full compensation for the harm ULPs cause, leading employers to still view ULPs as advantageous courses of action with only moderate associated costs.

The author argues that this problem can be solved or greatly mitigated without the need for formal reforms; LRBs rather must come to embrace the full range of remedial powers they already hold. Through an empirical analysis of cases brought to the British Columbia Labour Relations Board, the author shows how LRBs systematically choose to avoid compensating particular categories of harm, whether to individual or collective employee interests, or to the interests of the union. This failure is due to a misapplication of the principle of voluntarism, which seeks to have labour relations systems assist the voluntary resolution of labour disputes between unions and employers. By not requiring full compensation, LRBs attempt to maintain employers' voluntary commitment to the labour relations system, bur doing so inevitably causes the system to work against employees and unions. Voluntarism is not appropriate during the union-organizing period, when a union has yet to be established, and when it is thus vital that the rights of employees and unions be enforced and adequate remedies provided.

Les employes et les syndicats encourent des risques considerables lors du processus d'organisation d'un syndicat et leurs efforts sont souvent contrecarres par les employeurs. Les regimes de droit du travail tentent de minimiser ces risques en rendant illegales un certain nombre de pratiques deloyales de travail (PDT) que les employeurs peuvent utiliser pour empecher la syndicalisation. Les commissions des relations de travail (CRT) du Canada evitent pourtant souvent d'accorder la pleine compensation pour le tort cause par les PDT, ce qui amene les employeurs a percevoir les PDT comine des voies d'action avantageuses et a faibles couts.

L'auteure argumente que ce probleme peut etre resolu ou du moins grandement attenue sans reformes formelles ; les CRT doivent par contre prendre la pleine mesure des pouvoirs de redressement dont ils disposent deja. A travers une analyse empirique de cas entendus par la Commission des relations de travail de la Colombie-Britannique, l'auteure demontre comment les CRT choisissent systematiquement d'eviter de compenser certaines categories particulieres de prejudices, que te soit dans le cas des interets d'employes individuels ou syndiques ou dans le cas des interets de syndicats. Cet echec est du a l'usage errone du principe du volontarisme, qui insiste sur le fait que les systemes de relations de travail cherchent d'abord a assister les syndicats et les employeurs dans la resolution volontaire de leurs conflits de travail. En n'exigeant pas la pleine compensation, les CRT tentent de maintenir l'engagement volontaire de t'employeur dans le systeme des relations de travail, mais le systeme se trouve alors inevitablement a travailler contre les employes et les syndicats. Le volontarisme n'est pas de mise pendant la periode d'organisation d'un syndicat, alors que ce dernier n'est pas eneore etabli et qu'il est dono essentiel que les droits des employes et des syndicats soient respectes et proteges par les voies de droit adequates.

 
Introduction 
      A. The Problem 
      B. Old Solutions 
      C. An Alternative Approach 
   I. Unfair Labour Practices: Harm Caused During Organizing 
      A. Individual Employee Interests 
      B. Collective Employee Interests 
      C. Union Interests 
      D. Harms Caused by Particular ULPs 
         1. Illegal Termination 
         2. Illegal Employer Communication 
  II. ULP Complaints and Findings 
      A. Relative Frequency of ULP Complaints by Party 
      B. Relative Frequency of Types of Employer ULPs 
 III. ULPs and the Remedial Mandate of Labour Relations 
      Boards 
  IV. Compensatory Potential of Available Remedies 
      A. Remedies for Harm to Individual Employee Interests 
      B. Remedies for Harm to Collective Employee and Union 
         Interests 
         1. Communication and Access Orders 
         2. Remedial Certification 
         3. Second Vote 
         4. Monetary Compensation to the Union under Make-Whole 
            Orders 
         5. Legal Costs 
         6. Costs of Organizing 
      C. Noncompensatory Remedies: Declarations and Cease and 
         Desist Orders 
      D. Restorative Potential Revisited 
   V. Analysis of Remedial Awards 
      A. Termination cases 
      B. Speech Cases 
      C. Overall Trends 
  VI. The Principle of Voluntarism 
      A. The Traditional Model of Voluntarism 
      B. Voluntarism in Canadian Labour Relations 
      C. Application of the Procedural Understanding of Voluntarism 
      D. Shortcomings of this Approach 
         1. Contrary to Evidence and Experience 
         2. Adjudication and Enforcement 
         3. Parties' Interests 
         4. Inappropriate for Organizing Disputes 
         5. Conclusion 
 VII. Consequences of Deficient Remedial Responses 
      A. Perverse Incentives 
      B. Violations as the New Norm 
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Appendix 

Introduction

A. The Problem