How do perceived political environment and administrative reform affect employee commitment?

Recent public management research has emphasized the need to study public organizations in their unique context: embedded in fragmented political systems and highly charged political environments (O'Toole and Meier 1999; Pandey and Wright 2006; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). (1) It is reasonable to assume that the ways in which public managers perceive and interpret this unique environment will shape their attitudes, behaviors, and decision making. However, since this has rarely been studied in the public management literature, the dots between the external political environment, internal organizational characteristics, and employee attitudes have yet to be connected (Pandey and Wright 2006). To help connect these dots, this article focuses on two distinguishing characteristics of the public management environment: political support and the implementation of results-oriented reforms. We define political support as the extent to which elected officials approve of and encourage an agency and its mission, and in this article, we specifically focus on political support as it is perceived by managers.

In recent decades, public organizations have had to operate in increasingly antibureaucratic political environments (King and Stivers 1998; Yang 2006), which have led to increasing pressure to adopt results-oriented reforms (Barzelay 1992; Brudney and Wright 2002). Since the 1990s, the most widely implemented of such reforms is managing for results (MFR) (Brudney and Wright 2002; Ingraham and Moynihan 2001). Although the impact of political support and MFR on government performance has been widely discussed, few quantitative studies have actually examined how these two factors affect managerial perceptions and, subsequently, organizational practice and individual attitudes. This study specifically concentrates on one segment of this process by modeling how both MFR implementation and managers' perceptions of elected official support affect organizational systems and individual commitment.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Elected Official Support for the Agency and Public Manager Perceptions

It is not unusual for elected officials to engage in activities that manifest a lack of trust and support for government agencies, such as bureaucracy bashing and cutback management (Garrett et al. 2006; Levine 1978). Although a certain level of distrust is healthy for a democracy, too much can create considerable problems for governance.

The level of trust and support offered by elected officials constantly fluctuates. In periods of decline, government-is-the-problem ideology often leads elected officials to distrust the bureaucracy's willingness to faithfully follow legislative intent and/or the executive's agenda (Rourke 1992; Wilson 1989). When changes occur in group power, committee composition, administration agenda, or coalition stability, distrust often translates into tangible action such as restriction of mandates, budget cutbacks, and curtailment of discretion (Moe 1989). However, some agencies may continue to enjoy strong trust and support due to strong constituencies, skillful leadership, organizational cohesion, professional expertise, and/or a history of solid performance (Meier 2000; Rourke 1984).

Public managers perceive the actions of elected officials as signals of trust or distrust, satisfaction, or dissatisfaction. As a result, they may feel either motivated or frustrated. When managers perceive excessive distrust and bureaucracy bashing, they may react defensively, become cynical, and adhere rigidly to rules and procedures (Wilson 1989). As Bok (2001) asserts, "excessive [perceived] distrust may cause the government to become more cautious, more indecisive, more bureaucratic, and less capable of responding effectively to people's needs" (11). Conversely, perceived political support affects the level of innovation and performance in public organizations, leading to positive outcomes such as organizational effectiveness (Moynihan and Pandey 2005) and implementation of performance measures (De Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Wang and Berman 2001).