Does counseling need the mind?(Report)

In this article, the author argues that the language used in counseling practice is largely a common sense language using mentalistic words. Basic mentalistic assumptions and challenges to those assumptions are outlined. The practical consequences of retaining or discarding mentalism in counseling are discussed. The author concludes that mentalistic language persists in counseling practice because it offers a useful vocabulary, but that the counseling field could benefit from adopting a path similar to that used in the cognitive sciences.

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By recent counts, there are hundreds of approaches to counseling (Ivey, D'Andrea, Bradford Ivey, & Simek-Morgan, 2002). One common thread uniting most approaches is that counseling is largely a verbal enterprise. The primary tools used in counseling are the words exchanged between clients and their counselors. Counselors talk with clients in the fervent hope that their clients' lives will somehow improve. In doing so, counselors and clients use words like think, or remember, or self to refer to constructs within counseling practice and then typically begin a course of action based on these constructs. Before attempting any course of action within the counseling process, however, it might be beneficial for the parties involved to pay closer attention to the assumptions implicit in the language of counseling. The purpose of this article is to first examine the mentalistic assumptions underlying counseling practice and then to explore the practical consequences of retaining or discarding such mentalism.

Mentalism in Counseling Language

Several theorists have argued that the use of mental language is pervasive in Western culture (Gergen, 1999; Uttal, 2000; Westerman, 2005). As Gergen stated, "The language of the mind plays a pivotal role in Western cultural life" (p. 225). Mental language is readily apparent in a number of knowledge disciplines. According to Uttal (2000), "Our literature, our therapies (both medical and psychological), our commerce, our religions, in fact all aspects of our lives are expressed in terms of personal awareness" (p. 64). Gergen similarly stated, "Disciplines such as psychology, anthropology history and the like carry the culture's traditions on their shoulders. They keep the language of the mind alive" (p. 226).

Counseling is one such discipline that keeps the language of the mind alive. Counseling language tends to be mentalistic in nature. The words and concepts used within counseling reflect reference to mental states that are assumed to exist within the person. Counselors frequently reference these mental states without awareness of so doing. In a general sense, counselors use words such as think, feel, remember, and self in such a way as to imply the existence of internal mental states. This use of mentalistic language is readily apparent in the diagnostic categories of counseling. For example, a counselor may describe someone who binge eats as "having an eating disorder." Similarly, a client who frequently expresses feelings of sadness and hopelessness may be described as having "depression." The implication is that a disorder is something the client possesses and presumably possesses within the mind.

The use of mentalistic language in counseling invariably creates a condition wherein counselors focus their intervention efforts first at identifying and then somehow altering the mental state that has resulted in the client's current difficulty. Counseling interventions may focus on identifying feelings, desires, wishes, goals, beliefs, or other internal states that preceded the presenting problem. With the exception of behavioral modification, most counseling approaches seem to focus their interventions on the mental state rather than on the behavioral manifestations of that state. This certainly seems true for counseling approaches stemming from psychodynamic and humanistic theories (Plaud, 2001; J. M. Russell, 1980). Yet, even so-called cognitive-behavioral counselors are prone to using such an approach. For example, a central tenet of rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT) is that it is their beliefs about events that cause human beings to become disturbed, not the events themselves (Ellis, 1995). Plaud stated of REBT, "In other words, maladaptive thoughts cause maladaptive feelings. This is a very typical mentalistic analysis, focusing on the covert thoughts that are hypothesized to underlie and therefore cause psychopathology" (p. 1099). Likewise, in Beck's (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) cognitive therapy of depression, it is asserted that "an individual's affect and behavior are largely determined by the way in which he structures the world" (p. 3). From this perspective, an individual's ways of structuring the world can sometimes become distorted. If such distortion exists, then "correction of these faulty dysfunctional constructs can lead to clinical improvement" (Beck et al., p. 8). The point is not to criticize the efficacy of these various counseling approaches, but to highlight their reliance on mentalism.