Ending The Cuban Exception.(Jorge Castaneda; POINT OF VIEW)(Viewpoint essay)

For Cuba and all Latin America, it is unacceptable for Raol Castro to follow a China model.

The resignation of Fidel Castro from two of his three jobs in Cuba, together with the appointment of his brother as his successor, marks the end of an era--sort of. Raol Castro replaced the elder Castro as president of the Councils of Ministers and of State, but, for now anyway, Fidel remains first secretary of the powerful Cuban Communist Party. And in a remarkable scene worthy of the glory years of Stalinist rule in the former Soviet Union, Raol asked permission from the island "Parliament" to consult with Fidel on all major issues, and was authorized to do so by all 643 members, with no votes against or abstentions.

So as long as the founder of the Cuban revolution is around--writing, meeting foreign dignitaries, weighing in on issues like ethanol and the U.S. presidential election--two things will be clear. First, Raol will be barely able to budge on even the modest economic or regulatory reforms he hopes, somewhat naively, will put food back on Cubans' tables. Second, the younger Castro will be unable to replace the old guard in the top jobs with members of a younger generation. His successor in the armed forces is 72; his vice president is 77. But pushing them into retirement would give their replacements an edge in the next succession, when Raol, 76, passes on. The brothers do not necessarily agree on who should come next.

The succession arrangement the Castros designed years ago has the advantage of stability and predictability. With the exception of a few optimists and hotheads, few Cuba watchers gave any credence to the possibility that one Castro would not replace the other. But it also has serious drawbacks, particularly if it drags out almost endlessly, as it has since July 2006, when Fidel fell ill. For now, though, Raol's bet is still on: pursuing a so-called Vietnamese or Chinese solution that includes pro-market economic reforms while allowing the Cuban Communist Party, the Army and the old guard to continue to monopolize political power without any progress on democracy or human rights.

This option is a tempting one in many quarters. For those in the United States who have rightly concluded that the trade embargo and ongoing ostracism of Havana have proved to be both mean and counterproductive for nearly half a century, it is an appealing halfway response that provides an appropriate alibi for moderation. U.S. politicians will simply argue that economic reforms will one day bring political change. For Latin American pragmatists, always ...