Beyond Westminster governance: bringing politics and public service into the networked era.

The underlying premise of this article stems from the following question: is our Westminster, parliamentary model of democratic governance and administration adaptable for contemporary realities and emerging challenges? By framing this question as "adaptable" rather than "salvageable," the implication is that there should be room for discussion and nuance, because creating something anew is hardly a realistic proposition in the world of government, dramatic crises notwithstanding. Nonetheless, whatever the value of stability and tradition, the need for significantly re-thinking the Westminster doctrine is becoming altogether more apparent (for reasons explored below). The purpose here is thus twofold: first, to expose what is wrong with the current model; and, secondly, to sketch what sort of changes to our governing institutions must be envisioned in order to safeguard political legitimacy and administrative competence in a world that is increasingly networked. Both elements matter: too often those arguing for something new merely gloss over the value of what has worked in the past (and to some degree what may be still functioning).

Consider the contrast between two domestic streams of thought in Canada in recent rimes. On the one hand, two books devoted to political and managerial aspects of more networked and digitized forms of government have called for wholesale changes to much of our democratic and administrative architecture (Roy 2006a; Borins et al. 2007).

On the other hand, a recent article in this journal by Nicholas d'Ombrain (2007) provides a thoughtful and thorough defence of Westminster customs, arguing for a stricter application of tradition in order to best respond to any perceived or real shortcomings. In my estimation (and the motivation of this article), the value of this latter contribution by d'Ombrain is far less in offering a way forward, however, than in providing a solid understanding of where we have been (and why). The case for a significant overhaul of Westminster governance is now increasingly informed by the experiences of other parliamentary jurisdictions, perhaps most notably in the U.K. itself. And here, in Canada, the widening gulf between federal government insularity and external perceptions (both professional and public) was exposed all too clearly by a recent Public Policy Forum (2007) report based on the findings of a recent national consultative exercise.

It is not hard to understand why the Public Policy Forum report has received so little attention across media and policy circles (to say nothing of the citizenry itself). Neither government nor Parliament would seem to care very much about administrative or institutional reform: relative to many other developed countries there is little in the way of serious dialogue on such matters in Canada. There are some exceptions: fixed election dates and proposed Senate reforms are notable if rather narrow departures from the status quo, as is the Federal Accountability Act (S.C. 2006, c. 9). Such initiatives, however--largely reactions to past scandal--have done little to quell the emergence of all too familiar accusations against the Harper government, beginning with an over-centralizing Prime Minister's Office and systemic aversion to information-sharing and openness.

With the Federal Accountability Act now in place legislatively, the absence of any formal agenda politically (and assignation of duties ministerially) devoted to democratic and public administration reform is telling in this regard. The reflex of central agencies (operating within tight prime ministerial confines) is thus greater assertiveness across the system, placing Treasury Board and the Privy Council Office in the impossibly dualistic role of control-minded guardians and catalysts for change. Accordingly, the political priorities of the prime minister matter and so too do specific initiatives of the PCO clerk focused on elements of reform such as staff recruitment and retention. Yet lost is a wider, more inclusive and more public dialogue on new approaches to governing. Citizen apathy is all too apparent--as Lawrence Martin put it, "rarely has federal politics been so stagnant" (2007), a depiction not without consequence in terms of how the public service is run.

Minority government is one explanation offered by some as a force re-affirming caution and control (Good 2004). Is there reason to believe, however, that a Conservative majority government would become more experimental, or would it merely seek ways to more efficiently and narrowly impose its agenda? Although actions of the current government can and must be considered (particularly in responsive matters to prior governments such as the Federal Accountability Act), as politicians are undoubtedly a critical determinant of reform, partisanship is also a poor analytical prism. Successive Conservative and Liberal governments have continuously offered minor reformations to the current model that have not prevented the current situation from arising.

What is the current situation? Simply put, more and more Canadians are less and less inclined to trust, much less feel inspired by, Parliament and the federal public service. This admittedly sweeping characterization (and one not without exceptions) applies to voters at election time, to prospective partisans in between elections, and to both experienced and especially new professionals considering career paths (Dunleavy et al. 2005; Howe, Johnston and Blais 2005; Roy 2006a; Public Policy Forum 2007). Still, Canadian democracy remains resilient (if rather stagnant), and the federal government is in no danger of immediate implosion. A reasonably competent cadre of political and administrative leaders are more than sufficient to safeguard the status quo (many in the latter group well indoctrinated by and thus loyal to Westminster custom).