AccessMyLibrary provides FREE access to over 30 million articles from top publications available through your library.
Create a link to this page
Copy and paste this link tag into your Web page or blog:
This article is dedicated to the memory of Dr C. Robert Roll, a great friend and a scholar.
Nothing is too wonderful to be true.
--Kay Redfield Jamison
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Introduction
Modern warfare has evolved from conflicts dominated by massed manpower, the so-called first generation of modern (post-Westphalian) war, to a warfare that has integrated political, social, economical, and technological issues. A recent National Defense University study maps this evolution from first generation warfare, culminating in the Napoleonic Wars, to second-generation wars dominated by firepower. Third generation war was the new maneuver tactics developed by the Germans in World War II. Unconventional enemy, in terms of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, dominates the fourth generation. (1) In fourth generation warfare, the nation-states no longer hold a monopoly on weapon systems and may be involved in long conflicts with stateless enemies. Although insurgency is not new (dating back over two millennium) (2) the political features of insurgency have become a predominate character of modern insurgents. Advances in information technology also have had a revolutionary impact in these types of warfare.
A constant throughout the history of warfare has been the central role of logistics in the successful prosecution of any conflict. However, the 20th century logistical system lagged behind rapidly changing technology and tremendous efforts were put into the scientific study of logistics. Most of the early supply systems operated on a push concept rather than in response to actual needs and changes. It was thought that having an abundance of resources in theater ensured that combat support (CS) elements would be able to provide everything needed to achieve the desired operational effects. In practice, the presence of mountains of supplies did not always ensure warfighters' demands were met. In fact, the backlog of war materiel congested the CS system because of inefficiencies in the transportation system and the prioritization processes. It was evident that a more comprehensive capability was needed for matching CS assets to warfighter needs. In the past, prediction and responsiveness have been viewed as competing concepts. However, in this article, we argue that both are necessary and can be integrated within a command and control system to create military sense and respond capabilities.