Relief in place: managing transition of authority.

The necessity for conservation of the fighting power of the troops requires profusion for the periodic relief of units in line. (1)

Anyone who has served in a Special Forces group during the last six years has certainly participated in a rotation of forces to a combat theater, even if they have served only in a rear detachment.

Rotations of forces are massive undertakings. When one considers that the Soldiers, individual and organizational equipment of entire battalions, and possibly a group headquarters, must be moved from one hemisphere to another, the logistics seem staggering. Considering the complexity of the move and all of the preparation required, commanders would be justified in feeling a tremendous sense of accomplishment for completing the rotation alone, regardless of the success of their combat operations.

By the way, the unit will perform a rotation of forces every seven months. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, that would have been a dizzying prospect. Today, with some SF Soldiers on their seventh combat rotation, we have become quite adept at these complicated operations. Yet we all recognize that the operations themselves affect the greater objectives of our war of counterinsurgency, or COIN. Given the frequency of combat rotations and transition periods, and the varying methodologies commanders employ to manage them, transition periods have a potential for significant negative impact on our operational objectives.

One could argue that "rotational warfare," as it is often called, is one of the single greatest obstacles to the long-term success of COIN in our respective theaters. So why do we rotate? Since the vast majority of our combat formations are committed to, or are preparing for, operations in one or more theaters, consideration of that question is elevated to the strategic level.

FM 3-90, Tactics, which contains the doctrine for Army relief in place operations, says, "A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units." According to the manual, the relief-in-place frees the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance or specialized training. (2) In this era of all-volunteer forces, strategic-level planners must also consider personnel retention as a means of preserving the military component of national power.

In a COIN operation, even isolated actions by a few Soldiers can have significant negative effects on strategic objectives. As in all combat operations, COIN requires a single-minded focus in the form of a mission statement and the commander's intent that subordinate commanders can use to guide their efforts. Maintaining that focus over multiple combat rotations is one of the most daunting aspects of the operation. Commanders at the operational level provide guidance in operations orders. Their implementation instructions should be broad enough to allow tactical-level commanders to exercise the initiative needed to adapt to the circumstances in which they find themselves. That tactical freedom to act is absolutely essential to success.