Turkey and EU energy security: the pipeline connection.

'Energy security' is a growing public concern. (1) With energy prices rising from a combination of growing demand relative to available supplies, major consuming countries are struggling to formulate effective long-term energy policies. Highly dependent on relatively few energy sources and producing regions, most European Union (EU) member states have only begun to appreciate the urgency of this task. Their predicament became dramatically apparent in the winter of 2006, when Russia's Gazprom monopoly halted natural gas supplies to Ukraine, with the cut-off reverberating much further west, as Ukrainian territory conveys four fifths of Russia's gas exports to Europe. Given the heavy reliance of various EU member states and candidate countries on Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas, Betina Ferraro-Waldner, the EU's external relations commissioner, called the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute an 'eye-opener', dramatically elevating the status of energy on the Union's foreign policy agenda. (2)

The EU has recently come to recognise that Turkey may be able to offer crucial strategic advantages in this area. (3) In signing a recent intergovernmental agreement to back the building of the Nabucco gas pipeline that will connect Europe with various non-Russian sources of gas from the East via Turkey, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs stated that this project is 'essential to Europe and the EU's most important gas supply project'. (4) Going further, Emma Bonino, Italian Minister of International Trade and European Affairs, expressed that 'Turkey is an important energy corridor' to suggest that various controversial issues, such as the one over Cyprus, would not block Turkey's EU membership. (5) As discussed herein, such declarations are based on assumptions that require closer scrutiny. One is that EU economies need to increase the security of their energy sources. The second premise is that the EU has to project greater influence over its major energy suppliers--Middle East, Caspian Basin and Russia--in order to attain this diversification. The third is that Turkey, inside of the EU rather than as a nonmember, will be instrumental in giving the Union this influence. The final assumption is that Turkey can provide an alternative East-West energy transportation route at a reasonable cost. The paper analyses these major premises to assess the relative utility of Turkey in Europe's quest to ensure secure access to energy sources and how this would affect Turkey's membership prospects in the decade to come.

Our conclusion is that the value of Turkey for the EU from an energy-security angle is becoming vital. Although increasing awareness of Turkey's valuable role in this regard does not automatically make EU member states more receptive to the prospects of Turkey's accession into the Union, the fact that Europe's capacity to meet projected energy demand from existing supplies remains tenuous argues for a more positive EU attitude towards Turkish membership in the Union. This does not necessarily mean that the EU cannot obtain its goal of energy security without Turkey as a full member, but the alternatives involve European access to energy at a much higher price both economically and politically.

The EU Needs More 'Secure' Energy

Until recently, no significant common policy had emerged regarding security of energy and energy imports in the EU area. Energy has never been included in the EU founding treaties because 'it was considered strategic' by the members. (6) The European Commission's 'Green Paper' of November 2000 highlighted the shortcomings and risks inherent in EU members' individualistic policies and initiated a serious debate on the need for 'secure' energy supplies. The March 2006 Green Paper goes further, proposing that all member states should agree on an overall strategic objective in terms of energy, which would '...combine the freedom of Member States to choose between different energy sources and the need for the EU as a whole to have an energy mix that, overall, meets its core energy objectives'. (7)

The EU area's ability to obtain self-sufficiency is limited. As North Sea fields mature, domestic oil reserves are shrinking. Europe has indigenous coal reserves, but EU members are decreasing their use of a resource facing 'economic depletion', which makes it more expensive to mine, (8) and one responsible for large C[O.sub.2] emissions, a trend that could be reversed, according to the Commission, only if coal could be made 'cleaner'. (9) Nuclear power currently provides over one third of the Union's electricity, but expanding output to meet a larger share of energy needs is regarded unfavourably by many in the EU due to waste disposal problems and the risk of accident. (10) Renewable resources are domestically available, but can become usable to any significant degree only after substantially greater economic and policy commitments. As it stands now, the average use of renewable in the Union is six per cent, and although the EU has planned to double this rate by 2010, it is behind in reaching even this modest goal. (11)

Unsurprisingly then, as the most recent Green Paper reiterates, the EU's need for external fuel sources is on an upward trajectory. The Union is one of the world's fastest growing energy markets and the biggest importer. The 25 member states rely on fossil fuels to meet about four fifths of their energy consumption, import half of their collective oil and natural gas requirements (a figure that is projected to reach 70 percent by 2030), and are expected to depend on imports to meet 80 per cent of their collective natural gas need over the next 25 years. (12) Although acknowledging the EU's need to become a more efficient energy consumer, the European Commission admits that it will be very difficult for the EU to reduce its dependence on imports, which are expected to meet just under three quarters of its consumption needs by 2030. (13) Therefore, the EU needs to develop new policies in order to ensure easier access to secure energy sources.