Scred cow? Canada's response to the BSE crisis; Evaluating North American integration, science, and questions of intrusiveness and autonomy.

I. INTRODUCTION

This study focuses on foreign and domestic pressures related to Canada's first indigenous case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in May 2003. At the international level, the integration of the North American cattle and beef industry, export considerations in other markets, and the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Office International des Epizooties or World Animal Health Organization (OIE), all had implications for Canada. Not surprisingly, the most significant challenge for Ottawa was the closure of the Canada-United States border, which suggests an ongoing need to improve the efficiency of existing trade dispute mechanisms. In other cases, however, the federal government was able to exercise partial or substantive autonomy on issues such as limiting Specified Risk Material (SRM's) from the human food chain; maintaining a discriminatory "zero tolerance" import policy; selectively adopting OIE guidelines; providing extensive BSE subsidy programs; adopting a distinctive SRM ban on animal feed; responding to the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund (R-CALF) challenge; and negotiating WTO Sanitary and Phyrosanitary (SPS) and Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) guidelines. Canada's domestic policy process, on the other hand, highlighted the dominance of specific bureaucratic departments, such as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC). The impact of industry, however, was primarily limited to the Canadian Cattlemen's Association (CCA) and the Canadian Meat Council (CMC) in the pre and post BSE eras. Ultimately, these actors endorsed science-based initiatives, but these policies were directly attributable to economic considerations and the restoration of export markets. In the process, Canadian officials, especially within CFIA, also influenced the evolution of international norms and standards, albeit in conjunction with bureaucrats and industry representatives from the United States and Mexico.

II. EVALUATING THE CANADIAN RESPONSE TO BSE

Before reviewing Canada's BSE policy it is necessary to clarify the concepts of intrusiveness and autonomy. Intrusiveness, the independent variable, focuses on the impact of international developments on the domestic policy space of states. In the case of BSE and Canada, it is important to determine if external events imposed Canadian policies, or if Ottawa successfully resisted, or reciprocally endorsed these options. Autonomy, on the other hand, is best understood when compared to independence and sovereignty. According to Kim Nossal, "independence" is the "ability to be free from the control of others." In contrast, sovereignty focuses on the "juridical recognition" of states to control territory and exercise authority over citizens. Autonomy, however, is the "ability" to achieve specific preferences. Although all political communities pursue these goals, none are able to exercise complete autonomy consistently. Therefore, autonomy is reduced by material limitations, "or by the demands, actions, and constraints of others." (1) For the purpose of this study the autonomy of specific actors, the dependent variable, will be evaluated on a continuum ranging between minimal, partial, and substantive. It is important to remember, however, that questions of autonomy are also applicable to domestic actors within the state. If government or sectoral interests are relegated to process considerations, such as consultations, as opposed to directly contributing to policy outcomes, this suggests a minimal level of impact.

Unfortunately, the literature on Canada and the BSE crisis does not fully engage these measures of analysis. Amanda Whitfield, for example, analyzed Canadian and American responses to the outbreak of BSE in Britain during the 1990s and concluded that Ottawa failed to prioritize this issue, due to pressure from domestic industry. (2) From a historical perspective, Ian MacLachlan also examined the integration of Canada's cattle-beef "value added chain" from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century. (3) Other contributions focused on the positive and negative implications of an integrated North American cattle and beef industry. Linda Young and John Marsh concluded that North American integration limited options for Canadian policy makers. (4) Kate O'Neill reinforced this point by highlighting Canada's asymmetrical market dependence on the US in this sector. (5) Alexander Moens, on the other hand, persuasively argued that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) played a critical role in restoring cross-border trade and confronting protectionist pressures in Congress by stressing scientific approaches and rationales. (6) Geoffrey Hale has also suggested that market realities facilitated pragmatic cooperation between Canadian and American officials seeking harmonized North American science-based rules. (7) Finally, Robert Wolfe, who highlighted discussions between Canadian and American trade officials on this issue within the Appellate Body of the WTO, has emphasized transnational bureaucratic cooperation. (8)

III. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

International Markets: Mexico and Asia