Future Air Bases: power patches or military communities? A revolutionary approach is needed by the Air Force to reengineer not only its business processes but also its current and future basing methods.(Special Feature)(Essay)

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Introduction

Reality struck hard on 24 September 2007 when Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne publicly announced that the 40,000 personnel reduction taken by the Air Force to pay for new airplanes was not reaping the rewards envisioned--stated bluntly, "It isn't working." The purpose of the drawdown in Air Force personnel strength to 316,000 by fiscal year 2009 was to free up money to modernize the Air Force's aging aircraft fleet--average age of 24 years, 14 percent of which is either grounded or possesses mission-limiting restrictions. This type of drawdown, a method commonly used in private industry, is used to liquidate assets to gain the resources needed to recapitalize the company's asset base. However, the funds generated by the drawdown were only sufficient to alter the slope of the aging curve so that the average age was 26.5 years by the end of the current five-year defense plan. (1)

Further, the drawdown generated insufficient savings throughout the out-years to significantly alter the aging curve. Air Force leaders state they need an additional $20B per year to meet aircraft fleet recapitalization needs. (2) Additional drawdown of forces is not realistic and the Air Force Strategic Plans and Programs Division is already taking action for the next Quadrennial Defense Review to add back eight combat-ready wing equivalents and return Air Force end strength to 330,000 in order to meet future requirements for providing global strategic deterrence. (3)

What remains unclear is whether Congress will provide any additional funds to meet recapitalization requirements. Likewise, there is no indication from Congress that money will be appropriated to support the now needed upsizing of Air Force end strength to 330,000, or whether that cost will be borne by the Air Force out of its future budgets. As a result, the Air Force is looking for all means to achieve the needed savings for recapitalization.

The Air Force's current fascination with Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) may help it to do more with less via better management of resources and improved efficiencies--reviewing existing processes and attempting to make them more efficient. In fact, process reengineering has identified some savings in Air Force depot and industrial processes, but not nearly enough to meet the savings needed.

The Air Force budget is comprised of four main areas, all in need of additional funding: personnel (force structure), readiness, infrastructure (sustainability), and procurement (modernization). (4) Personnel costs (pay and benefits) have risen 57 percent over the last 10 years while personnel end strength has decreased by 8 percent. Operating (readiness) costs have increased 179 percent over the last 10 years, even though the aircraft inventory was reduced by some 2,500 airframes. The Air Force baseline budget, however, has not increased commensurate with these rising costs of operation. Figure 1 depicts defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) since Air Force establishment and the trend indicates there will likely be little change in the future? Although there has been debate, a convincing case has not yet been made to secure an increase in defense spending.