Gaza, Israel, Hamas and the lost calm of operation cast lead.

A shadow has fallen over the new years of 1430 and 2009 from Israel's air assault and ground invasion of Gaza, Operation Cast Lead. Not that any aspect of the Palestinian experience has been easy or well communicated to the global public, but it does seem that post-9/11 Western discourse on Arabs and Muslims has led to particularly biased reporting of the conflict, a glib assumption by major networks that their American viewers see the world just as Benjamin Netanyahu or Michael Oren do. Comprehensive reportage was really impossible; the Israelis barred journalists from Gaza, and the wildest sorts of allegations are being made. Still, we have an idea of the human impact: more than 1,300 Palestinians have been killed and more than 5,300 wounded, compared to thirteen Israeli deaths (some by friendly fire), as of January 18, 2008. The "why" of this latest adventure is harder to fathom, unless Israel truly desires to remain in a state of conflict, and for that conflict to worsen. This ought to be given serious consideration; it is not for nothing that Israel has become an exporter of weapons, security systems and "security training." Moreover, most Israelis remain physically segregated from Palestinian suffering and many maintain a comfortable and secure lifestyle that may not be much of an incentive to peace. Others live far less comfortably, travel by public transport but lack any sympathy for Palestinians, not only due to their separation from or ignorance of them, but due to fear, enlarged by the media.

Declarations like "Hamas has to be taught a lesson" belie the fact that Hamas is a movement located throughout the Palestinian national body, just as Hizbollah represents large numbers of Shii Muslims in Lebanon, and as an accepted political party, cannot be easily extricated from the nation. Most curious are Tzipi Livni's declarations of "success," which were implicitly, if subtly, challenged by Fareed Zakaria and others who have questioned the real military intent of reconquering Gaza. If by "successful" Livni means that there will be an end to Hamas, she is wrong. To claim that the goal is to reduce the numbers of rockets (which have killed very few Israelis) fired into southern Israel from Gaza since long before Hamas actually assumed political control of that area, is also clearly nonsense. That is not the goal of a massive air and ground campaign. At the very least, we can assume that there is no Israeli desire for peace with the Palestinians.

If Livni, instead, means that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are recouping some of the status lost in the summer of 2006, she is in denial. The long-term effect of the sight of dead and wounded Palestinian children and other civilians undermines the respect for life that must be part of any solution that will bring true security to the Israelis. I have recently spent several years studying Hamas as a movement and the way that it paradoxically arose to challenge all of Israel's assumptions, while transforming itself and gaining more legitimacy, despite inter-Palestinian strife and harsh treatment by Israel of the entire Palestinian population in an effort to punish or tarnish Hamas. It seems all my insights were wrong. I thought it would be far more logical for Israel to re-engage in a tahdiya (ceasefire) with Hamas when the previous one ended, either officially on December 16, 2008, or when Israel had essentially cancelled it by launching assassinations of Hamas leaders on November 5. The Israeli attack on Gaza had clearly been planned a long time beforehand. The IDF hoped to weaken Hamas at a time when they were certain of less international interference and greater political benefit to Tzipi Livni's government prior to the Israeli elections.

These have been the most severe attacks since 1967, and civilians have been the primary victims. Opening fire on five people daring to venture out to the market in Gaza City does not make the market a Hamas missile launcher. The inane Israeli-Western claim that Hamas uses "human shields" is just the opposite; Israel has for years used Palestinians as human shields in its raids on civilians in their homes. The deep cynicism and desperation produced by this small war, on the heels of a protracted boycott and effort to starve out the legitimately elected Hamas government, cannot produce a favorable attitude toward Israeli authority or any other. One also sees that the meaning of "occupation" is being forgotten or distorted in a discourse that continues, falsely, to juxtapose Israel and Palestinian power as if they were symmetrical. Indeed, they are not.

Hamas survived the air and ground war. It was not destroyed inside or outside of Gaza. This large movement has a very strong presence in the West Bank and has always, necessarily, maintained a presence in Jordan and Syria. However, survival is probably not enough for Hamas to fulfill its self-defined priority: to serve the Palestinian people and help them end the occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Neither sumud (steadfastness) nor jihad in a threatened third Intifada are appropriate ways forward. Will rocket attacks cease? Will suicide attacks increase? Probably some aspect of violent resistance will continue until and unless a political resolution to the conflict is reached. The current Israeli government has not demonstrated any desire for such a solution.

When I wrote this essay, the media were still barred from Gaza so as to prevent reporting of the situation on the ground. A foreign journalist from within Gaza reported on the incredibly fearful state of Palestinians, the lack of medical treatment, and the sense that the Israelis simply intended to inflict whatever harm was possible. Since Israel possesses the technology to hit missile launchers with accuracy, the ill intent towards all Gazans is obvious. At least 500,000 Palestinians have been displaced, and more than 4,000 buildings were destroyed. The enormous damage to infrastructure included mosques, government buildings, the Islamic University (where the Israelis' astoundingly false claim is that weapons were being manufactured), the police station, residential buildings, fuel-oil facilities and so on. Here we can note a trend: overwhelming military force has been used to destroy infrastructure and inflict collective punishment in this campaign, in the 2006 war on Lebanon (it was not merely a war on Hezbollah), and in the 2002 campaign that flattened Ramallah, Jenin and other parts of the West Bank. The conclusion to be drawn is that the Israeli military wish to destroy any basis for a Palestinian state.

Moving away from the issue of manipulation of the discourse over the conflict, let us examine Israeli strategy against Hamas. It is, after all, just one aspect of Israel's Arab policies. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians ...